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Philosophy 
Stony Brook University 
2016 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. 
Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of 
Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical 
challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part 
through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's 
interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the project of 
philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their 
own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges 
that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many 
skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this 
reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., 
Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own 
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The philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel is often suspected of an unrelenting dogmatism. It 
appears that Hegel continually refuses to take the necessary steps to justify even his core 
philosophical claims. For all of the effort that Hegel takes to construct his intricate philosophical 
system, it appears that he never seriously questions whether it has any bearing on empirical 
reality. Similarly, in his engagement with texts in the history of philosophy, Hegel seems 
unwilling to read these texts on their own terms, insisting instead on reading them in light of his 
own philosophical project. Indeed, it would appear that Hegel foists his philosophical system 
onto whatever object he examines, each laid to waste by his stubborn drive toward totality. As 
such, it can easily seem to readers that Hegel’s philosophy lacks any sensitivity to the limits of 
human cognition and, therefore, marks an unfortunate regression to pre-Critical metaphysics.  
This reputation, however, is undeserved. Upon careful examination of his work, one finds 
that Hegel takes questions of justification very seriously and indeed goes to great lengths to 
justify each part of his philosophical system. This is especially hard to miss when one considers 
Hegel’s careful engagement with the traditional problems of skepticism which raise difficult 
questions about the possibility of knowledge. Indeed, in taking up the challenges raised by the 
ancient Pyrrhonists, Hegel takes on arguably the most radical form of skepticism to emerge 
within the Western philosophical tradition. 
The most well-known of Hegel’s treatments of skepticism can be found in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In the 




through on its way toward absolute knowing.1 Similarly, in the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, skepticism appears as a stage in the historical development of the concept of 
philosophy.2 However, in this dissertation, I show that Hegel is in fact engaged with skeptical 
challenges to the possibility of knowledge at nearly every stage of his career. The seriousness of 
Hegel’s concern with skepticism is already evident in the review he writes for the Critical 
Journal in 1802 about the neo-Humean skeptic, Gottlob Ernst Schulze, where he argues that 
“without the determination of the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and without the 
insight that skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy [. . .] all the 
histories, and reports, and new editions of skepticism lead to a dead end.”3 It is here that Hegel 
first articulates what he sees as skepticism's legitimate role within the project of philosophical 
science. This becomes a guiding thread in the development of Hegel’s philosophical project 
thereafter, as this dissertation aims to show.  
 Hence, one finds the topic of skepticism at issue throughout Hegel’s corpus. This is, as I 
argue, because it is in part by grappling with the problems of skepticism that Hegel develops his 
system of philosophy.4 It is not simply that he subjects his system to skeptical challenges in order 
to demonstrate its legitimacy, nor that he perfects his system prior to his encounter with the 
                                                          
1 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 123-26. 
 
2 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6, Volume II: Greek Philosophy, trans. Robert F. 
Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 294-316. 
 
3 G.W.F. Hegel, "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and 
Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One," in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of 
Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 323. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically as RSP. 
 
4 In Philosophie des Remis: der junge Hegel und das ‘Gespenst des Skeptizismus,’” Klaus Vieweg convincingly 
shows the significance of skepticism for Hegel's early intellectual development. The present treatment adds to 
Vieweg's important study by showing that skeptical concerns about the possibility of knowledge continue to 
influence Hegel throughout his career. See Klaus Vieweg, Philosophie des Remis: der junge Hegel und das 




skeptical tradition. Rather, I argue, his philosophical project develops as he thinks through 
skeptical challenges and grapples with the difficult questions these pose about the possibility of 
knowledge.5  
 Michael Forster argues in his popular study, Hegel and Skepticism, that Hegel 
specifically designed his philosophical system around the epistemological concerns raised within 
the skeptical tradition. While I agree with Forster that Hegel's system grew out of an attempt to 
think through these classic epistemological concerns, I find it misleading to suggest that Hegel's 
primary interest in considering these arguments was to construct "an elaborate network of 
defenses erected to protect his philosophical system against them."6 I take issue with Forster's 
claim for two reasons. First, to suggest that Hegel sought to protect his system from skeptical 
challenges is to suppose that he had already devised his system prior to his encounter with the 
skeptics. I find this claim to be untenable on both historical and philosophical grounds. Second, 
if Hegel was concerned to protect his system against skepticism, he was only able to accomplish 
this task through integrating skeptical arguments into his system. To recognize that Hegel's 
strategy for meeting the epistemological challenges raised by the skeptics involves the 
integration of these challenges into his system is, however, already to acknowledge that he was 
not simply concerned with overcoming these difficulties. 
While Hegel’s continual engagement with skepticism shows him to be deeply concerned 
with classic epistemological problems, this is not the only way that skepticism is relevant to his 
                                                          
5 In Hegel's Epistemology, Kenneth R. Westphal offers an instructive account of how Hegel develops a model of 
justification that is able to meet the challenge posed by Sextus Empiricus' Dilemma of the Criterion. Sextus' 
challenge, in brief, is to develop a non-dogmatic criterion for the evaluation of all claims to knowledge. Westphal 
shows in his study how Hegel attempts to answer this difficulty in the Phenomenology of Spirit; however, in this 
project he does not acknowledge the important steps that Hegel takes to address this same difficulty in the Science of 
Logic. See especially Chapter Five in Kenneth R. Westphal, Hegel's Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to 
the Phenomenology of Spirit (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).   
 




philosophical project. One of the goals of this dissertation is to show how it is that the 
problematic of skepticism comes to hold important metaphysical ramifications for Hegel. These 
ramifications are two-fold. On the one hand, Hegel finds that although the skeptics are concerned 
to contest any claim concerning the fundamental nature of reality, a careful consideration of their 
arguments reveals certain basic metaphysical commitments implicit in them. On the other hand, 
Hegel finds that such commitments actually do tell us something true about the structure of what 
is. While many commentators are understandably reluctant to acknowledge the metaphysical 
dimensions of Hegel's philosophical project, I argue that his engagement with skepticism makes 
it quite clear that he does not think that the project of metaphysics, that is, the project of laying 
bare the fundamental nature of reality, is as hopeless as it seems – especially given the fact that it 
is through this engagement that he comes to deny the existence of any sort of mind-independent 
reality and to affirm the dialectical unity of thinking and being.  
In this respect too, this dissertation offers a perspective on Hegel’s engagement with 
skepticism that is in contrast to the one offered by Michael Forster in Hegel and Skepticism. 
Forster’s concern is largely to show how Hegel's system has a built-in defense against skeptical 
challenges. While Forster recognizes the great epistemological significance that skepticism holds 
for Hegel, what he overlooks is the crucial role it plays in Hegel's speculative metaphysics. 
Forster’s study includes a discussion of how Hegel is able to overcome the epistemological 
difficulties raised by the skeptics through the employment of his "dialectical method," but fails to 




three moments of the dialectic – three moments which, Hegel explains in the Encyclopaedia 
Logic, pertain to "every concept or everything true in general."7  
Moreover, I depart from Forster in arguing that Hegel is not actually concerned with 
refuting skepticism at all. Rather, his interest is in demonstrating its legitimate, if limited, role in 
the project of philosophical science. This is, in fact, what makes Hegel’s exploration of 
skepticism so unique. While many philosophers have attempted to resolve skeptical problems 
and put skeptical worries to rest, Hegel is concerned to show that, while these skeptical 
challenges must be taken seriously, a true philosophy has nothing to fear from them.  
In fact, Hegel shows, the traditional epistemological challenges raised by the skeptics are 
useful for combating dogmatism. By “dogmatism,” skeptics have historically understood the 
holding of beliefs that lack proper justification. For Hegel, however, one contests dogmatic 
claims when one challenges "one-sided" thinking – a form of thinking that clings to the truth of a 
claim to the exclusion of its opposite.8 As such, the contestation of dogmatic claims is, for Hegel, 
necessary for the articulation of what is true. This is what Hegel finds so important about what 
Sextus calls “the chief constitutive principle of skepticism” – that is, the claim that “to every 
account an equal account is opposed.”9 For Hegel, it is the enactment of this principle in the Five 
                                                          
7 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, trans. Klaus 
Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically as ENC. 
 
8 As Hegel explains: "The essence of dogmatism consists in this that it posits something finite, something burdened 
with an opposition (e.g. pure Subject, or pure Object, or in dualism the duality as opposed to the identity) as the 
Absolute; hence Reason shows with respect to this Absolute that it has a relation to what is excluded from it, and 
only exists through and in this relation to another, so that it is not absolute, according to the third trope of 
relationship" (RSP, 335).  
 
9 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, ed. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 




Modes of Agrippa, the most radical skeptical challenges presented by the Pyrrhonists, that made 
these arguments so effective in contesting dogmatism.  
But while Hegel finds skepticism useful – indeed necessary – in this way, it would be a 
mistake to say that Hegel is interested in skepticism only on account of its utility. Historically, 
skepticism has been regarded as a test applied to knowledge-claims. In Descartes’ Meditations 
on First Philosophy, for example, the Meditator famously uses doubt as a methodological tool 
with which to arrive at a non-dogmatic metaphysics. Hegel argues, however, that what is and the 
method by which we grasp what is are one and the same. As such, he suspects a more intimate 
relationship between skepticism and the object of philosophical inquiry. Thus, Hegel does not 
simply accept skepticism’s self-understanding prima facie, allowing, for example, its criteria to 
dictate what true knowledge consists in. In this way, Hegel’s encounter with skepticism should 
be distinguished from skepticism’s role in Descartes’ project. For Hegel, skepticism is not 
simply a philosophical method, a procedure for safeguarding though against the possibility of 
error. Understood properly, skepticism articulates an essential element in the fundamental 
structure of reality.  
Moreover, Hegel rejects the conclusions that skeptics have historically drawn from their 
arguments. The Pyrrhonist who abides by “the chief constitutive principle of skepticism,” for 
example, concludes from the application of this principle to specific knowledge-claims that we 
must suspend judgment on their truth on account of their “equipollence” – that is, on account of 
the equal persuasive power of opposing claims. For Hegel, this misses how the critique of 
dogmatism constitutes a positive advance in the development of knowledge. For the Pyrrhonist, 
the principle of skepticism leads inevitably to a "standstill of the intellect." For Hegel, however, 




point, it turns out, skepticism itself remains beholden to the sort of dogmatic thinking which 
Hegel finds its greatest strength lies in contesting.  
Hence, Hegel finds that skepticism is not opposed to philosophy as such, but only to the 
one-sided claims of dogmatic understanding. In its “inmost heart,” Hegel says, skepticism is “at 
one with every true philosophy.” This is why philosophy has nothing to fear from skepticism and 
needn’t rush to refute its claims, defending at all costs against them. At the same time, I hope 
that this dissertation makes clear that this statement should not be taken to mean that, for Hegel, 
the historical schools of skepticism are, in fact, the apogee of philosophical science. Hegel 
indeed reveals the limits of skepticism in the course of his investigation. In insisting that the 
equipollence of opposing claims should leave us in suspension of judgment and bereft of truth, 
skepticism fails to grasp the truth of its own activity as an aspect of true cognition. This point 
may be lost on skeptics of the past, but it is precisely what speculative philosophy recognizes to 
be at work in skeptical argumentation.  
With this in mind, it will be helpful to clarify the use of the term “skepticism” in this 
project. Following Hegel’s own usage, I occasionally use the term to refer to historical schools of 
skepticism, particularly Pyrrhonism, since this is the historical form of skepticism that most 
interests Hegel. However, in both Hegel’s writing and in this dissertation, the term is used to 
refer not only to historical schools of skepticism or even the forms of consciousness at work in 
them, but also to skepticism understood from the standpoint of reason – a standpoint that none of 
these historical schools, including Pyrrhonism, themselves attain. This distinction is not merely a 
terminological one but a conceptual one that is crucial for the account in this dissertation. In 
arguing for the unity of skepticism and philosophy, Hegel is not arguing that ancient skepticism 




What has an important role in this development is rather the “negatively rational” moment of the 
dialectic exhibited in the Logic. On my account, it is this that Hegel aims to retrieve from the 
skeptical tradition.  
In sum, this dissertation examines Hegel’s persistent effort to comprehend the 
relationship between skepticism and philosophy. This effort involves, on the one hand, a critical 
appropriation of skepticism as a means of challenging dogmatism and, on the other hand, a 
reconstruction of the “chief constitutive principle of skepticism” presented but not fully grasped 
by Sextus and the Pyrrhonists. In this way, I hope to demonstrate that Hegel is indeed sensitive 
to the epistemological concerns cherished by philosophers through the ages but also to the 
metaphysical commitments that underlie these same concerns.  
While the dissertation is primarily a contribution to scholarship on Hegel, I also see it as 
making an important contribution to the conversation about skepticism today. Philosophers today 
usually take one of two positions on skepticism: they regard it as either an insurmountable 
difficulty for human knowledge (motivating, for some, a turn to the necessity of faith or, for 
others, an embrace of irrationalism), or they regard it as a false problem that they can simply 
ignore without consequence. By contrast, in this dissertation I aim to show, first, that we cannot 
afford to ignore these pressing skeptical concerns but, second, that taking the problems of 
skepticism seriously need not lead us to abandon the traditional goals of philosophical thinking. 
Indeed, I argue that it is only through a thorough treatment of these concerns that philosophy can 
meet them, and thus arrive at a more adequate understanding of the world.  
In the first chapter, I take up Hegel’s first sustained engagement with skepticism, the 
1802 article that he wrote for the Critical Journal, on the “Relationship of Skepticism to 




der theoretischen Philosophie, where Schulze accuses Kant of begging the question against 
Hume’s skepticism regarding causality and thus contests the success of Kant’s Critical project. I 
argue that Hegel’s central objection to Schulze is that his critique of Kant rests upon a 
miscomprehension of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy, an error that Hegel 
sees as emerging from Schulze’s presupposition of an opposition between thinking and being. 
Though Hegel’s essay might be understood as a defense of the Kantian project, I argue that his 
objection to Schulze applies to Kant’s Critical project as well. Though Hegel argues that Kant 
sublates the antithesis of thinking and being in the Transcendental Deduction, he finds that Kant 
is inconsistent on this point, upholding this same opposition in, for instance, his refutation of the 
Ontological Proof of God’s existence. Above all, this chapter aims to show how the 1802 essay 
provides Hegel with an opportunity to develop the rudiments of a metaphysical project that takes 
the dialectical unity of thinking and being as its point of departure.  
In the second chapter, I go on to describe how Hegel continues to grapple with skepticism 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is in this work, I argue, that Hegel clarifies the sense of 
skepticism that in the 1802 essay he claims is “at one with every true philosophy.” While Forster 
and other commentators focus on the priority that Hegel gives to ancient skepticism over modern 
skepticism,10 I explain that it is not ancient skepticism that is “at one with every true 
philosophy,” since Hegel calls attention to the persistence of dogmatism even in the Pyrrhonian 
tradition. At first, it would seem that the Pyrrhonists avoid the charge of dogmatism by adhering 
to the “chief constitutive principle of skepticism,” which states that “to every account an equal 
account is opposed.” Nevertheless, I explain, it is precisely this insistence on opposition that, for 
Hegel, makes Pyrrhonism dogmatic. This is because the Pyrrhonists assume the general validity 
                                                          
10 See Michael Forster, "The Superiority of Ancient to Modern Skepticism," in Skeptizismus und spekulatives 




of the principle of non-contradiction by insisting that, of two opposing claims, only one but not 
both can be true. It is on the basis of this assumption that the Pyrrhonists argue, after all, that, 
faced with two opposing claims, one must suspend judgment. Thus, I argue that it is not 
Pyrrhonism that Hegel understands to be one with philosophy but rather the “self-completing 
skepticism” exhibited in the Phenomenology itself, since it rids itself of the dogmatism to which 
even the ancient skeptics had fallen prey.  
In the third chapter, I attempt to shed light on the role of skepticism in Hegel’s 
metaphysics by exploring its role in the Logic, the most mature expression of his thinking. I 
approach this by exploring what Hegel means when he claims in the Encyclopaedia Logic that 
the project attains a status of “total presuppositionlessness"(ENC, §78R). Richard Dien Winfield, 
William Maker, and others have interpreted this as meaning that Hegel has justified the starting-
point of the Logic already in the Phenomenology, using skepticism, as it were, as a propaedeutic 
to philosophy.11 Stephen Houlgate and Robert Stern argue, by contrast, that the Logic 
accomplishes this task immanently.12 On this point, I agree with Houlgate and Stern. However, 
not one of these commentators has questioned whether Hegel actually regards the 
presuppositionless character of the Logic as a formal methodological requirement. This is 
crucial, however, since, were Hegel to regard it as such, then this requirement could clearly be no 
more than a presupposition itself. Thus, in this chapter, I make clear that Hegel does not consider 
the presuppositionless character of the Logic as a formal methodological requirement which this 
                                                          
11 See William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations (Albany: State University of New York Press,1994) and 
Richard Dien Winfield, Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). Dietmar H. Heidemann agrees with Maker and Winfield that the Phenomenology of Spirit is 
meant to justify the starting-point of the Logic, however, he denies that Hegel is successful in this strategy. See 
Dietmar H. Heidemann, "Doubt and Dialectic: Hegel on Logic, Metaphysics, and Skepticism," in The Dimensions of 
Hegel's Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis (London: Continuum, 2010). 
 
12 See Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette: Purdue University 




investigation must satisfy in order to secure its own legitimacy, but rather as a unique 
accomplishment internal to the project of philosophical science itself. In order to clarify this, I 
examine the proof procedure at work in the Logic – a procedure which Hegel describes in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic as “rational proof.” Unlike in most arguments, in a “rational proof,” the 
result of an inquiry is not taken to depend upon certain presuppositions granted at the outset, 
whose validity is determined external to the inquiry itself. Rather, there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the presuppositions of an inquiry and its result. The presuppositions are, in 
some sense, derived from the result itself. It is in this sense, I argue, that the Logic is 
presuppositionless. In clarifying this, I hope to make clear that skepticism is not a propaedeutic 
to philosophy for Hegel but a moment through which philosophical science itself develops. This, 
I suggest, is what Hegel means when he claims that the second moment of the dialectic, “when 
taken in isolation by the understanding, constitutes skepticism” (ENC, §81R). 
 In the fourth chapter, I show how Hegel extends the conclusions he arrived at through his 
engagement with skepticism to defend the project of “philosophical history” from historicist 
concerns regarding the possibility of historical knowledge. The historicist’s insight is to 
recognize that all knowledge is a product of a particular historical age. But this insight gives rise 
to doubt about the historian’s ability to obtain an unmediated grasp of the past. This doubt 
mirrors the Pyrrhonian insistence that only knowledge that does not appear under particular 
conditions can be regarded as true. The chapter examines how this doubt may be raised against 
Hegel’s own interpretations of the history of philosophy. In his reading of Plato’s Parmenides, 
for example, Hegel interprets the work as an forerunner of speculative philosophy, prefiguring 
the account of speculative philosophy that Hegel himself develops later on. The historicist, 




ancient text. I argue, however, that such doubts are misplaced, since the point of Hegel’s 
“philosophical history” is not to recover the original intentions of past authors (e.g., Plato’s 
intention in writing the Parmenides) but to grasp what is at work in the text as a moment in the 
historical development of the concept of philosophy. I clarify that Hegel’s position here is not to 
deny that mediation is at work in historical knowledge, but to contest the historicist’s claim that 
legitimate knowledge of the past can only come to light if the historian is able to transcend their 
own historical situation. Just as in Hegel’s treatment of skepticism, Hegel’s strategy here rests 
upon the insight that immediacy and mediation are not mutually exclusive, as the Pyrrhonists 
presume, but two sides of the same rational process. Thus, Hegel’s response to the historicist’s 
doubt about the possibility of historical knowledge mirrors his treatment of skepticism: in both 






















"It cannot be denied," Fichte once observed, "that philosophical reason owes every 
noticeable advance it has ever made to the observations of skepticism upon the precariousness of 
the position where it has for the moment come to rest."13 Although Fichte evidently had in mind 
Kant's famous confession in the Prolegomena that it was Hume's challenge to causality that 
roused him from his "dogmatic slumber,"14 his claim deeply resonates with Hegel's early 
confrontation with skepticism as well. If the problematic of skepticism provided Kant with an 
opportunity to achieve a "noticeable advance" in philosophical cognition by inspiring his 
restriction of metaphysics to objects of possible experience, it offered Hegel a similar 
opportunity – an opportunity to articulate a new vision of metaphysics which, ironically, would 
challenge the basic presuppositions of Critical Philosophy. In his 1802 article for the Critical 
Journal, "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," Hegel offers his first and most sustained 
treatment of the philosophical significance of skepticism. While the piece is ostensibly written as 
a review of Gottlob Ernst Schulze's newly published Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie, a 
skeptical attack on Kant’s Critical Philosophy, especially as it is presented by Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold in his “Philosophy of the Elements,” Hegel's essay far exceeds this task, advancing the 
                                                          
13 J.G. Fichte, "Review of Aenesidemus," in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian 
Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 137.  
 
14 “I freely admit that the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my 
dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy.” 
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will be Able to Come Forward as Science: With 




bold claim that "skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy."15 At 
first blush, such a statement would hardly seem to set Hegel apart from the likes of Kant, for 
whom a certain brand of skepticism served the important critical function of curtailing the 
dogmatic excesses of classical metaphysics.16 Hegel, however, puts skepticism to a considerably 
different purpose, reserving a privileged place for the latter in a metaphysical framework which, 
as we will see, is decisively non-Kantian.  
 It is my goal in this chapter to demonstrate how Hegel's estimation of the philosophical 
significance of skepticism emerges as a central feature of the metaphysical account he develops 
in the course of his 1802 essay. Although Hegel's discussion of this relationship is ostensibly 
offered in this essay as a rejoinder to Schulze's Neo-Humean attack on Critical Philosophy, we 
will see that his account also has important implications for the project of transcendental 
idealism itself, suggesting that access to the supersensible remains possible despite Kant's 
protests to the contrary. While Hegel sees skepticism as occupying a legitimate role within the 
project of philosophical science, he explains that previous thinkers have failed to recognize this, 
viewing the relationship between skepticism and philosophy instead as an opposition between 
two conflicting epistemic positions. This error, he suggests, can be attributed to these thinkers' 
failure to grasp another, closely related relationship: the ontological relationship of thinking and 
                                                          
15 G.W.F. Hegel, "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and 
Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One," in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of 
Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1985), 322-23. Hereafter cited parenthetically as RSP. 
 
16 "This is the great utility of the skeptical way of treating the questions that pure reason puts to pure reason; by 
means of it one can with little expense exempt oneself from a great deal of dogmatic rubbish, and put in its place a 
sober critique, which, as a true cathartic, will happily purge such delusions along with the punditry attendant on 
them." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), A 486/B514. All references are to the Academy edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 





being. For Hegel, this more basic relationship, upon which the epistemic distinction between 
skepticism and philosophy is grounded, is also a relationship of unity, as we shall soon see. It is 
from this standpoint – the standpoint according to which thinking and being form a dialectical 
unity – that Hegel articulates what he considers the "true relationship of skepticism to 
philosophy" (RSP, 322) to consist in, and accordingly, from this standpoint that he criticizes 
Schulze's dogmatic skepticism and contests the apparent success of Kant's critique of 
metaphysics. As we shall see, however, Hegel's case for the assumption of this standpoint – at 
least, at this stage in his thinking – is not invulnerable to skeptical difficulties. In Part One, I will 
show that Hegel's complaint that this "latest form" of skepticism offered by Schulze 
misunderstands its intimate place within philosophy takes its lead from Hegel's own emergent 
insight into the dialectical unity of thinking and being. Then, in Part Two, I will demonstrate that 
the heart of Hegel's objections to Schulzean skepticism can be applied mutatis mutandis to Kant's 
Critical Philosophy – a point of which Hegel was no doubt aware in penning his review of 
Schulze's Kritik. Finally, after considering some of the implications of this essay's portrayal of 
the relationship of skepticism and philosophy, along with that of thinking and being, for Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy, I will conclude with an analysis of Hegel's argumentative strategy in the 
1802 essay.       
 
 
Part One: Hegel's Critique of Schulze  
 "Without the determination of the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and 




and hence that there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both 
at once, without this," Hegel cautions, "all the histories, and reports, and new editions of 
skepticism lead to a dead end" (RSP, 322-23). Though Hegel mobilizes a whole host of 
objections against Schulze's Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie, his entire discussion in the 
Skepticism essay springs from this one basic point – that any account of skepticism will 
ultimately prove fruitless unless it comprehends the "true" relationship of skepticism and 
philosophy, which, as Hegel insists, is properly one of unity. This is a point, however, which 
Schulze – and many with him in the Western philosophical tradition – fails to appreciate. In 
Schulze's effort to resuscitate Hume’s skepticism concerning causality in the wake of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, he is led to identify philosophy with dogmatism, so that he can only 
conceive of philosophy and skepticism as standing in a relationship of opposition, rather than in 
a relationship of unity. As we will see, however, Schulze's conflation of philosophy with 
dogmatism is the direct result of a deeper metaphysical commitment to the non-identity of 
thinking and being. 
In his anonymously published 1792 work, Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations 
of the Philosophy of the Elements Issued by Professor Reinhold in Jena Together with a Defence 
of Skepticism Against the Pretentions of the Critique of Reason, Schulze raised a number of 
skeptical objections concerning the success of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and its elaboration by 
Karl Leonhard Reinhold – objections which Schulze would refine over the next nine years, 
culminating in the 1801 publication of his Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie. Some of these 
objections were exclusively directed at Reinhold’s attempt to ground Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
on a universally valid, self-evident first principle, which according to Reinhold, philosophy 




calls the “proposition of consciousness,” which states that “in consciousness, the subject 
distinguishes the representation from the subject and the object and relates the representation to 
both.”17 It is the status of Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness as first principle that Schulze 
calls into question in his Aenesidemus and later in his Kritik. While Reinhold understood this 
proposition to concern the logical conditions of consciousness, Schulze takes the proposition as 
an empirical description instead. Finding this description to be arbitrary, he argues that it cannot 
constitute the self-evident first principle for philosophy that Reinhold was after.  
In addition to the concern with Reinhold’s appropriation of Kant, Schulze’s more general 
concern is with the project of epistemology itself. For Schulze, the project of epistemology fails 
to live up to its own standards. It attempts to secure knowledge by ridding itself of all 
presuppositions. However, it fails to make good on this aspiration, since, it inevitably 
presupposes the category of causality in offering a causal explanation of the origins of our 
representations. Thus, as Frederick Beiser points out, for Schulze, “the whole enterprise of 
epistemology cannot get off of the ground because of Hume’s skepticism about causality.”18  
This is one problem Schulze finds with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant claims to 
have undercut Hume’s skepticism concerning the necessary connection between cause and 
effect. However, in relying upon the causal principle in order to establish the principle’s 
objective validity, Schulze argues, Kant ends up begging the question against Hume, 
presupposing precisely what he must prove. Moreover, Schulze finds that Kant violates his own 
critical method. For Kant, the category of causality can only be legitimately applied to 
                                                          
17 Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen, Bd. 1, ed. 
Faustino Fabbianell (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2003), 167. 
 
18 Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard 




propositions about objects of possible experience. Schulze argues that Kant violates this rule, 
however, when he employs the causal principle in locating the ultimate causes of our 
representations of objects in the human mind.  
However, for Schulze, a deeper, more fundamental problem remains – namely, the 
implication that we can know reality outside of how it appears to us. Kant’s argument ascribes an 
ultimate, mind-independent reality to the principle of causality as well as those things that he 
argues cause our mental representations. Following Hume, though, Schulze insists that we 
cannot extrapolate from appearances to this kind of reality. To do so, in fact, would mean failing 
to make the most fundamental epistemological distinction – the distinction between thinking and 
being, conceptuality and objectivity. Kant’s theoretical philosophy does just this, however, by 
attempting to speak to the cause of our mental representations, striving after, as Schulze says, the 
"highest and unconditioned causes of all conditioned things,"19 endeavoring to penetrate to the 
realm of the "in-itself" solely through the powers of the human intellect. 
Schulze’s description of a dogmatic mode of inquiry untroubled by the distinction 
between concept and object may be appropriate of Leibniz, Wolff, and some other of Kant's 
predecessors in the rationalist tradition. To continue to conceive of theoretical philosophy in this 
manner after the Critique of Pure Reason, however, is to fail to comprehend what was truly 
innovative about this project – its insistence that a cognition of objects only becomes possible 
once we renounce all hope of securing knowledge of a mind-independent reality, limiting our 
theoretical ambitions solely to objects of possible experience. Crucial to Kant's innovation was 
his notion of the "thing-in-itself." Rather than separate the subject from the object and regard the 
                                                          




impressions one encounters in sense experience as issuing directly from the thing, Kant 
subverted this view of human cognition by developing a model which distinguishes both the 
subject from her representations and these same representations again from the objects to which 
they presumably refer. On this model, the object of cognition is not regarded as something 
external to consciousness, upon which our concepts and judgments are arbitrarily superimposed, 
but rather is taken to be something which, though encountered within consciousness, is not 
reducible to the latter – something which we construct by combining what is given in intuition by 
an ostensibly exterior source according to the a priori rules provided by the understanding. It 
was this inscrutable source exterior to consciousness, which presumably supplies the matter for 
cognition, that Kant understood by the "thing-in-itself," and it was by positing this "problematic 
concept" in contradistinction to our objects of cognition that he was able to establish for 
metaphysics the “secure course of a science” (CPR, Bxviii). Unfortunately, Schulze seems to 
have misunderstood this all-important role of the "thing-in-itself" in Kant's revision of 
metaphysics. He mistook Kant’s second-order investigation into the logical conditions for 
synthetic a priori propositions for a first-order inquiry into the causes of our mental 
representations. Schulze’s fundamental mistake was in thinking that Kant regarded the “thing-in-
itself” as the cause of our representations rather than as a limit concept that marks the bounds of 
human cognition. Hegel draws attention to precisely this error when he complains in the 
Skepticism essay that Schulze cannot conceive of the “thing-in-itself” in any other way than as 
“a rock underneath the snow” (RSP, 318). As he goes on to show, however, Schulze's inability to 
conceive of Kant's "thing-in-itself" in any way other than as the hyperphysical reality which 
while remaining inaccessible to our cognitive powers, nevertheless constitutes the true object of 




ultimately rooted in a misguided conception of the relationship of thinking and being – one that, 
for Hegel, is reflective of a dogmatic form of skepticism.  
 Hegel never engages the details of Schulze's critique of theoretical philosophy. This is 
presumably because he thinks that only one of Schulze's objections is worth considering – an 
objection which, ironically, Kant had earlier used in the Critique of Pure Reason in order to 
refute the Ontological Proof of God's existence. Later on, when we consider the fate of Kant's 
critical project in light of Hegel's critique of Schulze, we will have occasion to return to this 
argument once more. For now, however, let us briefly examine the contours of Kant's objection 
to the Ontological Proof in order to illuminate the metaphysical presuppositions Hegel sees at 
work in Schulze's repetition of this argument. As we shall see, if the Ontological Proof 
constitutes for Schulze and Kant the paradigm of dogmatism, to the degree that it posits the 
identification of concept and object, in Hegel's estimation, Kant and Schulze's refutation of this 
same argument exemplifies dogmatic skepticism, insofar as it insists on the opposition of 
thinking and being.  
 The Ontological Proof, at the most basic level, infers the existence of God from the 
concept of an absolutely necessary being – or, in Kant's language, it attempts to demonstrate that 
existence is a "real predicate" that is nevertheless analytically contained in the concept of the ens 
realissimum. The basic problem with such reasoning, Kant holds, is that "being is obviously not 
a real predicate" determinative of things, but is rather a logical function through which we posit a 
given predicate as belonging to a subject – that is, "merely the copula in a judgment" (CPR, 
A598/B626). Thus, the copula in the statement "God is omnipotent" expresses an objectively 
necessary connection inhering in the proposition between the concepts "God" and 




in question to which the predicate "omnipotence" may be attached. Accordingly, Kant argues 
that while it may be impossible, on pain of contradiction, to demonstrate that the predicate 
"omnipotence" does not apply to the subject "God," since the former is analytically contained in 
the latter, no contradiction arises in saying "God is not," as the subject is cancelled along with all 
of its predicates, so that "there is no longer anything that could be contradicted" (CPR, 
A594/B622). It is easy to see here that Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof trades on the 
opposition of thinking and being insofar as it denies that we can ever establish more than the 
mere possible existence of an object through conceptual analysis and insists that knowledge-
claims must be restricted to objects of possible experience. As we saw a moment ago, this 
restriction of knowledge to objects of possible experience was in part made possible by Kant's 
introduction of the "thing-in-itself;" interestingly enough, however, Schulze makes use of Kant's 
line of argument in his refutation of the Ontological Proof in order to charge Kant himself with 
confusing concept and object in his deduction of the categories as part of a larger strategy to 
show that Kant's response to Hume was simply a case of petitio principii. Schulze's basic 
argument runs as follows: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant strives to uncover the true 
ground of synthetic a priori judgments; (2) Kant concludes that the mind is the true lawgiver of 
nature since he finds that the mind must be thought of this way; (3) by "inferring from the 
constitution of something as it is in our representations its objective constitution outside us,"20 
Kant is guilty not only of violating his own central critical tenet that knowledge-claims can only 
legitimately be made of objects of possible experience, but also, in so doing, of begging the 
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question against Humean skepticism. Now, there are several problems with Schulze's application 
of Kant’s refutation of the Ontological Proof to the Transcendental Deduction, but the problem 
with which Hegel is most concerned is the one we have already introduced above: Schulze's 
misinterpretation of the "thing-in-itself" as the transcendentally real21 entity after which 
theoretical philosophy vainly strives. Hegel summarizes Schulze’s critique:  
To begin with, “things” are opposed to “cognition” within [the context of] Reason 
here; and secondly an explanation of its origin [is asked for], and therewith the 
causal relationship is dragged in; the ground of cognition, then, is something other 
than what is grounded, the former the concept, the latter the thing, and when once 
this basically false picture of rational thinking is presupposed, then there is 
nothing further to be done, except to repeat for ever that ground and grounded, 
concept and thing are different modes; that all rational cognition aims just to 
pluck a being out of thinking, existence out of concepts… (RSP, 341).  
To “pluck a being out of thinking” in this context is to illicitly infer the existence of some object 
from a representation. This, of course, is to assume that objects are separate from representations. 
Thus, behind Schulze’s misapplication of Kant’s argument lies his inability to conceive of the 
“thing-in-itself” outside of the antithesis of thinking and being – precisely the antithesis that Kant 
sought to overcome in the Transcendental Deduction. While it is true that Kant appeals to the 
antithesis of thinking and being in his refutation of the Ontological Proof, the Transcendental 
Deduction is hardly guilty of the illicit inference from concept to object that Kant once imputed 
to Descartes. Indeed, the very point of the deduction is to show how a priori concepts can be 
referred to objects of experience without resorting to such apparently fallacious reasoning. 
Nevertheless, because Schulze holds the antithesis of thinking and being, concept and object, to 
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be absolute, he simply cannot countenance the possibility that "there is a philosophy which is 
neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once" (RSP, 323).  
 We are now in the position to make sense of Hegel's complaint that Schulze fails to grasp 
the "true relationship of skepticism to philosophy." Because Schulze takes it as axiomatic that an 
unbridgeable gulf separates the order of thinking from the order of being and, accordingly, that 
any effort to join the two must proceed by way of the illicit (because merely conceptual) 
inference from concept to object, he can only echo the ancient skeptics Sextus Empiricus' 
apparently exclusive disjunction between dogmatism and skepticism,22 failing to grasp their 
unity in what Hegel alternately calls here "philosophy," "rational cognition," or simply "Reason." 
When we turn to our discussion of Kant in Part Two in order to show how Hegel's appraisal of 
skepticism leads him to depart from the Kantian framework, we will offer a sustained analysis of 
how Hegel envisages the unity of dogmatism and skepticism in "philosophy." At the present 
moment, however, we will limit our discussion of this relationship to what emerges through 
Hegel's criticism of Schulze's position.  
 In view of the fact that Hegel traces Schulze's opposition of skepticism to philosophy to 
his insistence on the antithesis of thinking and being, one might suppose that it is merely 
Schulze's misconstrual of this latter relationship that elicits Hegel's criticism. But this would be 
to overlook the fact that Hegel views skepticism – conceived here in terms of the antithesis of 
thinking and being – as occupying a legitimate place within genuine philosophical cognition. The 
problem is not that Schulze holds fast to the opposition of thinking and being, but that he fails to 
recognize how, in philosophy, this opposition is united with its opposite – that is, with the 
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identity of thinking and being. In attempting to justify the opposition of thinking and being 
which, as we have just seen, lies at the basis of his critique of theoretical philosophy, Schulze 
unwittingly presupposes their simple unity in the "facts of consciousness." This patent 
inconsistency, however, only confirms for Hegel that Schulze is incapable of grasping the "truth 
of Reason."    
 According to Hegel, Schulze's skepticism includes both a "negative" and a "positive" side 
– the former being concerned with the "destruction of the brain-children of the dogmatists, and 
their attempts to achieve cognition of the existence of hyperphysical things" (RSP, 318), and the 
latter with offering justification for the position from which this attack is undertaken. Rather than 
following the Pyrrhonian strategy of avoiding all knowledge-claims and reporting instead solely 
on how things appear, Schulze attempts to ground his position in apparently indubitable "facts of 
consciousness." Employing a line of reasoning that draws on Descartes' argument for the Cogito, 
Schulze contends that "the existence of what is given within the compass of our consciousness 
has undeniable certainty; for since it is present in our consciousness," he continues,  
we can doubt the certainty of it no more than we can doubt consciousness itself; 
and to want to doubt consciousness is absolutely impossible, because any such 
doubt would destroy itself since it cannot occur apart from consciousness, and 
hence it would be nothing; what is given in and with consciousness, we call an 
actual fact of consciousness; it follows that the facts of consciousness are 
undeniably actual, what all philosophical speculations must be related to, and 
what is to be explained or made comprehensible through these speculations 
(Quoted in RSP, 318).          
As we read on, it becomes clear that these facts, whose absolute certainty is evidently secured by 
the indubitable character of consciousness itself, pertain not to my existence qua res cogitans, 
but rather to the existence of external objects; indeed, from such facts we learn simply that sense 




stands in stark contrast to Descartes' line of argument in the Meditations, which begins by calling 
into question the "entire testimony of the senses" precisely in order to upset that practical 
certainty we ascribe to the judgments of everyday life – the very same certainty to which Schulze 
now appeals in order to contest the claims of theoretical philosophy. The "conscious-fact 
philosophy," through which Schulze attempts to ground his division between consciousness and 
what lies inaccessibly exterior to it, amounts, then, to little more than a form of naïve realism, 
which bluntly affirms the undeniable certainty of what is given through the senses. As Hegel 
points out, however, such a crude model of cognition will be at pains to countenance, let alone 
justify, the "negative side" of Schulze's skepticism: "in view of this absolute certainty that things 
exist (and certainty of how they exist) how," Hegel asks, "can it at the same time be the case that 
it is not self-explanatory that they are and that they are what they are?" (RSP, 319). Moreover, to 
the degree that it posits the unity of thinking and being in the "facts of consciousness" in 
maintaining that the latter make us immediately and undeniably aware of what we encounter in 
sense experience, Hegel contends in a line of argument presaging his later remarks on "sense-
certainty" in the Phenomenology that Schulze's skepticism surreptitiously appeals to the very 
position it would like to rebuff:  
Now what else does Mr. Schulze ground the indubitable certainty of the facts of 
consciousness upon, then, but the absolute identity of thought and being, of the 
concept and the thing? – and then again in an instant he explains that the 
subjective, the image, and the objective, the thing are of different species (RSP, 
342).23  
                                                          
23 Cf. Hegel's strikingly similar remark in paragraph 109 of the Phenomenology of Spirit: "It is clear that the 
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Nevertheless, this "complete contradiction" does not lead Schulze to reexamine his position 
concerning the relationship of skepticism to philosophy; indeed, in Hegel's estimation, this 
inconsistency only confirms the fact that "a true philosophy is infinitely more skeptical than this 
skepticism (RSP, 323)," since the latter flatly denies, against the "truth of Reason," that it bears 
any sort of relation to what it excludes – a move which Hegel at one point identifies as the very 
"essence of dogmatism."24  
 I therefore take the core of Hegel's critique of Schulze to consist in the following:  
if in any one proposition that expresses a cognition of Reason, its reflected aspect 
– the concepts that are contained in it – is isolated, and the way that they are 
bound together is considered, it must become evident that these concepts are 
together sublated, or in other words they are united in such a way, that they 
contradict themselves; otherwise it would not be a proposition of Reason but only 
of understanding (RSP, 324).  
In other words, Schulze fails to recognize that philosophy (or "Reason") expresses the fact that 
skepticism (which is predicated upon the opposition of thinking and being) and dogmatism 
(which assumes their simple identity) are united precisely to the extent that they contradict one 
another. To recognize this fact – that is, that two terms within an opposition are not merely 
opposed to one another, but also united by virtue of this relationship – is what Hegel means here 
by "sublation."25 We will return to Hegel's conception of contradiction later in Part Two. For 
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25 Hegel offers a helpful explanation of this term in a remark on Becoming in the Science of Logic: "To sublate and 
being sublated (the idealized) constitute one of the most important concepts in philosophy. It is a fundamental 
determination that repeatedly occurs everywhere in it, the meaning of which must be grasped with precision and 
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immediate; something sublated is on the contrary something mediated; it is something non-existent but as a result 
that has proceeded from a being; it still has in itself, therefore, the determinateness from which it derives." G.W.F. 




now, let us recognize that already in his 1802 essay, Hegel sees more in contradiction than just 
an error of reasoning. The substance of Hegel's criticism of Schulze's skepticism is not simply 
that it harbors within itself the opposition of thinking and being, nor just that it fails to provide 
sufficient justification for this opposition – nor even that it is self-contradictory to the extent that 
it simultaneously affirms and denies the unity of thinking and being – but rather that because it 
takes opposition itself to be absolute, it can only see skepticism as the antithesis of philosophy, 
rather than recognizing the former as an indispensable moment within the latter.  
 We are yet to fully comprehend what Hegel takes the true relationship of skepticism and 
philosophy to consist in, and how his efforts to recast this relationship as one of unity is related 
to the development of an emergent post-Kantian metaphysics. It is in the hope of answering such 
enduring questions that we now turn our attention to Hegel's brief but provocative engagement 
with Kant in the 1802 Skepticism essay. As we will see, Hegel's complaints against Schulze are 
mirrored in a handful of scattered parenthetical remarks concerning Kant. It is my contention that 
the general thrust of Hegel's critique of Schulze's skepticism applies mutatis mutandis to Kant's 
critique of metaphysics and, accordingly, that Hegel's effort here to rethink the relationship 
between skepticism and philosophy constitutes an essential moment in the unfolding of a 
metaphysical framework that departs in significant ways from the Kantian problematic.  
 
 
Part Two: Hegel's Critique of Kant 
              Schulze is undoubtedly the central target of Hegel's 1802 Skepticism essay, and though 




"thing-in-itself," that he is out to defend Kant against his would-be detractors, this would be a 
mistake – for Hegel's primary concern in this essay is to challenge certain metaphysical 
commitments underpinning both Schulze's critique of theoretical philosophy and Kant's revision 
of metaphysics.26 As we will see, the main objection that Hegel puts to Schulze's skepticism – 
namely, that it is based on a fundamental misconception of the relationship of skepticism and 
philosophy whose roots lie in a similarly misguided understanding of the relationship of thinking 
and being – allows Hegel to articulate the limitations of Kant's Critical Project. Although for 
much of the essay Hegel remains conspicuously silent about this connection, considering that 
Kant's philosophy constitutes the principal object of Schulze's Kritik, the importance of Kant for 
Hegel's analysis of skepticism is nevertheless made clear in a handful of remarks such as: 
"[Schulze's] skepticism has in its game only one single move, and one turn altogether, and even 
that is not its own, but it has borrowed even that from Kantianism" (RSP, 341). Now, we have 
already seen that Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof provides Schulze with a blueprint for 
his skeptical attack on theoretical philosophy and that Schulze's erroneous application of this 
argument to the Transcendental Deduction betrays his inability to conceive of Kant's "thing-in-
itself" outside of that antithesis of thinking and being which it was intended to disrupt. In what 
remains, we will consider how what Hegel perceives as an inconsistency between Kant's 
refutation of the Ontological Proof and the Transcendental Deduction holds the key to 
understanding how the problematic of skepticism reveals for him the misguided character of 
Kant's critique of metaphysics as well as the basis for Hegel's own inchoate metaphysical system. 
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 Again, it is only in brief parenthetical or otherwise undeveloped remarks that Hegel 
provides us here with a perspective on his appraisal of Kant's Critical project. In a passing 
comment, which seems more of an afterthought than a carefully considered piece of 
philosophical criticism, Hegel offers perhaps the most important clue for understanding how 
Kant fares with regard to the relationship of skepticism and philosophy. After explaining that it is 
Kant and not Schulze who deserves the credit "for having brought this antithesis [between 
thinking and being] home to the culture of our modern age" through his refutation of the 
Ontological Proof, Hegel observes that "the Kantian philosophy… from the limited standpoint 
from which it is idealism (its deduction of the categories) does indeed sublate this antithesis, 
but… is otherwise inconsistent enough to make the antithesis into the supreme principle of 
speculation" (RSP, 340). Although Hegel does not elaborate on this point any further here, it is 
clear that he means to draw attention to what he perceives as an inconsistency in the way that the 
Critique of Pure Reason portrays the relationship of thinking and being: while Kant evidently 
"sublates" the opposition between thinking and being in the Transcendental Deduction, this same 
opposition is nevertheless preserved in his refutation of the Ontological Proof.27 Since Hegel's 
criticism of Schulze hinges on the way that the latter conceives of the relationship between 
thinking and being, I submit that in the statement quoted above Hegel indicts Kant's critical 
philosophy on what are essentially the same grounds. Accordingly, in order to recognize how in 
Hegel's eyes Kant conceives of the relationship between thinking and being, we must come to 
grips with Hegel's suggestive comment – for doing so will allow us to shed light on what Hegel 
identifies as the specific shortcomings of Kant's critique of metaphysics. Let us turn then to the 
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Transcendental Deduction to consider how it could be said to "sublate" the antithesis of thinking 
and being. 
 To appreciate what Kant achieves in the Transcendental Deduction, it is helpful to keep 
in view the position it was partly designed to defeat: Hume's challenge to causality.28 After 
distinguishing between "relations of ideas," “discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 
without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe”29 and "matters of fact," brute 
empirical events which remain untouched by our human projections, Hume proceeds in Section 
IV of the Enquiry to argue that because "causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but 
by experience,"30 and since experience-based knowledge, in contrast to a priori reasoning, is 
incapable of yielding certainty, the causal principle is only a psychological projection arising 
from the constant conjunction of empirical events which, accordingly, holds at best only 
subjective validity, but cannot legitimately be said to pertain to actual objects. More generally, 
because Hume sees "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" as together comprising two 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive spheres of knowledge – the former promising the 
possibility of certainty but being of limited application, the latter ranging over empirical objects 
but being incapable of securing certitude, he denies that that necessity which pertains to 
“relations of ideas” can be found in experience. While it is true that Hume’s distinction between 
“relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” does not coincide with Kant’s distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments, it is nevertheless the case that Hume's argument against the 
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objective validity of the causal principle attempts in effect to rule out the possibility of what Kant 
calls synthetic a priori judgments.31 These judgments are necessary, but non-tautological – 
applicable to experience, but, emphatically, not derivable from it. And it was in hope of 
establishing the possibility of such judgments, and so, of demonstrating the objective validity of 
the causal principle, that Kant composed the Transcendental Deduction.     
 Kant's basic task in the deduction is to demonstrate that certain a priori concepts – for 
instance, that of causality – are indeed applicable to the objects we encounter in experience. As 
Kant himself puts it,   
it [the Transcendental Deduction] is the exhibition of the pure concepts of the 
understanding (and with them of all theoretical cognition a priori) as principles of 
the possibility of experience, but of the latter as the determination of appearances 
in space and time in general – and the latter, finally, from the principle of the 
original synthetic unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in 
relation to space and time, as original forms of sensibility (CPR, B168-69). 
In order to accomplish this task, Kant engages in a transcendental inquiry that attempts to justify 
the objective validity of these concepts by demonstrating that they in fact constitute necessary 
conditions which enable our experience of objects. Taking as his point of departure the unity of 
self-consciousness – the fact that I am able to recognize all of the variegated representations I 
encounter in experience as my own – Kant proceeds to argue that this unity is the 
accomplishment of a prior activity of synthesis. Through this "original synthetic unity of 
apperception" what is given in the manifold of intuition is united in such a way that it first 
becomes intelligible as belonging to me, and it is precisely by organizing the manifold into such 
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discrete representations that the synthetic unity of apperception makes the "I think" itself 
possible. Although what is given in the sensible manifold must conform to the formal conditions 
of space and time, Kant explains that that unity which allows me to recognize any given object as 
my own cannot issue from sensibility (the way in which objects are given to us), but must 
originate in the understanding, for it is only with thought that the manifold becomes united for 
consciousness. While it remains the work of the concept to unite what is given in intuition so that 
through it we can think a given object, because the unity of self-consciousness qua the "I think" 
logically precedes any given thought, Kant argues that this unity can only be accounted for by 
the synthetic activity of certain a priori concepts. Such "ancestral" concepts not only allow us to 
recognize and determine specific objects, but to specify, moreover, the minimal conditions 
constituting objects in general. For this reason, the categories encompass everything that can be 
properly said of any possible object of experience. As it turns out, causality is one such concept, 
and since it, along with eleven others, provides rules for determining what is given in intuition so 
that it may become an object of thought for me, we are, Kant concludes, entitled in ascribing to it 
objective validity. The categories then are not merely superimposed on the sensible manifold, as 
Hume had thought, but in fact make experience itself possible.      
 Although Hegel offers no explanation of how the deduction "sublates" the antithesis of 
thinking and being, it is fairly clear what he has in mind. As we have seen, Hume's challenge to 
causality is grounded on the skeptical opposition of thinking and being: it is only by insisting on 
the exclusive disjunction of "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" that he is able to contest the 
objective validity of the causal principle. Now, if in the face of this challenge, Kant had resorted 
to the same illicit inference from concept to object which he criticized in his refutation of the 




for he would have provided no reason why we should accept his claim concerning the objective 
validity of the causal principle over Hume's opposing argument. But as we have seen, this is not 
Kant's strategy. Kant does not simply fail to acknowledge any distinction between thinking and 
being. His strategy is rather to show that our very ability to recognize this distinction at the level 
of experience is only made possible by an activity which unites thinking and being at the 
transcendental level: the unity of self-consciousness, as we have just seen, results from the fact 
that the manifold of intuition must stand under the spontaneous synthesis-function of the 
understanding. Thus, it would not be at all incorrect to say that in the Transcendental Deduction 
the antithesis of thinking and being is both "abolished" (at the transcendental level) and 
"preserved" (at the empirical level). Indeed, one may even be tempted to conclude on the basis of 
this apparent "sublation" of the antithesis of thinking and being that the Critique of Pure Reason 
embodies that unity of skepticism and philosophy which Hegel's review of Schulze has been 
striving to illuminate. Given, however, that Hegel's praise of the deduction is rounded out with a 
comment on how inconsistently Kant treats the relationship of thinking and being, this would not 
appear to be the case. However much he admires what Kant achieves in the deduction, we must 
nevertheless read this praise in light of Hegel's less favorable estimation of Kant's refutation of 
the Ontological Proof. 
 Now, we have already seen above that Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof – as 
well as Schulze's recasting of this same argument – is grounded on the opposition of thinking 
and being: it strives to show that we cannot legitimately infer God's existence from the concept 
of a necessary being. We have also seen, however, that as misleading as this opposition may be, 
it is not ultimately what Hegel finds problematic about Schulze's account. Hegel's concern is not 




reveal how philosophy in fact stands in a relationship of unity with the latter – how, that is, 
philosophy includes, but is not reducible to, the opposition of thinking and being. If this is 
correct, however, then I would suggest that we shift our attention away from Kant's refutation of 
the Ontological Proof, and concentrate instead on the sense and significance of Hegel's claim that 
Kant is "inconsistent" in his treatment of the antithesis of thinking and being.  
 Let us return then to the comment in question: "as we all know," Hegel avers, 
it is the Kantian philosophy – which from the limited standpoint from which it is 
idealism (in its deduction of the categories) does indeed sublate this antithesis; but 
which is otherwise inconsistent [inkonsequent] enough to make the antithesis into 
the supreme principle of speculation; the insistence on this antithesis comes out 
most explicitly and with infinite self-satisfaction against the so-called 
"Ontological Proof" of the existence of God, and as reflecting judgment against 
Nature; and especially in the form of a refutation of the Ontological Proof it has 
enjoyed universal and widespread good fortune (RSP, 340).   
Earlier, we saw that Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof appeals to the antithesis of 
thinking and being. We have now seen how the deduction could be said to "sublate" this 
antithesis. It should therefore be relatively clear at this point what Hegel means in saying that the 
Kantian philosophy is "inconsistent:" these two accounts offer apparently divergent conceptions 
of the relationship of thinking and being. I would add here, however, that in charging the 
Critique of Pure Reason with inconsistency, Hegel is not simply bringing to our attention the 
presence of one isolated mistake appearing in an otherwise unproblematic work. Rather, the 
apparent incongruity of these two accounts signifies for Hegel the existence of a greater 
difficulty – the same difficulty, in fact, which in Hegel's eyes prevented Schulze from 
comprehending the relationship between skepticism and philosophy.  
 The problem, once again, was not that Schulze conceived of the relationship of 




but that he conceived of this relationship exclusively in such terms. Schulze failed to recognize 
that "there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once" 
(RSP, 323) because he could not countenance the notion that thinking and being are both united 
and opposed, identical and different. Kant seems at first sight to fare somewhat better than 
Schulze on this account. Evidently, Schulze was so committed to viewing the relationship of 
thinking and being as one of opposition that he was oblivious to the fact that the "positive" side 
of his skepticism – the "facts of consciousness" which in his mind justified his critique of 
theoretical philosophy – suggested, quite to the contrary, that thinking and being are in fact one. 
Kant, on the other hand, acknowledges in the Transcendental Deduction that though there is a 
sense in which thinking and being are opposed to one another (i.e., in empirical consciousness), 
there is another sense in which they are united (i.e., in the transcendental unity of consciousness). 
Nevertheless, even though Kant "sublates" the opposition of thinking and being in the deduction, 
in his argument against the Ontological Proof he refuses to acknowledge any legitimate sense in 
which concept and object stand together in a relationship of unity.  
 This is no mere oversight on Kant's part however. Indeed, Kant's inconsistent treatment 
of the relationship of thinking and being springs from the fact that his commitment to the 
principle of noncontradiction32 requires him to deny the unity of opposites. Even as Kant 
"sublates" the antithesis of thinking and being in the deduction, he still avoids embracing the 
manifest contradiction of holding thinking and being to be both opposed and united at the same 
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time and in the same respect by distinguishing between the transcendental and the empirical. The 
principle of noncontradiction is, of course, also operative in Kant's refutation of the Ontological 
Proof, where he argues that one can deny the predicate "existence" to the subject "God" without 
contradiction, in spite of the fact that this predicate has been traditionally thought to be 
analytically contained in the definition of God. In this respect, Kant is no different from Schulze 
or many other thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition. Hegel, however, has a markedly 
different conception of the principle of noncontradiction, and it is this conception, I argue, that 
ultimately allows him to recast the relationship of thinking and being as one of unity, and thus, to 
criticize those who have failed to achieve the insight that "skepticism itself is in its inmost heart 
at one with every true philosophy" (RSP, 322-23). It is also, as we shall see, the single most 
important way in which Hegel departs from the Kantian problematic.  
 That the status of the principle of noncontradiction is at stake in Hegel's account of the 
true relationship of skepticism and philosophy can be seen above all in the following passage: 
The so-called 'principle of contradiction' is […] so far from possessing even 
formal truth for Reason, that on the contrary every proposition of Reason must in 
respect of concepts contain a violation of it. To say that a proposition is merely 
formal, means for Reason, that it is posited alone and on its own account, without 
the equal affirmation of the contradictory that is opposed to it; and just for that 
reason it is false. To recognize the principle of contradiction as a formality, thus 
means to cognize its falsity at the same time (RSP, 325). 
To appreciate the significance of the passage in question, it is important to recognize that Hegel's 
discussion of the principle of noncontradiction is offered in contrast to what in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, the ancient Pyrrhonian skeptic, Sextus Empiricus, called the "chief constitutive 




opposed,”33 sits at the basis of the ancient Pyrrhonian practice. It is the principle that guides the 
Pyrrhonian response to any dogmatic knowledge-claim put forth. Following the principle, the 
Pyrrhonist demonstrates that, in the face of a knowledge-claim, there is no good reason for 
preferring it to its opposite. Such a realization leads to what Sextus describes as “the standstill of 
the intellect,” understood by the Pyrrhonist as a desirable state of mental tranquility (ataraxia). 
Although Hegel fails to specify which version of the principle of noncontradiction he 
regards as "false," it is nevertheless clear that he sees the principle of skepticism as superior to 
both Aristotle's classic articulation and Kant's modern adaptation of this basic principle of 
thought. While the principle of noncontradiction stipulates, in its classic form, that of two 
contradictory assertions at least one must be false and, in Kant's revision of this same principle, 
that no true judgment may be self-contradictory, the principle of skepticism merely states that "to 
every account an equal account is opposed." Far from providing a "negative criterion of all truth" 
which would allow us to formally test the veracity of a given claim, the principle of skepticism 
simply expresses the fact that, for any claim, an opposite yet equally convincing claim can 
always be found. As such, it remains completely silent on the truth-value of contradictory or self-
contradictory assertions, and this is, presumably, why Hegel prefers it to the principle of 
noncontradiction – because, in contradistinction to the latter, the principle of skepticism does not 
rule out in advance the truth of that class of self-contradictory claims that Hegel designates 
"propositions of Reason." These propositions are those that concern infinite objects. One must 
rely upon propositions of Reason, for example, if one is to have an adequate comprehension of 
the mind, the world, or God – all of which are ways of conceiving the infinite, for Hegel. In 
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attempting to think the infinite, of course, one may be tempted to understand it in 
contradistinction to the finite. This conception, which Hegel elsewhere refers to as the “bad 
infinite,” is the conception characteristic of the understanding, which, unlike Reason, is a finite 
mode of cognition. Abiding by the principle of noncontradiction, the understanding can only 
grasp the infinite as something opposed to the finite. For Hegel, however, a proper grasp of the 
infinite involves a violation of the principle of noncontradiction, for, to take the infinite as 
opposed to the finite is to consider it limited by the finite, which is to say as not truly in-finite. 
Indeed, a proper grasp of any infinite object involves a violation of this principle. Because 
propositions of Reason are necessarily self-contradictory, they always violate the principle of 
noncontradiction, but remain true, for Hegel, nevertheless:  
If in any one proposition that expresses a cognition of Reason, its reflected aspect 
– the concepts that are contained in it – is isolated, and the way that they are 
bound together is considered, it must become evident that these concepts are 
together sublated, or in other words they are united in such a way, that they 
contradict themselves; otherwise it would not be a proposition of Reason but only 
of understanding (RSP, 324). 
 Although Hegel evidently holds the principle of skepticism in higher esteem than he does 
the principle of noncontradiction, he never denies the general validity of the principle of 
noncontradiction. Nor does he deny the legitimacy of propositions of the understanding. 
Propositions of the understanding are true claims about finite objects. Indeed, without any 
comprehension of finite objects, one could never arrive at a comprehension of the infinite, since 
this involves a negation of those claims that elevate finite things into something infinite. Thus, 
Hegel does not diminish the status of the principle of noncontradiction. He merely denies that it 
holds for propositions of Reason, since "every proposition of Reason," he writes, "must in 
respect of concepts contain a violation of it" (RSP, 325). When thinking about infinite objects, 




Similarly, Hegel never offers an unrestricted affirmation of the principle of skepticism 
but only intimates that it accords with the general structure of rational propositions. Unlike the 
ancient thinkers who took “the chief constitutive principle of skepticism” to apply to any and all 
claims, Hegel argues that procedure of the understanding is only problematic when one attempts 
to use it in order to think about infinite objects. The principle of skepticism is, then, useful for 
revealing how finite claims are not absolute. However, it cannot be successfully extended to all 
claims – a point I shall return to later at the end of this chapter.  
These qualifications are absolutely crucial for Hegel's argument. As we will see next, 
they allow us to comprehend how it is that Hegel understands thinking and being to comprise a 
unity. This, in turn, will finally make clear how Hegel's efforts to rethink the relationship of 
skepticism and philosophy lead him beyond the boundaries of the Kantian framework.   
 Hegel offers several examples of what constitutes a proposition of Reason – for instance, 
"God is cause, and God is not cause" and "He is one and not one, many and not many" (RSP, 
325). He also gives at one point Spinoza's definition of causa sui in Part One of the Ethics. 
Given, however, that he equates the negation of this definition at one point in the essay with "the 
denial of the truth of Reason, and the transformation of the rational into reflection" (RSP, 339), I 
believe that this particular example warrants special attention. Spinoza begins Part One of the 
Ethics by defining causa sui as "that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can 
be conceived only as existing."34 While it is not immediately clear how Spinoza's definition 
qualifies as a proposition of Reason in the Hegelian sense – how, that is, that it could be said to 
be both true and self-contradictory, Hegel offers us a clue when he explains that its "opposed 
                                                          




counterpart" insists that "what is thought of, since it is thought-object, does not at the same time 
involve a being in itself" (RSP, 339) – in other words, thinking does not imply being. If, 
however, the skeptical opposition of thinking and being constitutes the "opposed counterpart" of 
Spinoza's definition and if, as Hegel maintains, every proposition of Reason "permits resolution 
into two strictly contradictory assertions" (RSP, 324-25), it becomes clear that, for Hegel, 
Spinoza's causa sui names that in which thinking and being are both united and opposed, 
identical and different. A further clue as to how Hegel understands Spinoza’s causa sui to qualify 
as a proposition of Reason can be found in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. “’The 
cause of itself,’” Hegel writes, “is a noteworthy expression, for while we picture to ourselves that 
the effect stands in opposition to the cause, the cause of itself is the cause which, while it 
operates and separates an ‘other,’ at the same time produces only itself, and in the production 
therefore does away with this distinction.”35 Since, for Hegel, Spinoza’s causa sui describes that 
in which the distinction between cause and effect is both dissolved and upheld, it must surely 
qualify for him as a proposition of Reason – a proposition that is true yet self-contradictory.36  
Once we recognize that Hegel identifies the positing of thinking and being (and of cause 
and effect) as unified in causa sui as a proposition of Reason which, as such, is both true and 
self-contradictory, it becomes apparent that it is Hegel's understanding of the principle of 
noncontradiction which ultimately allows him to recast the relationship of skepticism and 
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philosophy as one of unity, and to criticize Kant and Schulze for failing to achieve this insight. It 
is only because he maintains that there are some cases in which the principle of noncontradiction 
does not apply that he is able to countenance the truth of a proposition that contradictorily asserts 
the identity and difference of thinking and being and, for the same reason, one that asserts the 
unity and opposition of skepticism and philosophy.     
 To be clear, Hegel does not conceive of the relationship of thinking and being – or that of 
skepticism and philosophy – as a simple unity. In both cases, the kind of unity at issue is one that 
encompasses both the identity and difference of the related terms – a "dialectical" unity which 
becomes possible only once we grant that there is a class of true propositions which nevertheless 
violate the principle of noncontradiction. Once again, this is not to reject the general validity of 
the principle of noncontradiction, but only to acknowledge that this law must fall silent where 
propositions of Reason are concerned. This is a point, however, which neither Schulze nor Kant 
were willing to concede. To affirm the principle of noncontradiction as a "negative criterion of 
all truth" is, as we have seen, to deny the truth of any self-contradictory proposition – regardless 
of its content. Accordingly, because neither thinker was willing to entertain the notion that the 
principle of noncontradiction may be less than universally binding, neither were capable of 
viewing the relationship of thinking and being as one of unity and opposition. Kant came close 
to endorsing this view in the Transcendental Deduction, but his understanding of the principle of 
noncontradiction prevented him from consistently embracing the truly contradictory unity of 
opposites. Since, moreover, neither Kant nor Schulze could countenance the "dialectical" unity 
of thinking and being – the notion that being and thinking are both united and opposed to one 
another – neither was capable of achieving the Hegelian insight that "skepticism is in its inmost 




skepticism (conceived in terms of the antithesis of thinking and being) is not simply opposed to 
philosophy, but, that to the extent that the latter expresses the "dialectical" unity of thinking and 
being, philosophy also already encompasses the claims of the former. On the other hand, because 
Hegel makes this insight his point of departure in the Skepticism essay, and because, as we have 
seen, it is bound up with his understanding of the validity of the principle of noncontradiction, it 
becomes evident that the latter helps lead Hegel to metaphysical conclusions that Kant's critical 
philosophy could never support. To present Spinoza's definition of causa sui as a proposition of 
Reason – that is, to assert that thinking and being are at once identical and different in the infinite 
– is, after all, quite different from arguing, as Kant does in the Transcendental Deduction, that 
thinking and being are one in one sense (at the transcendental level) but two in another (on the 
level of experience). To see what is at stake in the difference between these two arguments, 
however, one need only consider Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof of God's existence. 
Because Kant held the principle of noncontradiction to be a "negative criterion of all truth," he 
could only regard the inference from concept to existence as an illicit move resulting from what 
could only be the dogmatic conflation of thinking and being – even when the concept under 
consideration is that of the highest being. If, however, we grant Hegel that there are some 
instances in which the principle of noncontradiction does not determine what can be counted as 
true, instances in which, for example, thinking and being are evidently identical and different, the 
inference from concept to existence begins to appear less problematic – especially once we 
recognize that this concession entails that the skeptical opposition of thinking and being on 
which Kant's refutation of the Ontological Proof is based is united in "every true philosophy" 




 In this chapter, I have offered a reconstruction of Hegel's argument in the 1802 
Skepticism essay in order to clarify the sense of his claim that "skepticism itself is in its inmost 
heart at one with every true philosophy" (RSP, 322-23). To this end, I have argued that to see 
how Hegel regards the "true relationship of skepticism and philosophy" as one of unity, one must 
grasp how he understands the relationship of thinking and being and, further, that this requires an 
understanding of Hegel's conception of the principle of noncontradiction. Given, however, that 
so much of Hegel's argument in the Skepticism essay rides on his understanding of the principle 
of noncontradiction, one might well wonder at this point what proof he offers in support of his 
contentious claim regarding the "falsity" of this principle for propositions of Reason – for Hegel 
knows as well as anyone that "one bare assurance is worth just as much as another."37 
Unfortunately, Hegel never directly addresses this issue in his essay, and while it may be true 
that the principle of noncontradiction itself famously defies demonstration,38 recognizing this 
point still leaves us with no reason to accept Hegel's account over the traditional conception of 
this principle. As I see it, there are two ways that Hegel attempts to address this concern in the 
Skepticism essay and to demonstrate the dialectical unity of thinking and being, neither one 
being ultimately satisfying.   
 First, Hegel attempts to show that propositions of Reason are impervious to traditional 
skeptical challenges, notably, to the Five Modes of Agrippa. The Five Modes of Agrippa are a 
series of ancient skeptical arguments, presented by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, designed to undermine any given knowledge-claim (OS, 40-43). The first argument 
in the Five Modes is what Sextus calls the “mode deriving from dispute.” When someone makes 
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a knowledge-claim, the skeptic uses this argument to point out that there are differing opinions 
on the matter. In light of this, it becomes clear that the person making the claim must now 
explain why their claim is preferable to the others. When one tries to explain this, however, one 
soon faces the challenge of the other modes. After one tries to provide evidence supporting their 
claim, the skeptic can then point out that additional justification is now needed to support this 
new claim. When additional evidence is provided to support it, the skeptic can then ask for 
further evidence, and so on. This second argument is called the “mode throwing one back ad 
infinitum.” In the third mode, the “mode deriving from relativity,” the skeptic demonstrates how 
any knowledge claim offered is relative to the subject making the claim. Thus, the skeptic points 
out that the object is not known immediately but only through numerous mediating 
circumstances. For example, the skeptic points out that, although it appears to us that honey is 
sweet, one must suspend judgment about whether it is sweet in itself, since it appears sweet only 
to the palate of a healthy human being. (The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, are all versions of this 
third mode, the “mode deriving from relativity.”) The fourth argument is the “hypothetical 
mode,” which challenges a knowledge-claim for which no evidence is offered by asserting that 
any other claim, including a conflicting claim, can then be accepted with equal legitimacy. The 
Pyrrhonian skeptic uses this mode in conjunction with the second mode, for when one finds 
oneself faced with the “mode throwing one back ad infinitum” and consequently gives up on 
offering any justification for their claim, the skeptic then points out that a conflicting claim can 
be asserted with equal validity. The final argument in the Five Modes of Agrippa is called the 
“reciprocal mode.” This occurs “when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under 
investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under investigation” (OS, 41). The 




After demonstrating how each of the five modes can be successfully used to combat the 
claims of dogmatism, Hegel nevertheless goes on to show that "these tropes are completely 
useless against philosophy" (RSP, 335). That is, the ancient arguments do not successfully 
undermine all claims. They do not undermine propositions of Reason, which Hegel regards as 
self-contradictory yet true, although they effectively call into question the one-sided claims of 
the understanding.39 Since this account is intended to demonstrate that skepticism's strongest 
weapons "fall apart internally" when applied to Reason, it can plausibly be construed as an 
attempt to justify Hegel's position on the relationship of thinking and being. If this is Hegel's 
strategy, however, it is surely unsuccessful, for it is only by virtue of certain special properties 
that Hegel ascribes to Reason that he is able to dismiss the force of each of these skeptical 
arguments. This is especially clear in the case of the fourth mode, which insists on the 
hypothetical – and hence tentative – status of every unproven claim: "the rational," Hegel writes,  
is not an unproven assumption, in accordance with the fourth trope, so that its 
counterpart could with equal right be presupposed unproven in opposition to it; 
for the rational has no opposed counterpart; it includes both of the finite 
opposites, which are mutual counterparts, within itself (RSP, 336-37).  
If Hegel had already established the fact that "the rational has no opposed counterpart," then he 
would be right to reject the effectiveness of the fourth mode against propositions of Reason. As it 
stands, however, if Hegel is advancing claims such as this in order to demonstrate the truth of 
rational propositions, he is obviously guilty of begging the question. In other words, the 
argument appears to be no more than a bare assurance – just what the fourth mode of Agrippa is 
meant to bring to light. I would also add here that even if Hegel were able to decisively refute 
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each of the five modes when applied to Reason, this would still presumably leave him open to 
the claims of modern skepticism and, at any rate, be far from establishing that dialectical unity of 
thinking and being which serves as the starting point of the Skepticism essay. 
 One possible strategy remains. After offering a survey of ancient skepticism, Hegel 
returns to Schulze's account in order to demonstrate its inferiority. At one point, Hegel employs a 
reductio ad absurdum to undermine the opposition of thinking and being which grounds 
Schulze's account; however, insofar as this argument is designed to reveal the absurdity of the 
skeptical opposition of thinking and being, I would suggest that it too could be construed as an 
attempt to demonstrate the dialectical unity of thinking and being. "According to this latest 
skepticism," Hegel writes 
the human cognitive faculty is a thing, which has concepts, and since it has 
nothing but concepts, it cannot go out to the things that are outside it; it cannot 
neither search them out nor reconnoiter them – for both of them (Vol. I, p. 69) are 
'specifically distinct; […] no rational man will be under the illusion that in 
possessing the image of something he also possesses that thing itself.' Nowhere is 
this skepticism outwardly disposed to be so consistent as to show that no rational 
man will be under the illusion that he possesses an idea of something; for 
certainly since the idea is also a something, the rational man can only have the 
illusion of possessing the idea of the idea, not the idea itself; and then again not 
that either, since this idea of the second power is again a something, but only the 
idea of the idea of the idea; and so on ad infinitum (RSP, 341-42).    
While this argument shows that Schulze's crude opposition of thinking and being inevitably 
results in an infinite regress whereby cognition itself becomes impossible – a conclusion which, 
presumably, even the most staunch skeptic would be reluctant to affirm – it nevertheless falls 
short of demonstrating the dialectical unity of thinking and being. One might be willing to 
concede on this basis of Hegel's argument that the very idea of cognition is ruled out on 
Schulze's conception of the relationship of thinking and being, but this says less about the truth 




conclusive, for instance, to a Kantian or a direct realist, neither of whom would accept where 
Schulze's account of cognition begins and who would thus not be persuaded by Hegel's reductio 
argument. In other words, so long as one refuses to accept a model of cognition according to 
which our concepts are held to be absolutely distinct from those things they are thought to 
represent, one will have absolutely no reason to accept the dialectical unity of thinking and 
being. To Kant, Hegel's argument would appear as a mere regression to dogmatic metaphysics.                   
 Thus, it appears that in his 1802 essay, Hegel is not able to justify his argument for the 
dialectical unity of thinking and being. However, as we shall see, Hegel remains quite committed 
to this task throughout his career. Before looking to the arguments that Hegel develops to this 
end, however, we would do well to clarify how the skepticism that Hegel speaks of, for example, 
in the 1802 essay, relates to historical manifestations of skepticism. To this end, we will need to 
follow Hegel in the distinction he draws between the idea of the skeptical and the historical 
schools of skepticism. With this clarification, we will be better able to understand and evaluate 
















 In Chapter One, we saw that Hegel's early confrontation with skepticism in his 1802 
article for the Critical Journal provided him with an opportunity to engage the metaphysical 
presuppositions at work in both Kant's Critical Philosophy and its reception by the neo-Humean 
skeptic, G.E. Schulze. Neither of these thinkers were able to attain to the speculative standpoint 
from which the unity of thinking and being is manifest, Hegel argues, because they failed to 
appreciate that "skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy."40 If it 
is true, however, that skepticism in some sense belongs to all genuine philosophical cognition, 
one is nevertheless left wondering whether there is some particular form of skepticism which 
Hegel has in mind. While it is evident in the Skepticism essay that Hegel considers the antithesis 
of thinking and being to be somehow emblematic of the sort of skepticism with which he is 
concerned,41 this characterization raises more questions than it answers. If it is Kant who 
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deserves credit for "having brought this antithesis home to the culture of our modern age" (RSP, 
340), one might well wonder the extent to which this antithesis can be considered unique to 
skepticism at all. Moreover, even if it were seen to be unique to skepticism, it remains unclear 
whether Hegel thinks that this antithesis has the same role to play in every form of skepticism or 
whether there is not one specific brand – say, Pyrrhonism – that puts this antithesis to special 
use. As we will see, there is, in fact, one particular form of skepticism that Hegel exalts as the 
"free side of every philosophy" (RSP, 324), but it cannot be confined to any given historical 
epoch. Although Hegel evidently holds ancient skepticism in higher esteem than its modern 
counterpart, this must not lead us to identify the skepticism which he sees as belonging to all 
genuine philosophical cognition – that is, the negative side of his own emergent philosophical 
system – with that of Sextus Empiricus or the New Academy. In fact, we run the risk of missing 
Hegel's insight into the relationship of skepticism and philosophy entirely if we fail to recognize 
that the mode of thinking at issue here has no true analogue in the history of skepticism. Thus, 
while the distinction between ancient and modern skepticism remains an important one for 
Hegel, the more important distinction for his appraisal of the philosophical significance of 
skepticism is the one he draws between Pyrrhonism and the "self-completing skepticism" of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. As I will argue, it is only the latter form of skepticism which can 
properly be said to belong to the philosophy which, Hegel claims, "is neither skepticism nor 
dogmatism, and is thus both at once" (RSP, 323). Ultimately, I hope to show in this way that 
Hegel's early confrontation with the problematic of skepticism in his review for the Critical 
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Journal already marks a significant step toward the development of the philosophical itinerary of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit.    
 
 
Part One: The Dogmatic Character of Modern Skepticism 
 If Hegel's primary goal in the Skepticism essay is to expose the metaphysical 
presuppositions basic to the self-understanding of both modern skepticism and the philosophy it 
sought to denounce, as part of a larger strategy to propound Hegel's own inchoate metaphysical 
vision, then crucial to this end is his discussion of the superiority of ancient to modern 
skepticism. It is through exhibiting the "dogmatic" character of the modern skepticism of G.E. 
Schulze42 that Hegel is first able to give determinate shape to the skepticism that is one with 
philosophy – the latter being something of an articulation of the speculative standpoint which 
Hegel proposes in the Skepticism essay. Given that the dogmatic character of Schulze's project 
emerges within a discussion of the superiority of ancient skepticism, one might suspect that it is 
the latter which, for Hegel, constitutes the "free side" of philosophy. This would be a mistake, 
however. In Hegel's discussion, ancient skepticism serves primarily as a foil which allows him to 
articulate the limits of Schulze's approach, but which he nevertheless subordinates to the 
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skepticism that is one with philosophy. This becomes clear as soon as we recognize that even 
Pyrrhonism – by all accounts the most radical form of ancient skepticism – remains dogmatic on 
Hegel's account. To recognize the dogmatic character of Pyrrhonism, however, we must attend to 
Hegel's characterization of "dogmatism" in the Skepticism essay. Above all, we must recognize 
that, for Hegel, dogmatism expresses a substantive problem concerning the nature of truth – not a 
merely formal concern regarding epistemic justification. Only then will it be evident that 
Pyrrhonism, though superior to Schulze's modern skepticism, is not the specific form which 
Hegel sees as one with philosophy. Let us turn then to Hegel's review of Schulze to see precisely 
what the superiority of ancient skepticism might be said to consist in.  
 In the previous chapter, I cast Hegel's review of Schulze's Kritik der theoretischen 
Philosophie in light of the latter's apparent inability to grasp the "true relationship of skepticism 
to philosophy" (RSP, 322). In the present section, I would like to briefly revisit Hegel's 
estimation of Schulze's philosophical project. This time, however, my analysis will attempt to set 
the dogmatic character of Schulze's skepticism into sharp relief, for this is ultimately what 
prevents Schulze from grasping the unity of skepticism and philosophy. In "Aenesidemus," 
Schulze infamously argued that Kant begged the question against Hume in his deduction of the 
categories: "the Critique of Pure Reason," Schulze writes, "tries to refute Humean skepticism by 
assuming as already unquestionably certain the very propositions against whose legitimacy 
Hume directed all his skeptical doubts."43 For Hegel, though, Schulze’s own skeptical argument 
against Kant signals a regression to the very dogmatism it seeks to denounce in taking the 
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antithesis of thinking and being to be beyond question. In an iconic passage which encapsulates 
Hegel's objection to Schulze, Hegel explains that recently skepticism has “sunk so far in 
company with dogmatism that for both of them nowadays the facts of consciousness have an 
indubitable certainty . . . so that, since the extremes now touch, the great goal is attained once 
more on their side in these happy times, that dogmatism and skepticism coincide with one 
another on the underside, and offer each other the hand of perfect friendship and fraternity" 
(RSP, 330).  For Hegel, if anyone is guilty of begging the question, it would seem to be Schulze 
himself, whose critique of Kant offers little more than a "bare assurance" of the non-identity of 
thinking and being.44  
 As we saw previously, Schulze's basic objection to Kant – that the Transcendental 
Deduction attempts to establish the objective validity of the causal principle by illicitly "inferring 
from the constitution of something as it is in our representations its objective constitution outside 
us"45 – only makes sense on an erroneous conception of Kant's basic philosophical project.46 On 
Schulze's interpretation, the deduction aims to prove that the "original determinations of the 
human mind are the real ground or source of the synthetic judgments found in our knowledge,"47 
but can only do so by presupposing the correspondence of concept and object. This was, 
however, precisely the presupposition which Kant had argued metaphysics must leave behind if 
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it is to advance beyond the "groping among mere concepts"48 which had hitherto characterized 
this enterprise. Convinced that Hume was correct to deny that any necessary connection between 
concept and object could be established by the mere operations of thought, Kant sought to 
develop an account which would demonstrate the "objective validity" (objektive Gültigkeit) of a 
priori concepts by exhibiting their constitutive role in human experience. Hence, in the 
Transcendental Deduction, Kant famously undercut Hume's challenge to causality by 
demonstrating that the causal principle, as one of the twelve "true ancestral concepts of pure 
understanding" (CPR, A81/B107), subtends the unity of self-consciousness and, for this reason, 
makes our experience of objects possible in the first place. If Kant had taken this argument as 
proof that our concepts legitimately apply to some mind-independent reality, then Schulze's 
objection would no doubt carry some weight. Of course, this was not at all Kant's intention, and 
if Schulze could not see this, Hegel argues, it was because he could not bring himself to question 
the "indubitable certainty of the facts of consciousness" which assured him of the non-identity of 
concept and object:  
To begin with, 'things' are opposed to 'cognition' within [the context of] Reason 
here; and secondly an explanation of its origin [is asked for], and therewith the 
causal relationship is dragged in; the ground of cognition, then, is something other 
than what is grounded, the former the concept, the latter the thing, and when once 
this basically false picture of rational thinking is presupposed, then there is 
nothing further to be done, except to repeat for ever that ground and grounded, 
concept and thing are different modes; that all rational cognition aims just to 
pluck a being out of thinking, existence out of concepts, (as it is put in words that 
are likewise Kantian) (RSP, 341).  
 One might gather from this that modern skepticism can be considered dogmatic to the 
extent that it relies upon beliefs which it leaves insulated from criticism and, therefore, that the 
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superiority of ancient skepticism consists, for Hegel, in the fact that it is able to dispense with all 
such presuppositions. To get a better idea of why the difference suggested here would seem to 
elevate ancient skepticism above its modern expression in Schulze, recall Sextus Empiricus' 
discussion of the difference between Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism. Sextus first draws 
this distinction at the beginning of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism where he offers a comprehensive 
taxonomy of the basic forms of philosophy. Sextus observes that, “When people are 
investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery or a denial of discovery and a 
confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation” (OS, 3). The first 
group, those claiming to have made a discovery, are the “dogmatists.” Those who deny that a 
discovery has been made Sextus identities with the Academic philosopher, that is, the Academic 
skeptic. While those who neither affirm nor deny that a discovery has been made but persist in 
their investigation Sextus identifies as skeptics, that is, Pyrrhonists. Thus, Sextus distinguishes 
Pyrrhonian from Academic skepticism here by explaining that the latter conclude their 
investigation too hastily, which is to say, without providing sufficient evidence for their 
conclusion, while the former simply suspend judgment on account of a lack of sufficient 
evidence. The true skeptics – the Pyrrhonian skeptics – are the ones that are still “investigating” 
(skeptesthai). Sextus returns to this important distinction later in the Outlines:  
The members of the New Academy, if they say that everything is inapprehensible, 
no doubt differ from the [Pyrrhonian] Skeptics precisely in saying that everything 
is inapprehensible. For they make affirmations about this, while the [Pyrrhonian] 
Skeptic expects it to be possible for something actually to be apprehended. And 
they differ from us clearly in their judgments of good and bad. For the Academics 
say that things are good and bad not in the way we do, but with the conviction that 
it is plausible that what they call good rather than its contrary really is good (and 
similarly with bad), whereas we do not call anything good or bad with the thought 
that what we say is plausible – rather, without holding opinions we follow 
ordinary life in order not to be inactive.49      
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Realizing that the Academic could never be epistemically entitled to her claim concerning the 
inapprehensibility of reality (or her judgments regarding the good), since her claim would be 
immediately refuted the moment she attempted to provide it with justification, the Pyrrhonist 
abstains from making any claims which would stand in need of further proof. What leads the 
Pyrrhonist to contest the truth of any given knowledge-claim, without having to flatly – and 
dogmatically – affirm the truth of its contradictory, is the “chief constitutive principle of 
skepticism.” As we saw in the previous chapter, this principle states that “to every account an 
equal account is opposed” (OS, 6).50 Rather than take recourse to claims which, as a skeptic, she 
is in no position to justify, the Pyrrhonist "set[s] out oppositions among things which appear and 
are thought of in any way at all" (OS, 4). She does this in order to demonstrate the 
"equipollence" – or, equal persuasive power – of the accounts in this way opposed and, 
consequently, the irresolvable nature of the matter under dispute. Because the Pyrrhonist only 
reports on how things appear, she is easily able to bypass that demand for justification which 
blunted the Academic's attack, since "no-one, presumably, will raise a controversy over whether 
an existing thing appears this way or that; rather, they investigate whether it is such as it appears" 
(OS, 9). Thus, the Pyrrhonist's strategy is not to counter her interlocutor's claim with an 
argument whose only hope for success lies in the off chance that it is spared from scrutiny, but 
simply to generate arguments, no more compelling than those to which they are opposed, in 
order to achieve a "standstill of the intellect." 
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 Now, it may be tempting to conclude that Hegel finds ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism to 
be superior to its modern counterpart, since, following Sextus’ distinction, one can see that 
Pyrrhonian skeptics differ from the Academics in that they refrain from making claims to which 
they are not epistemically entitled. If, however, in charging Schulze with dogmatism, Hegel were 
merely rehearsing the same objection that Sextus once upon a time put to the skeptics of the New 
Academy, one might wonder why Hegel would then repeatedly deny the existence of any 
meaningful difference between Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism. Hegel argues, for example, 
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, that "between the Academics and pure [Pyrrhonian] 
Skepticism a distinction has been drawn, which is certainly very formal, and has but little 
signification, but to which the [Pyrrhonian] Skeptics in their subtlety undoubtedly attached some 
meaning."51 After all, if the Pyrrhonian method of equipollence fails, for Hegel, to set it apart 
from the skepticism of the New Academy, then would it not, by the same token, fail to account 
for the superiority of ancient skepticism over its modern, dogmatic counterpart? This would 
seem to suggest that, contrary to popular belief, Hegel is not primarily concerned with 
epistemological matters in his treatment of the philosophical significance of skepticism.52 As we 
will see next, this suspicion is confirmed in the Skepticism essay by Hegel's account of the 
"essence of dogmatism" – an account which, to my mind, offers compelling evidence that the 
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distinction between ancient and modern skepticism, like Sextus' distinction between Pyrrhonism 
and the New Academy, "has but little signification" for Hegel's analysis. "The essence of 
dogmatism," Hegel writes,  
consists in this that it posits something finite, something burdened with an 
opposition (e.g. pure Subject, or pure Object, or in dualism the duality as opposed 
to the identity) as the Absolute; hence Reason shows with respect to this Absolute 
that it has a relation to what is excluded from it, and only exists through and in 
this relation to another, so that it is not absolute, according to the third trope of 
relationship (RSP, 335). 
 
Here, where one might expect to find an account of the norms of rational assent and their 
violation, we are met with something rather remarkable. What makes a given claim dogmatic, for 
Hegel, is not that it fails to accord with certain norms of justification (as in, for example, the 
informal fallacy of "begging the question"), but that it is made in denial of the concomitant truth 
of its contradictory.53 A dogmatic claim, then, is made when one posits something finite – that is, 
something that has an opposite – as absolute in pious observance of the principle of 
noncontradiction. This concerns Hegel’s distinction between Reason and the understanding 
discussed in the previous chapter. To review, propositions of the understanding can only 
adequately express finite objects. This is where they have their legitimate role in cognition. 
Propositions of understanding cannot, however, properly express infinite objects, since these 
objects cannot be grasped through any one-sided opposition. Propositions of Reason, by contrast, 
are self-contradictory but nevertheless true. By not denying the unity of opposites, which is to 
say by not holding fast to the principle of noncontradiction, they are able to properly express 
infinite objects. As Hegel puts it: 
If in any one proposition that expresses a cognition of Reason, its reflected aspect 
– the concepts that are contained in it – is isolated, and the way that they are 
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bound together is considered, it must become evident that these concepts are 
together sublated, or in other words they are united in such a way, that they 
contradict themselves; otherwise it would not be a proposition of Reason but only 
of understanding (RSP, 324).  
 
Thus, to say that a proposition of the understanding is dogmatic is to say that it is unable 
to articulate an infinite object and thus is not true in an absolute sense. This is, however, not to 
say that it is simply false. Such propositions are adequate ways of articulating finite objects. 
However, they become the mark of dogmatic thinking, for Hegel, as soon as one overlooks the 
limit of their application.  
In Part Two, we will encounter one particular expression of skepticism that consistently 
affirms the unity of contradictories; for the time being, however, I would simply like to stress 
that the charge of dogmatism indicates, for Hegel, the presence of a substantive metaphysical 
error – to wit, one in which a proposition of the Understanding is mistaken for a proposition of 
Reason – and not merely the kind of formal deficit which one might hope to avoid through strict 
adherence to accepted epistemic norms. Thus, Schulze's skepticism is dogmatic, not in the sense 
that it fails to adequately justify the basic opposition which it relies upon in presupposing the 
undeniable certainty of the "facts of consciousness," but in that it sunders "the rational" by 
positing this opposition (between thinking and being) to the exclusion of its contradictory (the 
unity of thinking and being). "This sundering of the rational, in which thinking and being are 
one, and the absolute insistence on this opposition, in other words the understanding made 
absolute," Hegel explains, "constitutes the endlessly repeated and universally applied ground of 
this dogmatic skepticism" (RSP, 339), and it is precisely what accounts for the dogmatic 
character of Schulze's Kritik.  
 Before turning to see why Pyrrhonism still remains inferior to the skepticism that is "one 




of dogmatism, the superiority of ancient skepticism would seem to consist in. If, as we just saw, 
Schulze's modern skepticism is dogmatic, not because it takes the antithesis of thinking and 
being for granted, but because it affirms this antithesis without at the same time affirming its 
opposite, then the superiority of Pyrrhonism would seem to lie not in the fact that it manages to 
dispense with presuppositions by reporting solely on how things appear, as we previously 
suggested, but in that it sets these very appearances in opposition to one another in accordance 
with the method of equipollence. Indeed, this is exactly what Hegel seems to suggest in the 
Skepticism essay when he elevates the "chief constitutive principle of skepticism" above the 
principle of noncontradiction. Whereas the principle of noncontradiction denies the unity of 
contradictories by insisting that only the affirmation of a given proposition or its denial (but not 
both) can count as true, the "chief constitutive principle of skepticism" – "to every account an 
equal account is opposed" (OS, 6) – would seem to stop short of such a claim. Because this 
principle leads the Pyrrhonist to suspend judgment on the truth of opposing claims, rather than 
affirm one of these to the exclusion of its opposite, it would seem then to elude Hegel's concern 
regarding dogmatism.  
 Though this perhaps accounts for the superiority of ancient skepticism over its modern 
counterpart, it should not lead us to identify the skepticism that is one with philosophy with 
Pyrrhonism. Even if there are "no better weapons against dogmatism on finite bases" (RSP, 335) 
than the Five Modes of Agrippa, Pyrrhonism still remains dogmatic for Hegel in its failure to 
sublate the principle of noncontradiction. Indeed, it adheres to this principle and thus denies the 
unity of opposites as assuredly as Academic skepticism. While this is presumably the reason why 
Hegel chooses to underplay the distinction between Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, we 




and even Sextus Empiricus from the skepticism that is one with philosophy – that is, from the 
"self-completing skepticism" which animates the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 
 
Part Two: The Sublation of Pyrrhonism 
 If Hegel suggests in the Skepticism essay that Pyrrhonism is notably superior to the 
modern skepticism of Schulze, this is only because the former manages to articulate what is 
problematic about dogmatism – not because it remains impervious to it. Indeed, as we will see, it 
is just as open to the charge of dogmatism as its modern counterpart in Schulze. Although Hegel 
engages Pyrrhonism in a number of different contexts, ranging from his analysis of the Five 
Modes of Agrippa in the Skepticism essay to his examination of skepticism as a pattern of 
knowing in the Phenomenology of Spirit, each of these discussions seem to express the same 
basic problem – that Pyrrhonism remains dogmatic to the extent that it fails to sublate the 
principle of noncontradiction. We will soon see how this criticism emerges within Hegel's 
treatment of Pyrrhonism, but to begin with, let us briefly recall that Hegel takes the "essence of 
dogmatism" to lie in positing "something finite, something burdened with an opposition (e.g. 
pure Subject, or pure Object, or in dualism the duality as opposed to the identity) as the 
Absolute" (RSP, 335). We have already seen that, for Hegel, dogmatism expresses the 
metaphysical error of failing to affirm the unity of opposites (as seen, for example, in Schulze's 
insistence on the antithesis of thinking and being to the exclusion of the affirmation of their 
unity); however, if we attend to the specific examples that Hegel provides in formulating the 
"essence of dogmatism," it becomes clear that this criticism extends as much to Pyrrhonism as it 




of dogmatism by adhering to the "chief constitutive principle of skepticism" – that is, by setting 
conflicting claims in opposition to one another in order to bring about that "standstill of the 
intellect" wherein neither claim can be preferred over the other. Nevertheless, it is precisely this 
insistence on opposition that leaves the Pyrrhonist open to Hegel's objection, as we will see. 
Rather than recognize the unity of conflicting claims – their constitutive co-implication – the 
Pyrrhonist focuses exclusively on their opposition. If, however, the Pyrrhonist insists that one 
must suspend judgment in the face of opposing claims, this can only be because she takes their 
mutual exclusivity for granted – because, that is, she assumes that of two opposing and 
equipollent claims, only one can possibly be true. But this would be to deny – or, at any rate, to 
overlook – the fact that opposing claims comprise a unity precisely in virtue of standing in a 
relationship of opposition. Thus, the problem that Hegel finds with the Pyrrhonian position is not 
merely that it presupposes the universal validity of the principle of noncontradiction, but that in 
interpreting contradiction as a token of error, as what effects that "standstill of the intellect" from 
which no knowledge may proceed, it "posits something finite, something burdened with an 
opposition… as the Absolute" – namely, opposition itself. Indeed, in his explanation of the 
"essence of dogmatism," Hegel specifically mentions opposition as an example of something 
finite which has been mistakenly and dogmatically crowned Absolute. To privilege "in dualism 
the duality [Dualität] as opposed to the identity" is, for Hegel, tantamount to positing the "pure 
Subject" to the exclusion of the "pure Object" because, in each case, one has committed the same 
error of denying the concomitant truth of contradictories and treating one of these as absolute – 
that is, of failing to sublate the principle of noncontradiction. That Hegel consistently raises this 
objection in the context of Pyrrhonism and that he does so in order to distinguish the latter from 




 Near the end of the Skepticism essay, Hegel offers an exposition of the Five Modes of 
Agrippa. As discussed in Chapter One, the Five Modes are a series of ancient skeptical 
arguments designed to call into question all knowledge-claims by showing that they have no 
greater warrant than mere opinions. They are the most radical skeptical challenges that Sextus 
provides in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The Five Modes include: the mode deriving from 
dispute, the mode of infinite regress (“the mode of throwing one back ad infinitum”), the mode 
of relativity, the mode of hypothesis, and the reciprocal mode. Sextus describes the first mode in 
this way: “According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension 
about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. 
Because of this, we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with 
suspension of judgment” (OS, 41). The First Mode of Agrippa thus calls attention to the fact that 
there is disagreement about any knowledge-claim that can be made and thus that the claim is not 
self-evident but requires further evidence to support it.  By requiring justification for any 
knowledge-claim, the first mode sets up the rest of the modes. Thus, the Second Mode of 
Agrippa follows from the first. As Sextus writes, “In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we 
say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs 
another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, so that we have no point 
from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows” (OS, 41). As 
soon, therefore, as one attempts to offer evidence in support of their claim, the Pyrrhonist shows 
that any piece of evidence that they can offer is not self-evident but requires further evidence, 
leading to an infinite regress. The skeptic appeals to the Third Mode of Agrippa, the mode 
deriving from relativity, when, presented with some knowledge claim, she points out that the 




thus is not known in itself. In this mode, Sextus explains, “the existing object appears to be such-
and-such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it,” thus leading 
one to suspend judgment on what the thing is like in itself (OS, 41). For example, since the tower 
looks round from afar but square from up close, Sextus argues, it is not possible to say what the 
tower is like in itself. If, in accordance with the Second Mode of Agrippa, one is unable or 
unwilling to give any evidence in support of their claim, the skeptic will then use the Fourth 
Mode, the mode of hypothesis, pointing out that, without any evidence for a claim, then one has 
no reason to prefer it to any other. Finally, the Fifth Mode, the reciprocal mode, occurs “when 
what ought to be confirmatory of the object under investigation needs to be made convincing by 
the object under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to establish the other, we 
suspend judgment about both” (OS, 41). This mode draws attention to the circularity when one 
attempts to justify a given knowledge-claim by appealing to some evidence which would, in turn, 
need to be legitimated precisely by the knowledge-claim at issue.  
In Hegel's estimation, these Five Modes constitute the "genuine arsenal" of Pyrrhonism's 
attack. Here is how Hegel himself describes each of the modes in the Skepticism essay:  
The first of these tropes of the suspense of judgment, is that of the diversity, no 
longer now of beasts or of men, as in the first ten tropes, but rather of common 
opinions, and of the teachings of philosophers, both in the opposition of the two 
groups, and internally within each group; this is a trope about which the skeptics 
are always very prolix – everywhere they look for and introduce diversity, where 
they would do better to see identity. The second is that of the infinite regress; 
Sextus uses it often, in the guise in which it has come to the fore in modern times 
as the 'urge toward a ground'; it is the familiar argument that for one grounding 
[principle] a further ground is required, for this still another again, and so on ad 
infinitum. – The third was already here in the first ten, namely, the trope of 
relationship.54 The fourth concerns assumptions, – against the dogmatics who 
                                                          
54
 Hegel explains in his discussion of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus that the suspension of judgment can be 
derived "from relationships (i.e., because everything stands in relationship to something else)" (RSP, 331). He later 
elaborates on this when he writes that "Reason shows with respect to this [false] Absolute, that it has a relation to 
what is excluded from it, and only exists through and in this relation to another, so that it is not absolute, according 




posit something as strictly first, and unproven, in order not to be driven to infinity. 
The skeptics straightaway imitate them, by positing with equal right the opposite 
of that assumption. The fifth is the circular argument, when that which is to serve 
for the proof of another [proposition], itself needs for its own proof, that same 
[proposition] that is to be proved by its means (RSP, 334-35).  
 
Hegel acknowledges there to be "no better weapons against dogmatism on finite bases" 
(RSP, 335) than the Five Modes. However, he goes on to show how each of these same skeptical 
arguments prove to be dogmatic when tested against a genuinely non-dogmatic mode of 
cognition – what Hegel variously calls in the Skepticism essay "the rational," "the Absolute," or 
simply "philosophy. " "Against dogmatism," Hegel writes, "they [the Five Modes of Agrippa] 
must necessarily be victorious therefore; but in the face of philosophy they fall apart internally, 
or they are themselves dogmatic" (RSP, 335). Let us consider the Fourth Mode of Agrippa in this 
connection. The mode of hypothesis is brought in, Sextus explains, "when the Dogmatists, being 
thrown back ad infinitum, begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume 
simply and without proof in virtue of a concession" (OS, 41). When this occurs, the Pyrrhonist 
simply points out that, in the absence of evidence, one has no more reason to accept a given 
claim over its opposite. As Hegel's comments reveal, however, even if the Pyrrhonist manages to 
bring to light what is illicit in the dogmatic procedure of assuming something without evidence 
through the Fourth Mode, this does not prevent her from falling into the same error when she 
turns this argument against a philosophical standpoint which embraces the unity of opposites: 
"the rational is not an unproved assumption," Hegel explains, "so that its counterpart could with 
equal right be presupposed unproven in opposition to it; for the rational," he continues, "has no 
opposed counterpart" (RSP, 335-36). Now, if, as we have seen, a claim is dogmatic in the 
Hegelian sense of the term when it is asserted independently to the exclusion of its contradictory 




problem by stipulating that no unproven presupposition can be preferred over its opposite. On 
the other hand, if "the rational" – or, "philosophy" – names that which, for Hegel, "has no 
opposed counterpart" since it "includes both the finite opposites, which are mutual counterparts, 
within itself" (RSP, 337), then the Pyrrhonist can only wield the Fourth Mode of Agrippa against 
philosophy by treating it as if it did have some contradictory opposed to it. Because, however, 
the Pyrrhonist insists on opposition even when she is faced with something which evidently has 
no opposite, she would appear to be guilty of positing opposition to the exclusion of unity, and 
thus, of dogmatically adhering to the principle of noncontradiction. Accordingly, even though 
the Pyrrhonist seems to recognize the "essence of dogmatism" when she insists, in accordance 
with the Fourth Mode, that no unproven assumption can be privileged over its opposite, she 
nevertheless posits "something finite, something burdened with an opposition… as the Absolute" 
(RSP, 335) in turning the Fourth Mode against the rational. Not only then, does Hegel's 
engagement with Pyrrhonism in the Skepticism essay provide him with an opportunity to exhibit 
the dogmatic character of modern skepticism; by exposing Pyrrhonism's own inherent limits, he 
is also able to define the contours of a philosophy which is "neither skepticism nor dogmatism, 
and is thus both at once" (RSP, 323). Nowhere is such a philosophy more evident than in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit – a work which Hegel explicitly describes as one of self-completing 
skepticism.  
 Before turning to examine how the skepticism that is one with philosophy emerges in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, let us briefly take stock of what we have seen in the course of our 
analysis. In Part One, we saw that Hegel considers Schulze's skepticism dogmatic not because it 
fails to adequately justify the basis of its attack on Kantianism in presupposing the truth of what 




the exclusion of their unity. Although the dogmatic character of Schulze's skepticism comes into 
view when it is set alongside the "chief constitutive principle of skepticism" ["to every account 
an equal account is opposed" (OS, 6)], this should not lead us to conclude that ancient skepticism 
fares any better, in Hegel's estimation, than its modern counterpart. Both of these, as we have 
seen, remain dogmatic, insofar as they fail to consistently acknowledge the unity of 
contradictories. Since, however, "every genuine philosophy," as Hegel explains, "always sublates 
the principle of contradiction" (RSP, 325), it would seem that neither of these forms could 
qualify as the skepticism that is one with philosophy. Indeed, if the skepticism that is one with 
philosophy is anywhere present in the 1802 article, it is in Hegel's description of the rational as 
that which exposes the falsity of every dogmatic assertion – including any that would posit 
opposition to the neglect of unity – and which, presumably, sublates the principle of 
noncontradiction in doing so. Already by 1802, then, Hegel had articulated the idea that 
"skepticism is itself in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy" (RSP, 322-23), but, as 
we will see next, it wasn't until 1807 that he was able to bring this idea to life in developing an 
account of the "path of natural consciousness pressing towards true knowing."55 Let us turn then 
to the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel's account of self-completing skepticism. 
 
 
Part Three: Self-Completing Skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
 When Hegel argues in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit that Science 
cannot presuppose its own validity without putting itself on equal footing with the "untrue 
                                                          
55 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 49. 





knowledge" which it disclaims, he is implicitly appealing to the Fourth Mode of Agrippa.56 
However, even if Hegel helps himself to the modes of skepticism in exposing the falsity of all 
forms of natural consciousness – and he does so liberally throughout this text – this is not 
because he thinks that Pyrrhonism is valid on its own account. Indeed, Hegel even identifies 
Pyrrhonism as one such pattern of knowing whose "untruth" the skeptical modes make manifest. 
What allows Hegel to make use of these modes in order to demonstrate the imperfections of each 
successive form of natural consciousness without reducing philosophy to skepticism is, as we 
will see, a basic feature of the Phenomenology's own distinctive method. Accordingly, if, as I 
have suggested, in speaking of a philosophy which is "neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is 
thus both at once" (RSP, 323), Hegel is attempting to articulate a mode of thinking which is 
capable of demonstrating the falsity of every "one-sided" claim to knowledge, and of doing so 
without taking for granted the validity of the principle of noncontradiction, then it will soon 
become clear that the skepticism that he is after is none other than the self-completing skepticism 
exhibited in the Phenomenology. 
 Hegel introduces self-completing skepticism [der sich vollbringende Skeptizismus] in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology, where he defines it in contradistinction to both Pyrrhonism 
and Descartes' hyperbolic doubt. In contrast to that methodological skepticism which would 
question the certainty of all long-standing opinions only in order to put these on a more secure 
footing, Hegel explains that the path outlined in the Phenomenology entails the "conscious 
insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge" (PS, 50). Rather than concern itself merely 
with questions of subjective certainty (of whether, that is, I am epistemically entitled to make a 
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given knowledge-claim), this skepticism "brings about a state of despair about all the so-called 
natural ideas, thoughts, and opinions" (PS, 50) precisely so as to arrive at the truth of what 
knowing is. Hegel further elaborates on this distinction between certainty and truth when he 
explains that "self-completing skepticism is also not the skepticism with which an earnest zeal 
for truth and Science fancies it has prepared and equipped itself in their service: the resolve in 
Science, not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to examine 
everything for oneself and follow only one's own conviction, or better still, to produce 
everything oneself, and accept only one's own deed as what is true" (PS, 50). Thus, while 
Descartes uses skeptical examination as a tool for arriving at subjective certainty, this is not the 
role of skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Rather, the “self-completing skepticism” that 
Hegel embarks on there is carried out in the interest of truth.   
Though this would seem to make self-completing skepticism similar to Pyrrhonism – if, 
that is, Hegel is correct that the concept of "doubt" is always "inappropriate" to ancient 
skepticism on account of its subjective undertones – he nevertheless goes on to sharply 
distinguish the former from the latter.57 As opposed to Pyrrhonism, the skepticism which "only 
ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is 
specifically the nothingness of that from which it results" (PS, 51), Hegel explains that "self-
completing skepticism" identifies a positive, determinate product issuing from the oppositions 
which it engages. The Pyrrhonist can never get beyond this "pure nothingness" because the 
suspension of judgment entails that she remain as indifferent to the counter-argument she puts 
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forth as to the original assertion she sets out to contest. To the Pyrrhonist, what is most 
significant is that the equipollence of opposing claims brings knowledge to a standstill. This is, 
presumably, why Hegel considers Pyrrhonism to be engaged in a purely "negative procedure" 
(PS, 50). "But," Hegel argues, "when the result [of contradiction] is conceived as it is in truth, 
namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the 
negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms 
comes about of itself" (PS, 51).  
 This is precisely what occurs in the case of self-completing skepticism. Rather than treat 
contradiction as the undoing of knowledge, self-completing skepticism regards it as a necessary 
moment in the development of Science – one which allows the phenomenological observer not 
only to recognize the falsity of a given pattern of knowing, but also to discover a new pattern 
disclosed in this very negation. Because, as Hegel argues, the distinction between the concept of 
knowledge ("being-for-another") and the object of knowledge ("being-in-itself") belongs to 
consciousness itself, the phenomenological observer need not provide her own criterion in order 
evaluate each pattern of knowing, but merely "look on" to see whether these two moments 
correspond to one another within a given form of natural consciousness. Hegel describes this 
procedure in the following: 
If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one 
another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it 
conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object 
itself alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a 
knowledge of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it 
essentially belonged to this knowledge. […] Since consciousness thus finds that 
its knowledge does not correspond to its object, the object itself does not stand the 
test; in other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was 
to have been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing is not only a testing 






If, after demonstrating the non-correspondence of the concept of knowledge and the object of 
knowledge within a given pattern of knowing, self-completing skepticism merely fastened onto 
the negative result of its findings (that is, the fact that this pattern does not constitute true 
knowledge), then it would hardly be distinguishable from the dogmatic skepticism of Sextus 
Empiricus. To the extent, however, that it identifies a positive result captured in the negative of a 
given knowledge-claim (that is, that consciousness alters its own shape when confronted by the 
non-correspondence of its two moments), it is able to advance beyond the narrow limits of 
Pyrrhonism.58 This difference between Pyrrhonism's own self-understanding and that of self-
completing skepticism is ultimately what allows the latter to qualify as the skepticism that is one 
with philosophy and, as we will see next, it is precisely this difference which Hegel chooses to 
highlight when he takes up Pyrrhonism as a pattern of knowing in the Phenomenology.   
 In the section entitled "Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness," Hegel 
examines three patterns of knowing which, as moments of Self-Consciousness, suggest that all 
knowledge is essentially self-knowledge. While Hegel finds in "Stoicism" a shape of 
consciousness which merely asserts the freedom of thought from the "bustle of existence," in 
"Skepticism" he takes up the "actual experience of what the freedom of thought is" (PS, 123) – a 
mode of thinking which attempts to establish its own absolute independence by tearing down 
everything firm which would stand in its way. As Hegel explains, however, "what [Pyrrhonian] 
Skepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it" 
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(PS, 124). If the Pyrrhonist can only establish her own absolute independence by negating all 
otherness standing before her, this means that she is in fact dependent on the negation of the 
existence of this otherness to achieve self-certainty: 
This consciousness is therefore the unconscious, thoughtless rambling which 
passes back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to 
the other extreme of contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and 
bewildering. It does not itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. At one 
time it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and 
contingency of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse into 
occupying itself with what is unessential (PS, 125). 
 
In this way, Hegel locates within Pyrrhonism a disparity between its concept and its object of 
knowledge. Although it maintains that all knowledge is simply the self-knowledge of a stable, 
self-identical, and radically independent subjectivity, it turns out that what it really knows is an 
utterly dependent figure which can escape the "contingency of existence" no more than the 
otherness that it seeks to annihilate in thought; what it knows is merely the "dizziness of a 
perpetually self-engendered disorder" (PS, 125).  
 Because the path outlined in the Phenomenology is one of self-completing skepticism, 
when the phenomenological observer is thus presented with the self-contradictory character of 
Pyrrhonism, she does not merely linger over the negative result of this form of consciousness, 
but identifies in its failure a new configuration of knowing – one which "brings together the two 
thoughts which [Pyrrhonian] Skepticism holds apart" (PS, 126). Since Pyrrhonism, however, 
insists on the mutual exclusivity of its two moments, oscillating between two conflicting 
conceptions of itself (as absolutely independent, on the one hand, and as absolutely dependent, 
on the other), it is incapable of acknowledging the emergence of this new pattern of knowing, 
which Hegel characterizes as the "unhappy"59 awareness of Pyrrhonism's own self-contradictory 
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nature. Here, we encounter once more the distinction which Hegel drew earlier in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology: unlike self-completing skepticism, Pyrrhonism cannot 
advance beyond the negative result of contradiction – not even when it is confronted with a 
contradiction which obtains in its own self-understanding.60 The reason why Pyrrhonism "only 
ever sees pure nothingness in its result" (PS, 51) is because it takes contradiction to entail 
falsehood. Now, self-completing skepticism shares this conviction with Pyrrhonism insofar as it 
considers the non-correspondence of concept and object in a given pattern of knowing to 
disqualify its claim to truth; however, it differs from Pyrrhonism in its understanding of the 
nature of falsity:  
To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and 
its Substance. But this very disparity is the process of distinguishing in general, 
which is an essential moment [in knowing]. Out of this distinguishing, of course, 
comes their identity, and this resultant identity is the truth. But it is not truth as if 
the disparity had been thrown away, like dross from pure metal, not even like the 
tool which remains separate from the finished vessel; disparity, rather, as the 
negative, the self, is itself directly present in the True as such (PS, 23). 
 
To say that a given pattern of knowing is "false" on account of the disparity between its concept 
and object is not, therefore, to say that it is extraneous to true knowing. Rather, the same process 
which exposes what is false in a given pattern of knowing through the comparison of its 
moments reveals what is true in that form. As Hegel is quick to point out, however, this does not 
mean that the "false is a moment of the True, let alone a component part of it" (PS, 23) – for this 
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would be to suppose that "truth" and "falsity," like oil and water, are so constituted that they 
must repel one another whenever they come into contact – but rather that they are two sides of 
the same coin. The "truth" of a given form of consciousness – and likewise its "falsity" – is 
contained in the shape succeeding it as the negation of that concept-object disparity present in 
this now superseded form. It is in this sense that the "Unhappy Consciousness" is the "truth" of 
"Skepticism." Because Pyrrhonism, by contrast, takes a dogmatic approach to falsehood, it fails 
to recognize that the oppositions upon which it insists already bespeak the presence of truth.  
 Thus, if we now ask what accounts for this fundamental difference between Pyrrhonism 
and self-completing skepticism, we find ourselves met once more with the foremost insight of 
the Skepticism essay. The Pyrrhonist is unwilling to accept the fact that negation is an essential 
moment in knowing because she holds dogmatically to the opposition of truth and falsehood – 
that is, because she cannot countenance the unity of these apparent opposites. Between the 
Skepticism essay and the Phenomenology of Spirit, therefore, Hegel's view of Pyrrhonism 
remains essentially unchanged: Pyrrhonism cannot be considered a genuine mode of 
philosophical cognition since it fails to sublate the principle of noncontradiction. On the other 
hand, because self-completing skepticism brings together the two opposing moments held part in 
every form of natural consciousness, it would seem to possess the defining characteristic of a 
philosophy which is "neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once" (RSP, 323) – 
that is, to consistently acknowledge the unity of contradictories. Consequently, self-completing 
skepticism is a later articulation of what Hegel described in his 1802 article for the Critical 
Journal under the heading of the rational. In fact, the only significant difference between these 
consists in the fact that the rational refers to that speculative standpoint from which the "essence 




character of every form of natural consciousness through a mode of philosophical skepticism 
unencumbered by the principle of noncontradiction. And yet, if, as I have argued, the self-
completing skepticism of the Phenomenology approximates Hegel's description of a form of 
skepticism that is "in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy" (RSP, 322-23), one 
might wonder whether this should be considered a form of skepticism at all. It is to this question 
that we now turn in conclusion. 
 In this chapter, I have argued that that particular form of skepticism which Hegel sees as 
one with philosophy is not that of Schulze, the New Academy, or Sextus Empiricus, since each 
of these fails in one way or another to sublate the principle of noncontradiction, but the self-
completing skepticism of the Phenomenology – a later, more carefully developed articulation of 
what Hegel calls the rational in the Skepticism essay. However, if, as Hegel writes, "the concepts 
of skepticism which allow it to be viewed only in the particular form in which it comes on the 
scene as skepticism pure and simple, disappear in the face of a philosophic standpoint from 
which it can be found as genuine skepticism even in those philosophical systems which Sch[ulze] 
and others with him can only regard as dogmatic" (RSP, 322), then it would seem to follow that 
self-completing skepticism is – strictly speaking – no form of skepticism at all. To view the 
matter this way, however, is to miss the entire point of Hegel's discussion of the philosophical 
significance of skepticism. The Pyrrhonist may insist on the antagonistic nature of the 
relationship of skepticism to philosophy, but, if my interpretation is correct, this is only because 
her adherence to the principle of noncontradiction prevents her from acknowledging the fact that 
opposition is an indispensable moment in all genuine philosophical cognition, and not, as the 
Pyrrhonist maintains, the foreclosure of this possibility. Accordingly, to oppose skepticism to 




with every true philosophy" (RSP, 322-23) – or, to put it in the terms of the Phenomenology, that 
philosophy is the "truth" of skepticism. As I have tried to show, the line of argument that Hegel 
develops across the Skepticism essay and the Phenomenology challenges us not only to rethink 
the opposition between philosophy and skepticism, but, equally, to rethink the nature of 
opposition itself. This will be essential to bear in mind, as we turn in Chapter Three to examine 
how the self-completing skepticism of the Phenomenology leads Hegel beyond the oppositions 
of consciousness, and thus, to the completion of skepticism in "Absolute Knowing," the starting 






















The Problem of Presuppositionlessness and the Path of Rational Proof:  




In Chapter Two, I attempted to clarify the sense in which the Phenomenology of Spirit 
could be considered a work of "self-completing skepticism." There, I showed that, in contrast to 
Pyrrhonism, which Hegel argues "only ever sees pure nothingness in its result"61 on account of 
its dogmatic observance of the principle of noncontradiction, the self-completing skepticism of 
the Phenomenology pushes beyond the limits it encounters in each pattern of consciousness, 
reaching its culmination in the standpoint of "absolute knowing." When the phenomenological 
observer arrives, in this way, at the "concept of science," the skeptical antithesis constitutive of 
ordinary consciousness – between the concept of knowledge ("being-for-itself") and the object of 
knowledge ("being-in-itself") – gives way, and with this insight, that the activity of knowing is 
identical to what is known, natural consciousness passes over into genuine philosophical 
cognition. Accordingly, I suggested there that the path outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
could be considered one of "self-completing skepticism" since it refutes every account of 
cognition predicated upon this skeptical antithesis by following the "chief constitutive principle 
of skepticism" ("to every account an equal account is opposed"62) to its logical conclusion.63 It 
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would certainly seem to follow, therefore, that with the conclusion of that text, questions should 
no longer arise as to whether or how we might attain to an unmediated grasp of an object which 
lies exterior to our own limited cognitive means – for if the Phenomenology succeeds in proving 
anything at all, it is that all such questions proceed from presuppositions which make cognition 
impossible. And yet, it is precisely at this point – namely, at the conclusion of the 
Phenomenology – that the challenge of skepticism seems to recur once more.  
 In the final paragraph of his examination of the three "Positions of Thought with Respect 
to Objectivity," an introductory essay to the Encyclopaedia Logic which, Hegel explains, shares 
with the Phenomenology roughly the same goals, we find the following remark: "The opposition 
between a self-standing immediacy of content or knowing and a mediation that is equally self-
standing but incompatible with the former must be set aside… because it is a mere 
presupposition and an arbitrary assurance" (ENC, §78).64 As he continues with this line of 
thought, however, several questions immediately arise – questions which, one would expect, the 
Phenomenology has long since laid to rest: 
Similarly, all other presuppositions or prejudices [Voraussetzungen oder 
Vorurteile] must be surrendered at the entry to science, whether they be taken 
from representation or from thought. For it is in science that all such 
determinations must first be examined and the status of them and their oppositions 
recognized (ENC, §78; my emphasis).65  
 
If, as Hegel goes on to suggest, the science must meet the requirement of "total 
presuppositionlessness [gänzliche Voraussetzungslosigkeit]," one might wonder how this may be 
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achieved and, indeed, whether such a goal can ever truly be realized – for surely there are certain 
conditions or presuppositions that beset every new beginning. Must we not, at the very least, 
presuppose in any inquiry both the object under investigation and the method by which the 
investigation is to be carried out? If it is true that presuppositions such as these are always 
unavoidable and, further, that the truth of the investigation conducted in the Logic is in fact 
contingent upon the achievement of "total presuppositionlessness," then Hegel's project would 
seem to be as hopelessly self-refuting as the forms of consciousness under consideration in the 
Phenomenology. But is Hegel claiming that the Logic is presuppositionless in this apparently 
irredeemable sense? 
 Two comments contained within the introductory material to the Logic speak against this 
interpretation and, to my mind, warrant a further examination of Hegel's claim. In the 
Introduction to the Science of Logic, Hegel makes the following remark:  
Absolute knowledge is the truth of all the modes of consciousness because, as the 
course of the Phenomenology brought out, it is only in absolute knowledge that 
the separation of the subject matter from the certainty of itself is completely 
resolved: truth has become equal to certainty and this certainty to truth. Pure 
science thus presupposes the liberation from the opposition of consciousness (SL, 
29; my emphasis).  
 
If, as Hegel contends, the result of the Phenomenology is the presupposition of the Logic, then it 
is difficult to understand the sense in which the latter may be considered truly presuppositionless. 
Moreover, if, as we have seen, the Phenomenology is able to articulate the concept of science 
only after despairing over the "untruth of phenomenal knowledge," then the following comment, 
which comes at the heels of Hegel's remark concerning the Logic's presuppositionless character, 
must seem equally perplexing: 
Skepticism, as a negative science applied to all forms of knowing, would present 
itself as an introduction in which the vacuousness [Nichtigkeit] of such 




also superfluous since the dialectical element is itself an essential moment of the 
affirmative science (ENC, §78R).    
 
How can the Logic attain to "total presuppositionlessness" if not through that via negativa laid 
out in the Phenomenology? But how, if the Logic is preceded by a work of self-completing 
skepticism which clears the way to genuine cognition, can it be said to have abandoned all 
presuppositions at the outset? It is my goal in this chapter to clarify the way in which the Logic 
resolves these apparent aporiai. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that the problematic of 
skepticism remains of the utmost importance for Hegel even after the conclusion of the 
Phenomenology.66  
 When Hegel describes the Logic as presuppositionless, as I will argue, he is referring, not 
to the argument's having met a formal methodological requirement, but to a unique feature of his 
speculative metaphysics. In fact, Hegel's understanding of the presuppositionless character of the 
Logic puts him squarely at odds with the project of foundationalist epistemology inaugurated 
with Descartes' program of methodical doubt.67 I will go on to show that this important point of 
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clarification – namely, that the Logic is presuppositionless only in the sense that it is its own 
presupposition – is pivotal to understanding how Hegel succeeds not simply in refuting 
skepticism but, indeed, in demonstrating how it expresses, albeit inadequately, the second 
moment of the dialectic and thus a constituent element of reality in the highest sense. In Part 
One, I concentrate on Hegel's account in the Encyclopaedia Logic of the three "positions of 
thought towards objectivity." Here, I argue that Hegel's basic objection to each account of 
cognition he considers is that it presupposes, at the methodological level, certain metaphysical 
and logical categories – what Hegel calls "thought-determinations [Denkbestimmungen]" – 
which only become justified finally in the Logic itself, where it becomes clear that these 
concepts are not merely subjective but, taken together in their systematic relationship, constitute 
the fundamental structure of reality. Or, as Hegel puts it in the Encyclopaedia Logic, “the 
relationship of forms such as concept, judgment, and syllogism to others like causality, etc., can 
only establish itself within the Logic itself” (ENC, §24R). Because, as I explain, each of the three 
positions of thought fails in this way to justify the basic concepts upon which it relies, it cannot 
be considered presuppositionless in the unique sense at issue in Hegel's description. An 
important consequence of this argument, as we will see, is that Hegel considers the attempt to 
clarify cognition prior to its employment to be predicated upon an epistemological prejudice. As 
it will turn out, Hegel rejects the attempt to employ skepticism as a propaedeutic for philosophy 
for the same reason. In both cases, Hegel’s rejection stems from his insistence that the critique of 
the finite forms of cognition and the activity of cognition itself must be considered one and the 
same. In Part Two, I turn to Hegel's account of "rational proof," where, I argue, his solution to 
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the problem of presuppositionlessness is to be found. This solution, as we will see, involves the 
application of a method which grounds all of its assumptions over the course of its elaboration – 
a method which proves to be identical to its object. Finally, I argue in Part Three that the 
presuppositionless character of the Logic, which emerges over the course of its "rational proof," 
helps clarify the way that Hegel conceives of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy 
in the most mature stage of his thinking. Here, Hegel comes to recognize that skepticism, 
containing "mere negation as the result of the dialectical" (ENC, §81R), is an inadequate 
expression of the second moment of the dialectic.  
 
 
Part One: The Proof of the Understanding 
 Hegel's introductions to the system are notoriously difficult. In the process of explaining 
what kind of project philosophical science is," Ardis Collins observes, "the introductory essays 
of Enc and WL call attention to the unique challenge involved in justifying its starting point."68 
As we will see, this unique challenge consists in the fact that philosophical science must be able 
to provide its own justification without appealing to any criterion which it does not itself prove. 
This is not only reflected in “With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?,” the 
introductory essay to the Science of Logic, but, as Collins suggests, also in Hegel's discussion of 
the three positions of thought towards objectivity in the Encyclopaedia Logic. Though this early 
section of the Encyclopaedia, like the Phenomenology, is intended to "explicate the importance 
and the standpoint here given to logic" (ENC, §25) and lead the reader up to the standpoint of 
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philosophical science,69 Hegel admits that this examination "can be conducted only historically 
[historisch]70 and by reasoning in a strictly formal way [räsonierend]" (ENC, §25R) – which is 
to say, unscientifically. This will be important to bear in mind as we make our way through 
Hegel's argument. While this introductory section arguably succeeds in clarifying the sense of 
presuppositionlessness at issue in the Logic by exposing the way that the proof procedure tacitly 
employed by each of these positions draws upon concepts which it cannot justify, his argument 
here suffers from the same basic limitation: it presupposes, rather than proves, its own validity. 
As we will see, it is only because the Logic deduces these same concepts from thinking itself that 
it can claim to be truly presuppositionless. Let us begin then by briefly familiarizing ourselves 
with these three positions – along with the assumptions that they unwittingly harbor – before 
moving on to examine how each one employs a method which ultimately prevents them from 
achieving total presuppositionlessness.  
 The first position of thought that Hegel addresses is pre-Critical metaphysics. This 
position, "still oblivious to the opposition of thinking within and against itself," Hegel writes, 
"contains the belief that through thinking things over the truth comes to be known" and that 
thought, in this way "engages the objects [Gegenstände] directly" (ENC, §26). Rather than 
concern itself with whether, how, or to what extent the forms of thinking that it is wont to 
employ can be legitimately predicated of things, this "naïve manner of proceeding" only inquires 
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into whether this concept corresponds to this object. To illustrate the limitations of this approach, 
Hegel directs us to the so-called "metaphysical proofs" of God's existence. According to the 
standpoint assumed in such arguments, there can be no question of whether predicates like 
"existence" can be meaningfully assigned to an apparently infinite object such as "God," or 
whether, on the contrary, this "form of determining the absolute by means of the attribution of 
predicates " (ENC, §28) can only persuade us of our own prejudices – for, as Hegel explains, it 
simply takes up the "abstract thought-determinations in their immediacy, and allow[s] them to 
count as predicates of what is true" (ENC, §28Z).71 Nor can there be any question here of 
whether this standpoint correctly construes the objects which it claims to know. Rather, Hegel 
argues, these objects (the soul, the world, God) are taken up in the first position of thought 
merely as they are given in "representation [Vorstellung]" – that is, in the pre-philosophical 
manner in which we consider objects in abstraction from their conditions of intelligibility.72 For 
example, in the Ontological Proof, one begins with a representation of God as “something than 
which nothing greater can be thought”73 and concludes from this representation that God exists. 
Not only then is this position guilty of taking for granted the concepts through which it claims to 
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grasp its object (e.g., the concept of existence); it also presupposes the very object itself (e.g., 
God) and, in this way, restricts thought to its immediate representations.  
 For Hegel, the second position of thought, which he identifies in both empiricism and 
critical philosophy, constitutes both an advance beyond, and a regression behind, the standpoint 
of the older metaphysics. "The initial point of departure," Hegel writes of the second position of 
thought, "is the difference between the elements that result from the analysis of experience: the 
sensory material and its universal relations" (ENC, §40). In other words, it sets out from a 
distinction between what is given in the sensible manifold, on the one hand, and the forms that 
unite and render intelligible this manifold, on the other. This difference is not operative in the 
first position of thought, which, as just discussed, simply takes for granted the objectivity of the 
concepts it employs without any reference to what is specifically given in experience. According 
to Hegel, empiricism introduces a new principle with respect to seeking the truth, namely, that 
truth must be sought with reference to experience. As he puts it, “There lies in empiricism this 
great principle that what is true must exist in actuality and be there for perception” (ENC, §37R).  
Hegel includes Critical Philosophy in the second position of thought, because in Kant’s 
philosophy one finds not only a similar distinction – namely, the distinction between concept and 
intuition – but a similar effort to limit the theoretical employment of reason to objects of possible 
experience. However, rather than accepting that the forms are only customary and ultimately 
contingent, Kant seeks to demonstrate their objective necessity through an investigation into the 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience itself.74 In this way, Kant’s Critical 
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philosophy attempts to avoid the presuppositions of the first position of thought by engaging in a 
comprehensive investigation into the nature and limits of human cognition. Kant's critique of 
metaphysics reflects in this way the understanding that cognition is only genuine when it is free 
from presuppositions.  
However, Hegel makes clear that despite this, Kant nevertheless fails to consistently 
apply this very insight to his own investigation. Rather than examine the categories "in and for 
themselves," Hegel explains, the critical philosophy considers them merely "with a view to the 
opposition of subjectivity and objectivity " (ENC, §41), without realizing that these, too, are 
concepts which must in turn be made subject to critical scrutiny. It is for this reason that Hegel 
counts Kant's contribution as a regression behind the first position of thought – because, that is, 
his investigation into the limits of cognition led him to deny that crucial insight that the 
determinations of thought must be considered the "fundamental determinations of things." This 
is, presumably, what accounts for the fact that Kant could affirm in the Transcendental 
Deduction that the categories are "objective" (insofar as they prove to be necessary for the 
legitimate cognition of the objects we encounter in experience), but at the same time deny that 
they could be said to pertain to things in themselves: in Hegel's estimation, Kant simply assumes 
that thoughts, "despite being universal and necessary determinations, are… merely our thoughts, 
and distinguished from what the thing is in-itself by an insurmountable gulf" (ENC, §41Z2), 
even as he recommends a thoroughgoing critique of the cognitive faculties. The second position 
of thought therefore fares no better in Hegel's judgment than the earlier metaphysics whose 




cognition can only come about once we abandon all presuppositions, Hegel argues that it can 
only offer this as a "bare assurance" for which it ultimately gives no justification.75 
 The third position of thought – immediate knowing [das unmittelbare Wissen] – shares 
with the preceding standpoint the conviction that the concepts of classical metaphysics are 
fundamentally limited. Since, according to this position, the activity of thinking only allows 
objects to be apprehended in the form of "something conditioned and mediated" (ENC, §62), 
thinking must necessarily distort any object which cannot be located within a given causal 
sequence.76 Jacobi thus finds himself in agreement with Kant that God, as an infinite, 
unconditioned object, cannot be known through the finite operations of discursive cognition. As 
Hegel explains, however, the peculiarity of the third position of thought consists in the fact that it 
insists that an adequate apprehension of the infinite is nevertheless possible through a form of 
knowing which eschews the mediation characteristic of discursive thought. Rather than attempt 
to prove God's existence through the employment of concepts which, according to this position, 
would reduce God to the status of something conditioned, the standpoint of immediate knowing 
considers God's existence to be an undeniable fact which can be found immediately within 
consciousness itself and proven in no other way.77 Though Hegel is far from disputing the claim 
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that "the infinite, the eternal, the God in our representation also is" (ENC, §64) but indeed 
affirms this as an indubitable certainty which philosophy shares with this standpoint, he 
nevertheless denies that this can be known only in the form of immediacy. As Hegel explains, 
Jacobi comes to the conclusion that the infinite can be exclusively grasped by an immediate form 
of knowing which eludes conceptual mediation only after first presupposing the mutual 
exclusivity of the concepts of immediacy and mediation. This is evidently what Hegel has in 
mind when he writes at the end of his introductory essay that "the opposition between a self-
standing immediacy of content or knowing and a mediation that is equally self-standing but 
incompatible with the former, must be set aside… because it is a mere presupposition and an 
arbitrary assurance" (ENC, §78) – that is, that Jacobi assumes, rather than explains, the basic 
opposition underpinning the doctrine of immediate knowing.78 As I will argue in what follows, 
however, Hegel's remark here is not merely directed at the third position of thought, but is rather 
aimed at all three positions to the extent that each employs a mode of proof that prevents it from 
achieving the sort of presuppositionlessness that is at issue in the Logic. Let us turn our attention 
then to Hegel's description of this proof procedure so that we might see how it is utilized by each 
of the three accounts of cognition he considers.  
 Hegel elaborates this proof procedure in connection with the metaphysical arguments for 
God's existence employed in the first position of thought, but, as we will see, its use is not 
restricted to this task: "The chief point here," he writes,   
is that the way of constructing proofs as it is undertaken by the understanding 
concerns the dependency of one determination on another. With this kind of 
demonstration, one makes a presupposition, something fixed, from which 
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something else follows. So what is being demonstrated here is the dependency of 
a determination on a presupposition. Now if the existence of God is supposed to 
be demonstrated in this way, then this means that the being of God is made to 
depend on other determinations so that the latter constitute the ground of God's 
being. Here one sees immediately that something out of kilter is bound to result, 
for God is supposed to be the ground absolutely of everything and therefore not 
dependent on something else (ENC, §36Z). 
  
Now, we have already seen that the first position of thought takes for granted the validity of the 
concepts through which it claims to know its object. As Hegel's account suggests, however, this 
is no mere accident, but rather the necessary consequence of a "finite" procedure predicated upon 
the opposition of immediacy and mediation. When Hegel, following Jacobi, objects that the 
Cosmological Proof, an argument which derives God’s existence from certain alleged facts about 
the world, results in the absurd conclusion that the "being of God is made to depend on other 
concepts so that the latter constitute the ground of God's being," he is not simply drawing 
attention to the fact that this argument rests upon questionable premises which it would do well 
to re-examine. If I am correct, his suggestion is rather that this argument can only grasp the 
unconditioned in the form of something conditioned because it presupposes the mutual 
exclusivity of the concepts of immediacy and mediation at the level of method – which is to say 
that the proof procedure employed in the metaphysical arguments for God's existence is 
ultimately incapable of demonstrating the truth of its premises and, for this reason, insufficient 
for an apprehension of the infinite. It is ordinarily assumed that a proof is complete when one has 
shown the conclusion to follow from a given set of presuppositions or premises granted at the 
outset. In this way, the typical process of proof assumes that something can be known only as 
mediated by an other which, in turn, can be known simply by virtue of its own immediate, self-
evident content. But if, as Hegel suggests, one can only hope to establish in this manner "the 




establish its own validity, since it assumes that the concepts of immediacy and mediation are true 
"in and for themselves." Consequently, the method of demonstration employed by the 
understanding leads to an explanatory regress in which the justification for this very approach is 
held in a state of abeyance and fails, in this way, to achieve total presuppositionlessness.79 
Though Kant and Jacobi were for this reason convinced that a cognition "which proceeds along 
finite mediations knows only the finite and contains no truth" (ENC, §77), this same argument, 
as we will see, led Hegel to a vastly different conclusion about the truth of cognition.  
 We saw above that Kant's critical philosophy shares with the Logic its concern for total 
presuppositionlessness. However, as we will now observe, it must necessarily fail to achieve this 
same goal since it employs a method that presupposes, rather than proves, its own validity. That 
Kant utilizes this mode of demonstration can be seen throughout the Critical Project, perhaps, 
most evidently, in his use of transcendental argumentation – a form of argument which attempts 
to derive from some evidently undeniable fact (e.g., the unity of self-consciousness) its necessary 
preconditions (e.g., the applicability of the categories to objects of possible experience). Hegel 
already discerns this derivative mode of reasoning, however, in the very notion of critical 
philosophy itself. The "Critical Philosophy," he writes,  
made it its task to investigate to what extent the forms of thinking were capable of 
being of assistance in knowing the truth at all. More specifically, the faculty of 
knowledge was now supposed to be investigated prior to knowing. In this there is 
contained the correct thought that the forms of thought themselves must indeed be 
made the object of knowing. However, the misunderstanding of wanting already 
to know prior to knowing or of wanting not to set foot in the water before one has 
learned to swim, very quickly creeps into the process. To be sure, the forms of 
thought should not be employed unexamined, but examining them is itself already 
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itself a process of knowing. Consequently, the activity of the forms of thought and 
their critique must be joined in knowing (ENC, §41Z1).80   
 
Kant, as we have seen, engages in a second-order inquiry into the limits of human thinking in an 
effort to avoid the presuppositions of the older metaphysics; but, as Hegel here suggests, to insist 
that a critique of the faculties of cognition must precede their legitimate employment is to 
impose upon philosophy an insurmountable task. Kant's project is misguided, in Hegel's 
estimation, not merely because it takes recourse to unwarranted assumptions, but because, in 
failing to recognize that the activity of knowing is itself the very same activity by which knowing 
is made aware of its own inherent limits, the critical philosophy employs a proof procedure 
which is unsuitable to its object. Thus, the critique of cognition is no better starting point than the 
facts themselves. As Hegel explains in the Science of Logic: 
Whatever might be adduced against it [universality] – about the limitations of 
human cognition; about the need to reflect critically on the instrument of 
cognition before getting to the fact itself – all these are themselves 
presuppositions, concrete determinations that as such carry with them the demand 
for mediation and grounding. Therefore, since they formally have no advantage 
over beginning with the fact itself as they protest against, and, because of their 
more concrete content, are on the contrary all the more in need of derivation, 
singling them out for special attention is to be considered as empty presumption 
(SL, 751). 
As Hegel explains here, the notion that cognition must be clarified prior to its employment is 
itself a mere presupposition. This point is crucial to understanding Hegel’s conception of logic, 
which he refuses to separate from metaphysics or equate with the merely formal rules of 
thinking. For Hegel, one cannot separate knowing from what is known; hence, logic should not 
be regarded merely as an investigation into thinking but as an investigation into what is. This is 
what Hegel means when he says that “logic coincides with metaphysics” (ENC, §24). To insist, 
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therefore, that genuine cognition can only come about after the forms of thinking have been 
made subject to critical analysis is to overlook the cognition already at work in the analysis itself 
and to employ a problematic proof procedure. The proof procedure in this case is, once again, 
one that "makes a presupposition, something fixed, from which something else follows." In 
supposing that the critique of the finite forms of cognition ground our comprehension of the 
activity of knowing, Kant presumes the mutual exclusivity of the determinations of immediacy 
and mediation. This suggests to Hegel a very important result – namely, that the "forms of 
thought must be considered in and for themselves [an und für sich]" (ENC, §41Z1), and not 
according to some presupposed method which would have received its legitimation prior to this 
consideration. This result offers an important clue to how it is that the Logic actually achieves 
total presuppositionlessness, a point I will shortly develop further. However, before going on to 
consider the alternative mode of demonstration that Hegel employs in the Logic, and which he 
calls "rational proof," let us first see how the position of immediate knowing takes recourse to 
the very proof procedure that it denounces. 
 Though he credits Jacobi for having recognized the basic defect in the way that the 
understanding conducts its proofs, Hegel finds that the standpoint of immediate knowing "does 
not change anything in the method, introduced by Descartes, of ordinary scientific knowing" 
(ENC, §77). The standpoint of immediate knowing claims to offer an unmediated grasp of its 
object; but, as we have already seen, so long as it takes immediacy to exclude mediation, it will 
be ill-equipped to make good on this promise. Indeed, "in those very exclusions," Hegel writes, 
"the identified standpoint immediately reveals itself to be a relapse into metaphysical 
understanding, into its either-or" (ENC, §65), since they reveal it to be mediated by one-sided 




accommodate. To the extent then that the standpoint of immediate knowing depends, even in its 
basic self-understanding, upon concepts which it takes for granted, it can be constructively 
compared to the proof procedure of the understanding. Since both of these approaches can only 
prove "the dependency of a determination on a presupposition," they cannot do otherwise than 
presuppose their own validity. It is this insight that leads Hegel to claim that the standpoint of 
immediate knowing "discards all methods" and, at the same time, that it nevertheless changes 
nothing "in the method, introduced by Descartes, of ordinary scientific knowing" (ENC, §77). 
Rather than allowing the determinations of thought to "examine themselves… and determine for 
themselves their limits and point up their deficiency in themselves" (ENC, §41Z1), the 
standpoint of immediate knowing, like the proof procedure which it rejects, can ultimately only 
assert the truth of its claims. Accordingly, when Hegel remarks at the conclusion of his 
introductory essay to the Encyclopaedia Logic that the opposition between immediacy and 
mediation, along with all other presuppositions, must be abandoned with the commencement of 
science, this comment must not be taken simply as an attack on the standpoint of immediate 
knowing and its rejection of discursive cognition. But neither, for that matter, should it be read as 
an endorsement of Kant's effort to divest thought of its immediate character through a critique of 
the cognitive faculties. Least of all, however, should Hegel's comment here be interpreted as a 
general methodological principle, the mere adherence to which would secure in advance the 
legitimacy of a given inquiry, irrespective of its particular subject matter.81 Rather, I suggest that 
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 Hegel makes this same point in "With What Must the Beginning of Science be Made?": "But the modern 
perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further need which escapes those who are either busy demonstrating 
their principle dogmatically or skeptically looking for a subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophizing, and is 
outright denied by those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual 
intuition, etc. and who would be exempt from method and logic. If earlier abstract thought is at first interested only 
in the principle as content, but is driven as philosophical culture advances to the other side to pay attention to the 
conduct of the cognitive process, then the subjective activity has also been grasped as an essential moment of 
objective truth, and with this there comes the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle" 




we read Hegel's remark, on the one hand, as an indictment of each of the three positions to the 
extent that they employ a formal procedure which prevents them from establishing their own 
validity and, on the other, as a provisional articulation of the unique constraints which define the 
project of philosophical science.  
The success of this project is indeed bound up with its presuppositionless character. As I 
have tried to suggest, however, this entails not only that it abandon all pre-scientific conceptions 
of its object but, equally, that it renounce the pretension of possessing a method whose 
legitimacy could be secured in advance, prior to its engagement with its object: "the exposition 
of that which alone can be the true method of philosophical science," Hegel writes, "falls within 
the treatment of logic itself; for method is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-
movement of the content of logic" (SL, 33). The Logic can claim to be presuppositionless, as we 
will soon see, because it utilizes a different method of demonstration than the one employed in 
the three positions of thought – namely, that of "rational proof," which is able to establish each 
of the concepts it employs, including the "essential, self-positing unity of immediacy and 
mediation" (ENC, §65R), because it recognizes these same concepts to compose the very 
substance of its object.  
 
 
Part Two: The Path of Rational Proof 
 Even if Hegel is primarily concerned in the introductions to the system to remind his 
reader that the mere articulation of philosophical method is not yet its realization and, 




not be more than a web of presuppositions, assurances and formal reasoning [Räsonnements]" 
(ENC, §10), it will nevertheless be instructive for our purposes to begin our analysis of the mode 
of demonstration employed in the Logic with the description of "rational proof" contained within 
Hegel's consideration of the three positions of thought. Here, Hegel provides an invaluable 
articulation of his own method that helps to clarify the way in which the Logic succeeds in 
winning its truth. In considering this preliminary methodological statement – first, in 
contradistinction to the proof procedure of the understanding, then with reference to the general 
structure of the Logic as a whole – it will become clear that the Logic is presuppositionless, not 
in the sense that it employs a method whose presumed validity guarantees the truth of its 
findings, but in that it provides its own immanent deduction wherein method and object turn out 
to be two complementary expressions of one and the same fundamental reality.   
 Hegel's account of rational proof follows immediately upon his description of the 
procedure employed within the metaphysical proofs of God's existence. Accordingly, Hegel 
elaborates this alternative mode of demonstration using the being of God once more as his 
primary example. Hegel's choice here, however, is not incidental, but rather reflects the only sort 
of object that he deems appropriate to this mode of proof – an object to which the finite 
predicates of classical metaphysics cannot be ascribed in any straightforward manner. These are 
what Hegel calls “objects of reason.” "To be sure, the manner of proving engaged in by reason," 
he writes, 
equally takes something other than God for its point of departure, and yet in its 
progression it does not leave this other standing as something immediate and as a 
being. Rather, by exhibiting this other as something mediated and posited, it leads 
at the same time to the result that God is to be regarded as that which is truly 
immediate, primordial, and self-subsistent, containing mediation as sublated 
within himself. […] Hence, the position is reversed and what appeared as a 




a ground is demoted to a consequence. This is precisely the path of rational proof 
[der Gang des vernünftigen Beweisens] (ENC, §36Z) (with my changes). 
   
Hegel's fundamental objection to the proof procedure of the understanding is, as we have seen, 
that it must necessarily fail to establish its own validity since it rests upon concepts which it 
cannot prove, but must rather presuppose – concepts which, for this reason, it effectively treats as 
the ground of the object under investigation. Although in a rational proof, one must also 
presuppose concepts in the beginning, this does not mean that rational proof fails in the same 
way that the proof procedure of the understanding does. This is because, in contrast to that 
procedure of finite cognition in which "one makes a presupposition, something fixed, from 
which something else follows" (ENC, §36Z), a rational proof proceeds to prove its own 
presuppositions by deducing these from its own unique object. To be clear, Hegel’s point is not 
that the logic of the understanding must be rejected as false. This logic is adequate for making 
finite claims about finite objects. However, for Hegel, we cannot ever fully justify the claims 
made by the logic of the understanding without engaging in rational proof. In other words, a 
finite logic must be grounded in one that is infinite.  
 At first sight, the difference between the proof of the understanding and the proof of 
reason that Hegel points to here might seem to amount to a merely nominal difference, changing 
only what is presupposed in the process of proof, rather than doing away with presuppositions 
entirely. But Hegel is not suggesting that we must derive knowledge of the world from 
presumptions about the nature of God any more than that we must derive knowledge of God’s 
existence from presumptions about the world. For in either case, the inquiry’s presuppositions – 
what mediates the object of inquiry – are left unscrutinized. When, for example, one looks to 
nature as a guide for finding God, Hegel explains: “. . . this does not mean that God is something 




consequence is at the same time the absolute ground of the former” (ENC, §36Z). In taking the 
presuppositions of an inquiry to be valid independently of that inquiry’s results, then, we proceed 
from a derivative conception of cognition. The problem with the proof of the understanding is 
not, therefore, that it begins with something immediate, something taken for granted, for every 
inquiry must begin in this way. As Hegel says, "The difficulty of making a beginning… arises at 
once, since a beginning is something immediate and as such makes a presupposition, or rather it 
is itself just that" (ENC, §1). The problem, rather, is that, in making the truth of its findings 
entirely dependent upon that of its starting point, it effectively presupposes the mutual 
exclusivity of immediacy and mediation, presupposition and result, at the level of method. Thus, 
when Hegel claims that "what appeared as a consequence shows itself equally as a ground, and 
what presented itself at first as a ground is demoted to a consequence" his point is we discover 
along the path of rational proof that immediacy and mediation, like all other finite concepts, do 
not hold absolute validity in the face of a truly unconditioned object – an object of reason. What 
Hegel is trying to express here therefore, albeit in a provisional and anticipatory manner, is that 
the Logic, qua rational proof, can attain to total presuppositionlessness only insofar as it serves 
as its own presupposition. This is because, from the speculative standpoint assumed in the Logic, 
the beginning is nothing more than the concept of science posited in advance, prior to the entire 
process of its development: "this standpoint," Hegel writes, "which thus appears to be an 
immediate one, must transform itself into a result within the science itself, and indeed into its 
final result, in which the science recaptures its beginning and returns to itself" (ENC, §17). To 
illustrate this point in greater detail, it will be instructive to consider the epistemological 
presupposition which stands at the beginning of the Logic – the result of Hegel's preceding 




 The Phenomenology concludes with the insight that all knowledge is essentially the self-
knowledge of a subject for whom every reference to an other standing over against it has been 
sublated. Because, however, each of the oppositions encountered along the "way of despair" are 
shown up, in their turn, to be false, Hegel argues that this simple unity into which consciousness 
resolves is, strictly speaking, no knowledge at all, and is more appropriately conceived as 
"simple immediacy [einfache Unmittelbarkeit]" – or, better yet, as "pure being [reine Sein]."82 It 
is with this "simplest of all simples" that the Logic properly begins. Though this determination, 
being the most basic and thus least determinate articulation of the concept, is what in the Logic 
comes first, Hegel makes clear that it must not be taken simply as the ground of all that follows: 
in philosophical science, "progression is a retreat to the ground, to the origin and the truth on 
which that with which the beginning was made, and from which it is in fact produced, depends" 
(SL, 49). Thus, the Logic begins with pure being, but it proceeds to ground this presupposition 
by exhibiting knowledge in its full systematic totality as the "concept of the concept" – that truly 
universal form of thinking in which each of the concepts of classical metaphysics which, taken 
singly and on their own, suggest a separation between concept and object, are grasped in their 
necessary interrelation.83 It is only at the end of this exposition, when being is grasped, not 
merely as something immediate, but as the first expression and product of the idea, that it 
becomes truly intelligible. As Hegel explains in the Science of Logic, "what constitutes the 
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beginning, because it is something still undeveloped and empty of content, is not yet truly known 
at that beginning… only science, and science fully developed, is the completed cognition of it, 
replete with content and finally truly grounded" (SL, 49). From this perspective, however, the 
presupposition that stands at the beginning of the Logic loses its "one-sided" character since it 
proves to be mediated by that systematic totality of which it is a mere moment, that is, it proves 
to be “something posited and mediated and not what simply and immediately is [nicht als das 
Seiende und Unmittelbare]” (ENC, §239Z). It becomes, in this respect, not unlike "the old man 
who says the same religious sentences as the child… but [for whom] … they have the meaning 
of his entire life" (ENC, §237Z). It is not, therefore, in renouncing, but rather, in grounding what 
first appears as immediate that the Logic turns out to be totally presuppositionless and to depend 
upon nothing other than what it already contains. Accordingly, when Hegel claims that "pure 
science… presupposes the liberation from the opposition of consciousness" (SL, 29), he does not 
mean to suggest that the truth of the Logic is in any way contingent upon that of the 
Phenomenology,84 but rather that the latter concludes with the concept of science in its infancy – 
the same point with which the Logic begins and to which it invariably returns upon the path of 
rational proof.  
It must, of course, be stressed that the meaning that being takes on when it is 
comprehended as both presupposition and result is different than the meaning it has when it is 
taken up simply as immediate:  
One may well say… that every beginning must be made with the absolute, just as 
every advance is only the exposition of it, in so far as implicit in existence is the 
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concept. But because the absolute exists at first only implicitly, in itself, it equally 
is not the absolute nor the posited concept, and also not the idea, for the in-itself is 
only an abstract, one-sided moment, and this is what they are. The advance is not, 
therefore, a kind of superfluity; this is what it would be if that which is at the 
beginning were already the absolute; the advance consists rather in this, that the 
universal determines itself and is the universal for itself, that is, equally a singular 
and a subject. Only in its consummation is it the absolute (SL, 740). 
The Logic begins and ends with the absolute; it is both the presupposition and the result of that 
investigation. This does not mean, however, that the latter is reducible to the former. The Logic 
exhibits the concept of science in its full systematic development, from pure being to the idea. It 
is not until the concept is comprehended as both presupposition and result, however, that it is 
grasped “for itself.” 
To reiterate then, when Hegel describes the Logic as presuppositionless, he is not 
claiming that it satisfies a formal methodological requirement which would secure in advance the 
legitimacy of this investigation. As we have seen, this notion of presuppositionlessness is 
predicated upon the mistaken assumption that immediacy and mediation are mutually exclusive 
concepts which are true "in and for themselves," rather than two moments of the Concept whose 
truth lies in their unity.85 While the Logic certainly proceeds from an assumption arrived at 
through phenomenological reflection – namely, that concept and object stand as one in a simple 
unity – it differs from the formal procedure exhibited in the three positions of thought in that it 
goes on to ground that presupposition in its result, in accordance with that alternative mode of 
demonstration which Hegel calls "rational proof." It is only, therefore, in utilizing a method 
which establishes each of the concepts to which it appeals in the course of its employment by 
                                                          
85
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demonstrating these to belong to the very nature of its object that the Logic wins its truth and 
achieves total presuppositionlessness.86 This is why Hegel can claim, without inconsistency, that 
though the Logic is indeed presuppositionless, it nevertheless presupposes the result of that 
investigation conducted in the Phenomenology.  
 But one might wonder whether this is this really all that the Logic presumes. After all, if 
the Logic presupposes the conclusion of the Phenomenology, and if this conclusion can only be 
attained through the destructive work of a "negative science" which would reveal the finite forms 
of cognition in their nullity, doesn't this then imply that the Logic requires skepticism as its 
propaedeutic? And, if it is indeed the case that the Logic must put skepticism to work in its 
service in order to purify cognition of its finitude, doesn't this make it vulnerable to the same 
objection which Hegel put to the second position of thought – namely, that "to want to clarify the 
nature of cognition prior to science is to demand that it should be discussed outside science, and 
outside science this cannot be done" (SL, 46)? For to treat skepticism as a propaedeutic to 
philosophy is to suggest that true cognition can only come about once the activity of thinking is 
legitimated by something external to it or, to recall Hegel’s formulation presented earlier, to 
refuse to “set foot in the water before one has learned to swim” (ENC, §41Z1). And finally, if 
Hegel supposes that an adequate apprehension of the infinite can only come about with the 
negation of the finite, doesn't this make him guilty of taking for granted the mutual exclusivity of 
the concepts of immediacy and mediation, that is, of assuming that we must set aside all finite, 
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 Focusing primarily on "With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?," Michael Wolff argues that Hegel's 
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show that all such forms are true only when they are taken in their systematic interconnection. See Michael Wolff, 
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mediating structures so as to attain an unmediated grasp of the infinite?  If Hegel cannot meet 
these basic objections, then he can hardly claim to have improved upon the proof procedure of 
the understanding.  
But is it true that the Logic must be preceded by a work of skepticism? Hegel's answer, in 
short, is no – that such a requirement would be not only "unpleasant [unerfreulicher]" but also 
"superfluous [überflüssiger]" since, as he explains, "the dialectical element is itself an essential 
moment of the affirmative science" (ENC, §78R). Now, we have already seen that the Logic, qua 
rational proof, cannot depend upon any presupposition which it does not itself establish and, 
consequently, that its truth cannot be won through the employment of a method which would lie 
external to logic itself. However, even if this already suggests that the critique of the forms of 
finite cognition must constitute a necessary feature of the project of philosophical science, it still 
does not explain how, within a truly presuppositionless philosophy, this is to be accomplished. It 
is to this question that we now turn.   
 
 
Part Three: The Self-Sublation of the Finite 
 The Logic is presuppositionless, as we have seen, in that it goes on to establish each of 
the presuppositions to which it appeals: it begins with pure being taken in its immediacy, but 
concludes when this presupposition is comprehended equally as mediated by its result. While 
this fact illustrates the important point that I have been trying to develop – namely, that the Logic 
can be considered presuppositionless only insofar as it serves as its own presupposition, it does 




and mediation, along with all other concepts of the understanding, can only be regarded as 
inadequate expressions of the infinite; however, it still remains unclear what it means to say that 
these concepts are not true in and for themselves. This, I argue, is precisely what Hegel is 
attempting to explain when he claims that skepticism is "superfluous" for the achievement of a 
truly presuppositionless philosophy, since "the dialectical element is itself an essential moment 
of the affirmative science" (ENC, §78R). As we will see, Hegel's account of the three moments 
of the dialectic clarifies the precise sense in which the concepts of the understanding are to be 
regarded as "finite" and, at the same time, offers a glimpse at how Hegel conceives of the 
relationship between skepticism and philosophy in the most mature form of his own thinking.  
 "Every concept" and, indeed, "everything true in general," Hegel explains, can be said to 
contain three distinct, but ultimately inseparable elements: "(α) the abstract side or that of the 
understanding, (β) the dialectical or negatively rational side, (γ) the speculative or positively 
rational side" (ENC, §79). Hegel relates the first of these moments to the activity of the 
understanding. Now, we have already seen that the understanding conducts its proofs by 
exhibiting the "dependency of one determination on another," where each determination is 
treated as though it possessed a discrete, self-contained, and independently intelligible content. 
Hegel's characterization here of the first moment of the dialectic is in keeping with this usage: 
"Thinking as understanding does not budge beyond the firm determinateness [of what is 
entertained] and its distinctiveness over against others. A limited abstraction of this sort counts 
for it as self-standing and [as having] being [als für sich bestehend und seiend]" (ENC, §80). 
Accordingly, the first moment pertains to the fact that an object first becomes intelligible only 
after it has been endowed with the form of immediacy – a form which imparts to the content of 




such objects.87 It is only, for instance, once pure being has been abstracted from the systematic 
totality within which it is embedded, and taken up as a presupposition, that it can be first 
identified as an object of thought. Though it turns out that the activity of the understanding 
presents a deceptive image of its object when it is led to impose the form of immediacy upon 
something which turns out to be essentially mediated, Hegel nevertheless maintains that "the 
understanding shows itself in every domain of the objective [gegenständlich] world, and it 
belongs essentially to the perfection of an object that the principle of the understanding receive 
its due in it" (ENC, §80Z). This is because this moment of abstraction constitutes an essential 
feature, not just of our own thinking, but of reality itself. This is what Hegel means when he 
identifies the moment of abstraction as one side of “the logical.” As Hegel explains, "since the 
logical sphere in general is to be construed not merely as a subjective activity, but instead as 
absolutely universal and therefore at the same time as objective, this is to be applied to the 
understanding as the first form of the logical as well" (ENC, §80Z).   
 With the second moment of the dialectic, the sense of independence conferred upon 
objects by abstract thinking is shaken, and the "determinations of the understanding, of things, 
and of the finite in general" (ENC, §81R) are grasped in their "untruth." Though the form of 
immediacy grants to the determinations of thought the semblance of possessing a fixed and self-
subsistent content (in Hegelian terms, of being true “in themselves”), the dialectical moment 
shows these same determinations to be intrinsically incomplete, to transition into their opposites, 
and to depend upon these opposites for their own coherency. That is, it shows these concepts to 
be mediated by their opposites. This is why Hegel argues that the mode of demonstration 
characteristic of the understanding is a "finite" procedure – because this form of proof cannot 
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demonstrate its own basic presupposition that something can be known only mediately, that is, 
through something else whose truth is presumed to be self-evident.  
Though Hegel at one point likens the dialectical moment to skepticism,88 he goes on to 
explain that the Logic need not put skepticism to work in its service in order to demonstrate the 
specious nature of this proof procedure along with the concepts which it employs, since it is in 
the very nature of these one-sided concepts to reveal their own internal limits. "[T]he finite," 
Hegel explains, "is not limited merely from the outside but, by virtue of its own nature, sublates 
itself and changes into its opposite on account of itself" (ENC, §81Z1). The concept of 
immediacy itself at first appears to be such a fixed, stable, and self-subsistent totality; but a 
closer look reveals it to be conceptually incomplete and to depend upon the concept of mediation 
for a meaning which it possesses only by virtue of this relationship to its opposite. It is simply, 
therefore, in exhibiting the "self-sublation" of the concepts of classical metaphysics – the 
inevitable negation of their claim to immediacy – that the Logic carries out the critique of the 
finite forms of cognition, not through the work of skepticism. We will return to this point in a 
moment. 
 While it is true that the second moment of the dialectic shatters that semblance of 
immediacy conferred upon the determinations of thought in the first moment, Hegel makes clear 
that its genuine philosophical worth lies not in its destructive capacity, but rather in the "positive 
result" which can be seen to emerge within the contradictions it elicits. It is ordinarily assumed 
that contradiction is an indication of error, and that only that which conforms to the image of 
fixity imparted by the moment of abstraction can count as true. Hegel's claim, however, is that 
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this notion is a prejudice of the sort of one-sided thinking that the dialectical moment reveals as 
false, and that the result of contradiction is never merely negative, since it necessarily preserves 
that content which the second moment negates in its immediate form: 
The one thing needed to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to make 
an effort at gaining this quite simple insight into it – is the recognition of the 
logical principle that negation is equally positive, or that what is self-
contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but 
essentially only in the negation of its particular content; or that such a negation is 
not just negation, but is the negation of the determined fact which is resolved, and 
is therefore determinate negation; that in the result there is therefore contained in 
essence that from which the result derives – a tautology indeed, since the result 
would otherwise be something immediate and not a result. Because the result, the 
negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content. It is a new concept but one 
higher and richer than the preceding – richer because it negates or opposes the 
preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is 
the unity of itself and its opposite (SL, 33). 
 
Though each of the concepts examined in the Logic prove to be self-contradictory, this does not 
mean that they must be rejected, but rather that their true significance only comes to light when 
they are wrested from that process of abstraction characteristic of the understanding and 
comprehended as integral to a concrete, self-mediating totality.89 Indeed, as Hegel here suggests, 
it is only through successively negating the finite forms of thought as they immediately appear – 
and laying hold of the positive, sublated content contained therein – that the Logic progresses to 
an apprehension of the infinite. This is precisely what we have already seen to occur along the 
path of rational proof. The Concept proves to be "truly immediate, primordial, and self-
subsistent" (ENC, §36Z) – and, hence, totally presuppositionless – only when it has been shown 
to contain the presuppositions with which it is mediated as its own sublated moments.90 To grasp 
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the determinations of thought in their finitude is not, therefore, simply to perceive in them 
inadequate expressions of the infinite, but to recognize that it is only by virtue of the self-
sublation of the oppositions which emerge within every finite form of thought that the infinite is 
made manifest. With this insight, however, we have already arrived at the third moment of the 
dialectic – its "speculative or positively rational" side.91  
 Now that we have seen that the Logic achieves total presuppositionlessness by 
performing an immanent critique of the finite forms of thinking, where each of these are grasped 
as sublated moments which, in their systematic unity, compose the very content of the concept, it 
should be apparent why Hegel would say that skepticism is "superfluous." Though skepticism is 
capable of exhibiting the finitude of one-sided concepts through the method of equipollence, it 
proves to be an "extraneous art" and an "external… elevation above the finite" (ENC, §81R) 
since it is in the very nature of these concepts to transition into their own opposites. To say that 
skepticism is "superfluous," however, is not to say that it has no role to play within the 
achievement of a truly presuppositionless philosophy. Hegel's point is rather that skepticism 
represents an imprecise articulation of the second moment of the dialectic – one which emerges 
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when it is taken up immediately and considered in abstraction from the other two moments with 
which it forms a unity.  
 Though Hegel is led, for analytical purposes, to divide the logical into three distinct 
elements, he explains that to treat them as separate is to bring them under the purview of the 
understanding, where they are "not considered in their truth" (ENC, §79R). This is precisely 
what occurs in the case of skepticism.92 Rather than "hold fast to the positive in its negative, to 
the content of the presupposition in the result" (SL, 744), the skeptic "stops short" at the negative 
result of contradiction. In the contradictions she shows to arise with the one-sided thinking of the 
understanding, she does not recognize a content which sublates itself and transitions into a new 
concept containing the negation of the one preceding it, but only something null and void – the 
"nothingness of all things finite" (ENC, §81Z2). Even if the skeptic is correct to see in the 
concepts of the understanding so many forms of immediacy, no more true in their apparent fixity 
than the opposing concepts with which they are mediated, she nevertheless fails to recognize 
that, in interpreting contradiction in its merely negative significance, she remains beholden to the 
very sort of abstract thinking that she rejects. In the first moment of the dialectic, as we have 
seen, the determinations of thought are abstracted from their concrete unity in the concept and 
presented as fixed, self-subsistent totalities – a procedure which is effectively reversed under the 
"negatively rational" moment. When, however, the skeptic sees in the contradictions she elicits 
the impossibility of knowledge, rather than that "principle through which alone an immanent 
connection and necessity enters into the content of science" (ENC, §81R), she holds fast to this 
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same abstractive activity: contradiction holds a merely negative significance only for one who 
presumes that truth must approximate the one-sided form it is given by the understanding, and 
abstracts the dialectical moment from that dynamic unity within which it is embedded – only, 
that is, for one who considers contradiction in its mere immediate form. This is what Hegel 
ultimately means when he writes that "the dialectical [moment], when taken in isolation by the 
understanding, constitutes skepticism" (ENC, §81R) – that skepticism, like those forms of 
immediacy whose illusory character it reveals, is properly understood only when it is seen as 
composing a moment of "everything true in general" (ENC, §79R), and not, as occurs when the 
dialectical moment is taken in abstraction by the understanding, when it is presupposed as 
something true in and for itself. What this shows, however, is that the sublation of skepticism, 
that all-important result that the Phenomenology reaches only with its culminating moment, is 
already contained within the critique of the finite forms of cognition which the Logic performs 
immanently – namely, in the very movement of the dialectic itself. It proves, moreover, that 
skepticism continues to hold special significance for Hegel's philosophical project, even after the 
conclusion of the Phenomenology. Skepticism, as an incomplete expression of the negatively 
rational moment of the dialectic, may in the final analysis amount to a mere presupposition, but 
its transformation signifies, for Hegel, "the soul of all truly scientific knowing" (ENC, §81Z1) 
and the way that knowledge proves to be truly immediate. 
 In this chapter, I have tried to show that the problem of presuppositionlessness only 
pertains to those for whom the opposition of immediacy and mediation represents a fixed starting 
point and an ultimate foundation, and that Hegel's solution to this difficulty constitutes a 
significant advance beyond that of his philosophical forbearers. This solution, as we have seen, 




and mediation – presupposition and result – prove to be two moments in the development of 
"every properly logical content" (ENC, §79R) whose truth lies solely in their sublated unity. 
Though Hegel shows the problem of presuppositionlessness to be predicated upon a confusion 
which arises when the concepts of classical metaphysics are taken up immediately by the 
understanding and treated as true in and for themselves, his account at the same time reveals this 
confusion – and its correction – to belong to the very nature of reality. This is why Hegel argues 
that philosophy does not need skepticism as its propaedeutic – because, as the Logic shows, the 
critique of the finite forms of cognition is "already itself a process of knowing" (ENC, §41Z1), 
not something external which would occasion its mere possibility. Accordingly, Hegel's 
consideration of the problem of presuppositionlessness does indeed open the door to skepticism, 

















History and Skepticism: The Philosophical Basis for  




 When Arcesilaus assumed leadership of the Academy in the third century BCE, he found 
no better means by which to oppose the suspicion growing in Athens at that time that Stoicism 
was "the logical development and true intellectual heir of Platonism"93 than to point up the 
skeptical dimension of Plato's philosophy. And he was not without good reasons for doing so – 
for it is difficult, even in those dialogues which do not expressly end in aporia, to discern a 
positive philosophical statement being advanced by Plato. It is easy enough to identify the 
assumptions at issue within a given dialogue, but since Plato never seems to speak in his own 
name – leaving all the talking, largely, to Socrates – it remains unclear whether Plato genuinely 
endorses any of the beliefs that he puts into the mouths of his characters.94 Be that as it may, it is 
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 Five classical arguments for Plato's alleged skepticism are given within an anonymous sixth-century CE 
Introduction to Plato's Philosophy: "In his discussion of things, they say, he uses certain adverbs indicating 
ambivalence and doubt – e.g. 'probably' and 'perhaps' and 'maybe'; and that is a mark not of one who knows but of 
one who fails to apprehend any precise knowledge . . . They argue secondly that inasmuch as he tries to establish 
contrary views about the same things he clearly extols inapprehensibility – e.g. he tries to establish contraries when 
discussing friendship in the Lysis, temperance in the Charmides, piety in the Euthyphro . . . Thirdly, they say that he 
thinks that there is no such thing as knowledge, as is clear from the fact that he refutes every account of it in the 
Theaetetus . . . Their fourth argument is this: if Plato thinks that knowledge is two-fold, one sort coming through 
perception and the other through thought, and if he says that each sort falls down, it is clear that he extols 
inapprehensibility . . . This is their fifth argument: they say that he himself says in his dialogue 'I know nothing and I 
teach nothing: all I do is raise problems' (pp. 205-6 Hermann)." Cited in Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The 
Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
13. In "Plato the Sceptic," Julia Annas contrasts the arguments given in this anonymous sixth-century text with those 
offered by Arcesilaus in the second century B.C.E., likening these positions to two modern interpretations of Plato. 




one thing to acknowledge the fact that Plato's preferred mode of presentation, the dialogue, poses 
certain unique interpretive challenges, and quite another to argue that his philosophy is, for this 
reason, skeptical through and through: "[W]hen Plato makes assertions about Forms or about the 
existence of Providence or about a virtuous life being preferable to a life of vice," writes Sextus 
Empiricus, 
then if he assents to these things as being really so, he is holding beliefs; and if he 
commits himself to them as being more plausible, he has abandoned the 
distinctive character of Skepticism, since he is giving something preference in 
point of convincingness and lack of convincingness . . . Even if he does make 
some utterances in skeptical fashion when, as they say, he is exercising, this will 
not make him a Skeptic. For anyone who holds beliefs on even one subject, or in 
general prefers one appearance to another in point of convincingness or lack of 
convincingness, or makes assertions about any unclear matter, thereby has the 
distinctive character of a Dogmatist.95 
 
For Sextus, the question is not whether Plato employs skeptical arguments and phrases, nor even 
whether his dialogues aim to generate the suspension of judgment, but merely whether he 
considers some beliefs to be more convincing than others. Only if Plato abstains from such 
preferences, Sextus argues, can he be considered a skeptic; otherwise, if he holds beliefs which 
cannot ultimately be justified, he must be counted among the dogmatists. For dogmatism is the 
condition of possessing unjustified beliefs.96 But doesn't there remain, between dogmatism and 
skepticism, a third way – a path upon which the non-skeptical examination of knowledge and the 
non-dogmatic possession of belief ultimately coincide? And wouldn't such a way seem more apt 
to describe Plato's actual philosophical practice than the two poles of Sextus' opposition?   
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 In his 1802 examination of the "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," Hegel makes 
his first attempt to carve out this alternative path, citing Plato's Parmenides as a prime example 
of a philosophy which is "neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once."97 In 
Plato's dialogue, Hegel finds a "self-sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism" 
which is not only compatible with the non-dogmatic possession of belief, but in fact "is itself the 
negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as the positive 
side" (RSP, 323). Accordingly, Hegel's attempt to resolve this long-standing controversy 
involves interpreting Plato's Parmenides as an early instantiation of speculative dialectic in 
which skepticism is but a moment in the expression of truth.  
 For this very reason, however – because, that is, Hegel sees in the Parmenides an 
anticipation of his own speculative dialectic, it would be easy to dismiss his contribution to the 
debate concerning the skeptical status of Plato's philosophy as the product of a dogmatic and 
ahistorical retrojection.98 If Hegel can find in Plato an early proponent of speculative dialectic, so 
it would seem, this says perhaps more about Hegel and the prejudices of his time than it does 
about the status of Plato's philosophy. The concern here is part of a widespread suspicion 
regarding Hegel's orientation toward the history of philosophy – namely, that he fails to treat 
historical texts on their own terms, assimilating them rather to his own decidedly modern 
sensibilities. In fact, however, Hegel has already anticipated this concern and integrated it within 
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the very conception of history which forms the basis for his reading of Plato. In this chapter, I 
look to Hegel’s philosophical historiography in order to argue that the justification for his 
interpretation of historical texts can be seen as an extension of his engagement with skepticism. 
In Part One, I examine Hegel's interpretation of the Parmenides, first as it emerges in his early 
essay on the "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy" and then in his Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy. Here my chief interest is to clarify what leads Hegel to identify Plato's dialogue as 
an early instance of speculative dialectic – that is, as exhibiting a logical structure according to 
which things that are taken to be opposed and distinct are unified. In Part Two, I examine the 
basic elements of Hegel's philosophical historiography, that is, his theory of the writing of 
history, arguing that his account of the history of philosophy is best understood as a 
philosophical history of philosophy, where concerns surrounding the historical status of his 
interpretation of the Parmenides ultimately lose their footing.  
 
 
Part One: Hegel's Reading of the Parmenides 
 Hegel's initial intervention into the debate surrounding Plato's alleged skepticism can be 
found in his 1802 article for the Critical Journal on the "Relationship of Skepticism to 
Philosophy." In his attempt to demonstrate the limitations of G.E. Schulze's attack on Kant's 
Critical philosophy, an attempt that I examined earlier in Chapter One, Hegel turns at one point 
to Plato's Parmenides, a text that he argues indicates an alternative, a third way, beyond the poles 
of Sextus' opposition. For Schulze, no philosophy can escape the horns of Sextus' dilemma: a 
philosophy is either dogmatic, in which case it naïvely posits the identity of concept and object, 




consciousness."99 For Hegel, however, the Parmenides offers an example of a philosophy that 
not only contests the truth of this opposition, but that exposes the dogmatic or unjustified 
character of oppositional thinking as such. Thus, Hegel finds here in the Skepticism essay a 
philosophy that is “infinitely more skeptical" (RSP, 323) than the brand of skepticism 
exemplified by Schulze. Later, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel returns to the 
Parmenides once again, focusing on the way that the text exemplifies a form of dialectic that 
incorporates elements of, but is not reducible to, the later skeptical tradition. Before turning to 
Hegel's engagement with the Parmenides, however, let us review the series of proposals and 
refutations that occur in Plato’s dialogue. Of course, it cannot be my task here to offer a detailed 
summary of Plato's Parmenides. I wish, however, to highlight the elements of the dialogue that 
are most germane to Hegel's interpretation. 
 The Parmenides opens with an exchange between the Eleatic Zeno and a young Socrates 
on the nature and number of being. Though we do not hear Zeno's initial speech, Socrates 
provides us with a summary of the philosopher's argument: "If things are many," Socrates states, 
reiterating Zeno's position, "they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, 
because unlike things can't be like or like things unlike" (127c).100 After confirming that he has 
correctly understood Zeno's speech, and identifying an unacknowledged partnership between his 
argument against “the many” and Parmenides' teaching of “the one,” Socrates proceeds to 
advance an alternative ontological account:  
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But tell me this: don't you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of 
likeness, and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is? Don't you 
and I and the other things we call 'many' get a share of those two entities? And 
don't things that get a share of likeness come to be like in that way and to the 
extent that they get a share, whereas things that get a share of unlikeness come to 
be unlike, and things that get a share of both come to be both? And even if all 
things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are 
both like and unlike themselves, what's astonishing about that (128e5-129a9)?   
 
Socrates' account seems, at first sight, to improve upon the Eleatic conception. In asserting that 
only “one,” properly speaking, is, Zeno finds himself compelled to deny not only the manifold 
character of being, since he cannot accept the evidently absurd notion that that which is can 
admit of opposing properties.101 But Socrates is able to circumvent this difficulty by explaining 
how it is that things can be both like and unlike in a non-contradictory sense. He does this by 
positing the existence of a form of likeness and differentiating it from particular things that 
participate in this form (i.e., like things).102 Socrates provides an analogy to help make his point, 
explaining that it is not astonishing at all to say that he is both one and many in two different 
respects. Insofar as he has a frontside and a backside, an upper part and a lower part, he is many, 
but insofar as he may be one person among seven people present, he can also rightfully be called 
one. In this way, one and many can belong to the same subject, just as like and unlike can. What 
would be astonishing, by contrast, is to say that the one itself is many or that likeness itself is 
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unlike.103 The contradiction only arises when we assert a thing to be both like and unlike without 
further qualification. In sum, Socrates’ proposal manages to avoid the manifest contradiction of 
asserting something as both like and unlike at once by distinguishing between the different 
respects in which something may be like and unlike.  
Nevertheless, Parmenides finds several problems with Socrates' account. He quickly 
stumps Socrates by asking him whether he thinks that there are forms for all things, even things 
that are “totally undignified and worthless,” such as mud, hair, and dirt. More importantly, 
Parmenides goes on to offer a series of arguments that challenge Socrates’ notion that particular 
things are what they are by virtue of participating in the forms of which they are instantiations. 
Parmenides asks, for example, whether it is the whole form or just a part that is instantiated in 
every particular thing. He reaches the conclusion that, in either case, each form must be divisible, 
thus contesting Socrates’ proposal that each form is one. Next, Parmenides introduces a problem 
that anticipates Aristotle's Third Man.104 As Parmenides explains, if there is in fact a form of 
likeness "itself by itself" which stands quite apart from, but unites all like things, and if this form, 
being what all like things truly consist in, is also like, then it follows that there must be above 
this form another form of likeness, greater than the first, which would unite it with all other like 
things, and above this, yet another, ad infinitum. Parmenides points out, in other words, that 
Socrates' proposal leads to an infinite regress where it becomes necessary to posit ever greater 
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forms in order to account for the unity each successive form has with the class of things it is 
meant to unite.  
 Finally, Parmenides points to one last difficulty faced by Socrates’ proposal. If each 
form is truly separate from the many sensible things which instantiate it, and if we only have 
access to these instantiations, then if there is a form of knowledge "itself by itself," it would have 
to be radically separate from the knowledge available to humans, including even knowledge of 
the forms themselves. If the forms cannot therefore be known by humans, it seems unlikely that 
anyone will be able to refute the skeptic who doubts whether such forms truly exist. With this 
last argument, Socrates is left at an impasse. Parmenides goes on to suggest, however, that these 
difficulties may not in fact be insurmountable, and that a way forward remains for one who has 
received proper training in a dialectical exercise which "people think useless" and "the crowd 
call idle talk" (135d5), but which is in fact, Parmenides insists, necessary "to achieve a full view 
of the truth" (136c7-8). The entire second part of the dialogue is devoted to an illustration of this 
"worklike game."  
 Earlier, Socrates had claimed that, though there's nothing strange about the fact that 
opposing properties can be found among things which participate in opposing forms, he would 
be quite astonished to learn that such properties could be attributed to the forms themselves: 
So if – in the case of stones and sticks and such things – someone tries to show 
that the same thing is many and one, we'll say that he is demonstrating something 
to be many and one, not the one to be many or the many one – and we'll say that 
he is saying nothing astonishing, but just what all of us would agree to. But if 
someone first distinguishes as separate the forms, themselves by themselves, of 
the things I was talking about a moment ago – for example, likeness and 
unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and motion, and everything of that sort – 
and then shows that in themselves they can mix together and separate, I for my 





However, in the eight series of deductions which together comprise the recommended 
"gymnastic" training, Parmenides shows that one can indeed observe a certain "wandering 
between opposites" even among "those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason 
and might think to be forms" (135e3-4). To demonstrate this point, Parmenides explains, one 
must consider in turn the consequences that follow from the assumption that one is and from the 
alternative assumption that not-one (or many) is,105 for each of the forms, taken both in relation 
to themselves and in relation to each other. Thus, the dialectical analysis which spans the latter 
half of the dialogue proceeds from the initial hypothesis, "if one is," and leads to the apparently 
paradoxical conclusion that whether one or not-one is, “it and the others [e.g., like, unlike, part, 
whole, motion, rest, etc.] both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all 
ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other" (166c3-6).106 In this way, the 
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A. If One is,  I. can be affirmed of the One  1. nothing 
        2. everything  
    
   II. can be affirmed of the Many  3. nothing 
        4. everything 
 
B. If Not-One is,  III. can be affirmed of the One  5. everything 
        6. nothing 
    
   IV. can be affirmed of the Many  7. everything 




dialogue concludes by acknowledging a number of contradictions that arise in either case – 
whether we assume that being is one or that being is not-one (or many). These are contradictions 
that Socrates’ perspectivist solution presumably cannot resolve. Unfortunately, it is never 
explained how such a display might offer a way forward for the theory of forms beyond the 
problems that Parmenides identifies or a defense of their existence to the skeptic: Parmenides 
simply states that without this dialectical training "the truth will escape you" (135d5-6).  
For this reason, it is tempting to read the Parmenides as an “aporetic” text, for the 
dialogue seems to offer no indication of whether the dialectical demonstration at its core is meant 
to reinvigorate the theory of forms or signal its demise. On Hegel's reading in the Skepticism 
essay, however, the dialogue does not leave us in a state of aporia, forced to suspend judgment 
on the truth of this theory, but in fact deals a fatal blow to the heart of Socrates' proposal: "This 
Platonic skepticism," he writes 
is not concerned with doubting these truths of the understanding which cognizes 
things as manifold, as wholes consisting of parts, or with coming to be and 
passing away, multiplicity, similarity, etc. and which makes objective assertions 
of that kind; rather it is intent on the complete denial of all truth to this sort of 
cognition (RSP, 323).     
 
Although Hegel is not explicit here about how Socrates' forms relate to these "truths of the 
understanding," it is not difficult to see what he has in mind. What Plato's Parmenides shows, on 
Hegel's view, is how Socrates' theory of forms embodies the same mode of thinking that in the 
Skepticism essay he identifies with the understanding. Recall that, for Hegel, the understanding 
is characterized by its tendency to think in terms of one-sided oppositions. In denying that 
opposing predicates can be equally affirmed of the same subject at the same time and in the same 
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respect, propositions of the understanding uphold the principle of noncontradiction. As such, the 
understanding is legitimate for a cognition of finite, non-contradictory objects. However, it is 
inappropriate for an apprehension of infinite objects – objects for which finite predicates can at 
best represent only one side of their nature. For such objects, only propositions of reason, which 
violate the principle of noncontradiction, are adequate. Thus, when Parmenides shows Socrates 
that the forms themselves have a way of turning around into their opposites (e.g., that if one is, it 
also is not, that it is both like and unlike itself, both in motion and at rest, etc.), and that, for this 
reason, they lack the sort of self-subsistence and ontological primacy that Socrates ascribes to 
them, Hegel reads this along the lines of his own distinction between reason and understanding. 
That is, he reads Parmenides’ dialectical exercise in the second half of the dialogue as 
demonstrating the inability of the understanding to adequately think the infinite. 107 This is why 
Hegel extols the Parmenides for revealing the limits of the understanding. Every work of "true 
philosophy,” for Hegel, necessarily includes such a "negative" or "skeptical" side which 
acknowledges the equipollence of opposing concepts and thus rejects the one-sided truths of the 
understanding: "This skepticism that comes on the scene in its pure explicit shape in the 
Parmenides, can, however, be found implicit in every genuine philosophical system; for it is the 
free side of every philosophy" (RSP, 324).  
 If Plato's dialogue makes plain what is tacitly expressed in every true philosophy – 
namely, that propositions of the understanding are inadequate for articulating infinite objects, its 
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philosophical significance, for Hegel, goes beyond this strictly negative utility. Though Hegel 
acknowledges that the Parmenides "appears only from its negative side" (RSP, 323), exposing 
the limits of Socrates’ theory, he suggests that the dialogue contains a "positive side" as well. It 
is the inclusion of this positive side that, for Hegel, makes Plato's dialogue an instance of a 
philosophy which is "neither skepticism nor dogmatism" but both at once. If the negative side of 
the Parmenides is concerned with the rejection of that sort of "one-sided" thinking which Hegel 
associates with the understanding and which insists on the mutual exclusivity of opposites, its 
positive side is concerned with the speculative insight that opposites "are united in such a way 
that they contradict themselves" (RSP, 324) – that is, that Socrates' forms are in fact "true" only 
insofar as they can be seen passing over into their own opposites. In other words, Hegel finds 
that Plato's Parmenides exhibits an awareness of the fact that objects of reason (the world, the 
mind, God) are self-contradictory, in bearing opposite predicates, but nevertheless true, in being 
the sort of object which is equally a subject. This is why, on Hegel's reading, the Parmenides 
cannot be interpreted as "skeptical" in Sextus’ sense of the term. Even though it offers a 
refutation of Socrates' proposal, it does not do so without at the same time advancing a positive 
alternative to the theory of forms – an alternative which, on Hegel's reading, directly issues from 
the refutation itself. This is what Hegel ultimately means when he writes that the skepticism of 
Plato's Parmenides "is itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly 
presupposes Reason as the positive side" (RSP, 323) – that Plato articulates a form of "genuine" 
skepticism which compels us to move beyond the poles of Sextus' opposition108 and the one-
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sided mode of cognition which it represents. Though in the Skepticism essay Hegel only offers a 
general indication of how the Parmenides expresses the unity of philosophy and skepticism, 
later, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he returns to this very same point. 
 Between the Skepticism essay and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel's 
interpretation of the Parmenides undergoes a subtle shift in orientation. While Hegel focuses in 
the former on the skeptical features of Plato's dialogue, in the latter he apparently abandons this 
pursuit in favor of an analysis of the "logical" or "dialectical" element present in Plato's 
philosophy. Although Hegel's discussion no longer turns on the skeptical status of the dialogue, 
his analysis of Platonic dialectic nevertheless makes it clear that he considers Plato to be neither 
a skeptic nor a dogmatist, but rather a speculative philosopher in whom the equipollence of 
opposing concepts receives its first positive and systematic expression. As we will see, in 
distinguishing the speculative dialectic he sees at work in the Parmenides from two additional 
forms of dialectic then in currency (one that he associates with the Sophists, and another with the 
Eleatics), Hegel can be seen in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy intervening into the 
debate concerning the skeptical status of Plato's philosophy once more.  
 In the lectures, Hegel explains that the speculative dialectic that commences with Plato is 
concerned with the fulfillment of two intimately related tasks: (1) the demonstration of the self-
contradictory nature of “the particular" and (2) the production and determination of "the 
universal." "The first concern of dialectic," Hegel explains,  
… is to confound the particular, to refute its validity, since what gets exhibited is 




that it is not in fact what it is but passes over into its opposite – that it has a limit, 
a negation of itself that is essential to it.109  
 
This description calls to mind Hegel's earlier account in the Skepticism essay of the "negative 
side" of the Parmenides. Indeed, what Hegel sees presaged here in Plato's text is once again the 
critical distinction mentioned above between reason and understanding. Here, however, Hegel 
presents the demonstration of the inherently self-contradictory nature of objects of 
understanding, what he refers to here as the "dissolution of the particular," not as a feature of 
"every genuine philosophical system," but as something that can be found even among the most 
dogmatic – or, indeed, the most skeptical – of philosophies: "it is a dialectic," Hegel explains, 
"that Plato has in common with the Sophists, who understood very well how to dissolve the 
particular" (LHP II 25-6, 197). Hegel makes a similar point when he remarks, in his article for 
the Critical Journal, that "since every genuine philosophy has this negative side, …anyone who 
has the urge can set this negative side in relief and set forth for himself a skepticism" (RSP, 325). 
Here however, he goes one step further and distinguishes the dialectic that is peculiar to Plato 
from a "common dialectic" which he attributes to the Sophists, but which can be found among 
the skeptics as well. Unlike this "common dialectic," which "annuls one determination in the 
process of substantiating another" (LHP II 25-6, 199) – that is, which appeals to an opposing 
truth in order to contest the truth of a claim – the genuine Platonic dialectic has no need to appeal 
to some external criterion. This is because it directly exhibits the particular in its own self-
contradictory nature – that is, because it shows the particular to depend upon its opposite for its 
own coherence. This is, presumably, why Socrates dismisses Zeno's refutation of “the many” in 
the opening section of Plato's dialogue – because it fails to demonstrate that “the many,” were it 
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to exist, would have to be both like and unlike itself, rather than be like in one respect and unlike 
in another.110 Not only, however, does Plato's dialectic, for this reason, put him squarely at odds 
with skeptics who, like Schulze – and even Sextus himself111 – can dispute a given knowledge-
claim only by taking recourse to some apparently undeniable fact (e.g., the "facts of 
consciousness"); Hegel suggests that it is only through demonstrating in this way the self-
contradictory nature of the particular that we arrive at the universal, that rational object which, in 
containing all opposites, has nothing to which it is truly opposed.   
Accordingly, the second task of Plato's dialectic "consists in taking the universal that 
emerges from the confounding of the finite, in defining it within itself and resolving the 
antitheses within it" (LHP II 25-6, 197). As Hegel observes, however, many of Plato's dialogues 
actually fail to meet this aim and often end without having arrived at any positive result.112 At the 
end of the Euthyphro, for example, we do not learn so much what piety truly is as what it is not 
(e.g., that it is not "what is dear to the gods"). Dialogues such as these succeed in "bringing 
people's finite views into confusion and dissolution" (LHP II 25-6, 197) – that is, succeed in 
challenging a certain concept, or contesting a set of particular claims, but fail to bring the 
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universal to consciousness. Nevertheless, Hegel finds that a number of Plato's dialogues also 
make good on this latter ambition – namely, the Sophist, the Philebus, and, above all, the 
Parmenides: 
The result of the dialectic of the Parmenides has a strange look: whether the One 
(τὸ ἓν) is or is not (either itself or the other Ideas, rest and motion, arising and 
perishing, and so forth – taken not only in isolation but also in relation to 
another), all of this together both is and is not, appears and appears not, and the 
One, or what is, both is and is not, appears and appears not. In our ordinary view 
we are very far from taking these wholly abstract categories – the One, being, 
non-being, appearing, rest, motion, and so forth – to be Ideas. But for Plato the 
Ideas are what is wholly universal. They show that they are dialectical, in that 
only identity with its other is what is true" (LHP II 25-6, 206).   
 
The conclusion of the Parmenides is indeed strange. As we have seen, it ends not with any 
explicit pronouncement on the status of Socrates' theory of forms, but rather with the apparent 
affirmation of a whole host of contradictions which emerge over the course of Parmenides' 
dialectical exercise. On Hegel's mature reading, however, though Plato's dialogue ends in 
contradiction, it exhibits an affirmative result nonetheless, since the universal is articulated 
precisely in that activity whereby the forms transition into and are united with their opposites.113 
Indeed, on Hegel's view, the universal, the true subject and object of thinking, is nothing other 
than this very activity.  
 Hegel contrasts the speculative dialectic he sees at work in Plato's Parmenides with one 
he associates with the Eleatics in order to clarify this crucial point: 
The second thing Plato combats is the dialectic of the Eleatics and their thesis 
(shared by the Sophists) that only being is, and non-being is not at all. For the 
Sophists this thesis, as Plato presents it, has the sense that the negative is not at 
all, for only what has being is; that is, there is nothing false; what has being – 
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everything – is something true. In other words, everything that we perceive or 
imagine, the purposes we espouse, are purely affirmative determinations and, as 
such, are all something true and not something false (LHP II 25-6, 200). 
 
Hegel calls special attention to the relativistic consequences that follow from this assumption, 
arguing that it undermines the distinction between true and false, right and wrong, virtue and 
vice. However, what is more important for our purposes is the fact that, on Hegel's view, the 
Eleatics cannot supply a determinate conception of the universal without renouncing this 
apparently "harmless" thesis. For Hegel, all determination is negation (omnis determinatio est 
negatio)114 and nothing is except insofar as it is involved in a process by which it is distinguished 
from what it is not. Accordingly, the universal – the only thing which, on Hegel's conception, 
properly speaking is – is only to the extent that it distinguishes itself from all particulars which, 
as we have seen, are by their very nature self-contradictory. Thus, absolute being, the universal, 
is not, as the Eleatics suggest, something that stands above and beyond particulars – some one 
whose very existence excludes that of the many, but is its negation. Because, on Hegel's reading, 
the Eleatics fail to grasp this crucial insight and deny the being of non-being, they can only think 
the universal in terms of an indeterminate one; because they fail to grasp "the one thing needed 
to achieve scientific progress… the recognition of the logical principle that negation is equally 
positive" (SL, 33), they are left with the empty tautology that "being is."  
 In the dialectic that appears in the Parmenides, however, Hegel sees an anticipation of 
this all-important speculative insight. "For Plato," Hegel writes,  
the highest form [of dialectic] is the identity of being and non-being. The true is 
what has being, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν. But this actual being is not devoid of 
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negation. On the contrary, non-being is [too], and what is simple or self-identical 
partakes of the other, unity partakes of multiplicity (μετέχει, μέθεξις) (LHP II 25-
6, 201). 
 
Hegel acknowledges that the Parmenides never explicitly affirms the being of non-being.115 His 
suggestion, however, is that the dialogue exhibits an awareness of this decisive point in 
demonstrating the equipollence of opposing concepts even if no such statement can be found in 
Plato's text.116 Only on this supposition does it make sense to argue that the negation of the 
particular constitutes a determination of the universal. If this interpretation of the Parmenides is 
correct, and if the dialectical demonstration at its core does in fact reflect an appreciation of the 
being of non-being, not only does this distinguish Plato from the Eleatics and Sophists – it also 
sets him apart from the Pyrrhonists. Hegel does not make this point explicit in the Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy – presumably, because he considers it anachronistic to distinguish 
Plato from a philosophical movement that rose to prominence only after his death. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, however, Hegel presents the fact that Pyrrhonian skepticism "only ever sees pure 
nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the 
nothingness of that from which it results"117 as both its defining characteristic and fundamental 
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flaw. Thus, because on this reading Plato's dialectic subsumes but ultimately transforms features 
which have come to define the skeptical persuasion, Hegel's mature interpretation of the 
Parmenides can be read as an attempt to more clearly articulate what he had earlier conceived in 
the Skepticism essay in terms of the relationship of skepticism to philosophy,118 and to portray 
Plato as a speculative thinker whose contribution to the history of philosophy is only obscured by 
its skeptical assimilation.119 
 Hegel's interpretation of the Parmenides certainly departs from the more familiar account 
of Plato that has come down to us from the tradition, but to what extent does his reading reflect a 
careful and historically sensitive engagement with Plato's philosophy? If, as Hegel himself 
admits, the Parmenides never explicitly affirms the unity of opposites, and if, as others suggest, 
the only textual evidence that Hegel can muster in support of this crucial claim derives from a 
now notorious "mistranslation" of the Sophist,120 what sense is there in even countenancing such 
an interpretation? Given these considerations, isn't it just as likely that Hegel, like Arcesilaus, is 
merely foisting his own presuppositions onto Plato in an effort to shore up his own philosophical 
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ambitions – or, at the very least, that he is so completely immersed in the concerns of his own 
age that he cannot achieve the critical distance that is necessary for an unbiased historical study? 
How, indeed, can anyone leap outside of their place in history and attain to such an impartial 
perspective? Unfortunately, Hegel gives us no reason to believe that his interpretation of the 
Parmenides agrees with Plato's own intentions, but, as we will see, he does offer a powerful 
argument as to why this does not undermine its legitimacy. Hegel grants that we need "a wholly 
unbiased, impartial, dispassionate spirit in order to study Plato's dialogues" (LHP II 25-6, 198), 
but he insists that the historian of philosophy need not leave his own age behind in order to 
apprehend the philosophical significance of an earlier historical text. In order to understand how 
Hegel attempts to justify his heterodox interpretation of the Parmenides, let us look next to 
Hegel’s own philosophical historiography, his theory of the writing of history, where he offers a 
way forward beyond these apparent aporiai and explains how it is possible to achieve a 
standpoint that would validate his engagement with the history of philosophy.  
 
 
Part Two: History and Skepticism 
 Hegel begins his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History by examining three 
varieties of historiography: "original history," "reflective history," and "philosophical history." 
He associates the first mode of historiography, "original history," with historians like Herodotus 
and Thucydides, who "wrote down the events that they experienced or described the deeds of 
which they were aware."121 A work of original history is not necessarily written by one who has 
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personally witnessed the events in question, but its author must belong to the same historical 
context within which these events originally occurred. Since the original historian "stands and 
lives in the material itself" (LPWH, 134), they do not need to abstract from their own historical 
situation in order to express what was particular to the epoch which they describe, for, as Hegel 
writes, "the spirit of the author and the general spirit of the actions he relates, are one and the 
same" (LPWH, 134). Indeed, the historian’s testimony is, in this respect, no different than that of 
any other contemporary observer: "even if he elaborates on what they said, the substance, 
culture, and consciousness of this elaboration are identical with the substance and consciousness 
of those whom he has speak in this fashion" (LPWH, 69).  
 Hegel contrasts original history with "reflective history," the second mode of 
historiography which he examines. If original history presents what is peculiar to a given epoch 
from the internal standpoint of one who has lived through it, reflective history, by contrast, offers 
an image of the past that is the product of later historical reflection – it is a history "whose 
portrayal goes beyond what is present simply to the author and that depicts not only what was 
present in time but is present in the life of spirit" (LPWH, 71). Unlike the original historian, the 
reflective historian does not concentrate their efforts on any one particular epoch, but attempts to 
provide a historical narrative that is more comprehensive, more expansive, in scope – "what one 
expects from them above all is a survey of the whole of a people or of world history" (LPWH, 
136). For this reason, however, they cannot assume the perspective of any one of the ages they 
describe; rather, they must try to transcend each of these and achieve a standpoint from which it 
is possible to engage each epoch with the same impartiality. As Hegel points out, however, such 
attempts are never particularly successful. Not only must the reflective historian "more or less 




abbreviations" (LPWH, 74) in their attempt to compose a unified narrative, but since "the spirit 
of the time in which the [reflective] historian writes is different from the spirit of the time that is 
to be described" (LPWH, 136), their descriptions can never approximate the same degree of 
historical accuracy that is exhibited in a work of original history. When the reflective historian 
attempts to describe the spirit of a bygone era, Hegel explains, "it is usually his own spirit that is 
heard" (LPWH, 72).122 It doesn't matter whether the reflective historian calls upon the past for 
the purpose of moral instruction or simply in order to evaluate the credibility of conflicting 
historical accounts (what Hegel calls "pragmatic" and "critical" history, respectively), for in each 
instance, the problem remains the same: their account of the past is burdened by the weight of 
present concerns, distorted by the particularity of their own historical situation.123  
 A number of skeptical and relativist conclusions can be drawn from the observation that 
every individual is the product of unique historical circumstances which one can no more escape 
"than one can jump out of one's own skin."124 Since all historical knowledge is mediated in this 
way, one may argue, no true knowledge of history is possible.125 Hegel, however, rejects this 
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conclusion. In order to understand the basis for this rejection, we turn now to the third mode of 
historiography, what Hegel calls "philosophical history." As we will see, this is the mode of 
historiography at work not only in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, but also in 
the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where his mature interpretation of Plato's Parmenides 
is found. 
 Philosophical history, like reflective history, has something universal for its subject 
matter, "but," Hegel explains, "this is no abstract universal; rather it is what is infinitely concrete 
and utterly present" (LPWH, 140). Both the reflective historian and the philosophical historian 
are interested in past events insofar as these comprise a totality. However, whereas the reflective 
historian is only concerned with the fact that these events belong to a given whole (for instance, 
the whole of human history), the philosophical historian aims to discover the principle by which 
all such events are organized. Their question is not simply what has occurred in the history of the 
world (res gestae), but what ultimately determines the actions and deeds which unfold over its 
course and the individuals through whom they are enacted. Their answer (the philosophical 
historian's and Hegel's) is that "reason governs the world" (LPWH, 79). Reason, Hegel explains,  
is itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life and the infinite form 
that activates this its content. [It is] the substance whereby and wherein all 
actuality has its being and subsistence. [It is] infinite power, for reason is not so 
impotent as to yield only an ideal or a moral ought, and only outside the bounds 
of actuality, or who knows where – perhaps merely as something particular that 
exists in the heads of a few individuals. [It is] the infinite content, all essentiality 
and truth, itself constituting the material on which it operates by its own activity. 
Unlike finite action, it does not require the limiting factors of external materials or 
a given medium from which to derive its sustenance and the objects of its activity. 
It feeds upon itself, it is itself the material that it labors on. Just as it is itself its 
own presupposition, its own end, the absolute final end, so it is itself the 
activation and the bringing forth, out of inwardness into appearance, into world 






To say that reason governs the world and directs the course of world history is, therefore, to say 
that the historical process is the activity of a subject that knows itself to be its own object – the 
work of an infinite, self-determining subject that realizes itself through the actions of individual 
self-conscious agents. This work, Hegel insists, is not arbitrary, but is guided by the principle of 
freedom: "the application of this principle to actuality, the penetration and transformation of the 
worldly conditions by the principle of freedom, is the long process that is history itself" (LPWH, 
88). Thus, world history, for Hegel, is a rational process oriented toward the actualization of 
human freedom, and it is the task of the philosophical historian to trace this development in time 
through the accomplishments (and failures) of the individual historical actors through whom this 
process is effected. 
 
 But why see history this way? We have already considered concerns, after all, about how 
the reflective historian's conception of their object is influenced by their own historical 
circumstances in a way that threatens the reliability of his account. For example, one may worry 
about how a modern historian's conception of science impacts the history of science they offer. 
Since it is clear that one can raise this objection to any work of reflective history, why should it 
not be the same with the philosophical historian's notion of history as governed by reason? Isn't 
this no more than a presupposition that stems from some historian's particular historical 
situation? 
 When it comes to philosophical history these concerns ultimately prove misplaced. This 
is because "its point of view," Hegel explains, "is not a particular universal, nor is it one of many 
general viewpoints that is singled out abstractly at the neglect of others; rather it is a concrete 
universal, the spiritual principle of peoples and the history of this principle" (LPWH, 141). In 




they have taken their own age for granted, nor because they have somehow managed to abstract 
themselves from the historical conditions in which they are embedded. Rather it is precisely the 
particularity of their own historical moment that affords them an adequate conception of their 
object, because theirs is the age in which reason, the universal, has come to an adequate 
comprehension of itself – the age in which it has become possible to consider history 
rationally.126 As Hegel puts it, 
…the main objection brought against philosophy is that it approaches history, and 
reflects on it, with thoughts or conceptions [Gedanken]. However, the sole 
conception that it [philosophical history] brings with it is the simple conception of 
reason – the conception that reason governs the world, and that therefore world 
history is a rational process. From the point of view of history as such, this 
conviction and insight is a presupposition. Within philosophy itself this is no 
presupposition: by means of speculative cognition it is proved that reason… is 
substance and infinite power (LPWH, 79). 
 
 When looking to justify the standpoint of philosophical history, then, we can look 
nowhere but to philosophy itself. It is not by some external standard that it is to be measured – 
for example, by its correspondence to some event lying, as it were, buried in the past – but by the 
cogency of the philosophical demonstration which it offers. To properly evaluate a work of 
philosophical history requires, then, that one come to grips with the claim that reason governs 
world history and that this rational process is teleologically determined by the idea of human 
freedom, absolute reality as it unfolds in time through the medium of human spirit. But this, in 
turn, requires the examination of certain claims that lie at the heart of Hegel's system – above all, 
those regarding the self-justification of reason and the autonomy of philosophical science. While 
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it cannot be my task here to expound upon Hegel's justification for these fundamental claims 
which he regards as the all-important achievement of that investigation conducted in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit,127 it is important to note that though philosophy is, for Hegel, "wholly 
identical with the spirit of its age" (LHP I 25-6, 67), he also regards it as reason's own self-
comprehension: the universal as it comes to know itself through the particular. This is what 
Hegel means when he writes, “The spirit of its age is its [philosophy’s] specific, worldly content, 
although at the same time philosophy as knowing is outside the age, which it sets over against 
itself” (LPH I 25-6, 67). Thus, when the philosophical historian engages history philosophically, 
they are neither insulated from the concerns of their own age nor entirely bound to and limited 
by them. 
 Now that we have come to understand why philosophical history is not burdened by the 
same problems as reflective history, let us now return to Hegel's Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. In reading these lectures, I suggest, one must consider what kind of history Hegel’s 
own history of philosophy is, that is, which of the three modes of historiography outlined by 
Hegel it reflects. After all, although Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy examine 
philosophical thought systems rather than res gestae, these thought systems must nevertheless be 
considered the deeds of concrete historical actors. By examining Hegel's own introductory 
remarks to these lectures, I will demonstrate that Hegel understands his own account of the 
history of philosophy to be a work – not of original history nor of reflective history – but of 
philosophical history in the sense described above. It is in the context of a philosophical history 
of philosophy, then, that Hegel engages with Plato’s Parmenides. Hence, we will see that the 
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mode of historiography operative in his mature interpretation of the Parmenides already 
anticipates concerns surrounding the historical status of this interpretation. For just as in the case 
of philosophical world history, the task is not to understand the significance of past events from 
the perspective of those who lived through them but to discover the principle by which all such 
events are organized, Hegel’s task in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy is not to lay bare 
the intentions of an historical author but to discover the principle that organizes all historical 
systems of thought. 
 Hegel opens his 1823-24 Lectures on the History of Philosophy with a reflection on the 
supposed need for impartiality in composing an historical narrative: 
It is admittedly justifiable to require that a history of any topic whatsoever recount 
the facts without partiality, without seeking to validate some particular interest 
and aim. Yet a commonplace requirement of this sort does not amount to much 
because the history of a topic is necessarily linked very closely to the view one 
forms of that topic. In light of that view, one decides for oneself what counts as 
important and pertinent. Then the way one relates what has taken place to that 
decision brings selectivity into the narration of events. It introduces a method of 
grasping them and perspectives that govern their arrangement (LHP I 25-6, 205-
06). 
 
In these remarks, Hegel introduces the same concern that we saw him address above in the 
context of reflective history. At first sight, it seems quite reasonable to demand of a work of 
history that it dispense with all presuppositions and consider its object impartially, for these 
presuppositions would seem to restrict what the work can discover to the particular concerns of 
its author and the historical conditions in which it is embedded.  
 While one may raise such concerns about any history whatsoever, these concerns would 
seem especially relevant to the kind of history that Hegel is undertaking in these lectures – 
namely, the history of philosophy. After all, there is no generally agreed-upon notion of what 




sciences: “that there are the most diverse views even about its concept, about what philosophy 
could and should be accomplishing” (LHP I 25-6, 206). Thus it would seem that the historian of 
philosophy can do nothing but project his own particular conception onto the past and evaluate 
each previous system on this basis. The result is that the history of philosophy appears to be open 
to the charge of dogmatism – that is, of harboring unwarranted presuppositions.  
 Hegel argues, however, that it is neither possible nor even desirable to make a 
presuppositionless beginning in constructing a history of philosophy. As we have seen, thinking, 
for Hegel, is always historical, always bound to the particular time of its emergence. It is 
therefore impossible for the historian of philosophy to understand earlier philosophical systems 
apart from the conception of philosophy at work in the historian's own particular age. More 
emphatically, without any presupposition, the historian of philosophy could have no conception 
at all of what they are examining. In this case, the philosophical tradition would appear to be 
nothing more than a meaningless sequence of events with nothing to render them intelligible. 
This is why Hegel argues that "wanting impartiality in the history of philosophy is no different 
from wanting that history to be devoid of thought and content, to be just one thing after another, 
a narration leading up to the present day without connecting its various parts" (LHP I 25-6, 247).  
 Such attempts at offering an impartial history of philosophy are strange indeed in that 
they require that we approach the tradition as if it were totally insignificant to the present, or as 
Hegel occasionally puts it, as if this tradition were not alive and active but dead and gone: 
“Dealing with what is lifeless,” Hegel warns, “is itself devoid of life. The heart must be dead if it 
is said to find its satisfaction in dealing with cadavers" (LHP I 25-6, 62). To relate to the 
philosophical tradition as a living tradition is not to understand it as something external to 




development of our own thinking: "its historical course does not present the coming-into-being 
of things foreign to us, but is our own becoming, the coming about of our scientific knowledge" 
(LHP I 25-6, 210). To understand this point better, how it is that the history of philosophy bears 
upon our present thinking, however, we need to look more closely at Hegel's discussion of the 
concept of philosophy which forms the basis for his historical interpretations. This discussion 
makes it clear that Hegel thinks that the history of philosophy can hold significance for the 
present age without being bound by it.   
 It is usually assumed that the history of philosophy must proceed impartially and is thus 
taken for granted that the goal of such history should be to provide an objective portrayal of 
previous philosophical developments. This is not, however, Hegel's approach. For Hegel, just as 
philosophical history is concerned with past events only to the extent that they are expressions of 
reason, a philosophical history of philosophy takes up past philosophical systems only insofar as 
they constitute determinate stages in the self-comprehension of the idea – what Hegel describes 
in the Science of Logic as the absolute unity of concept and object. Thus, “by stripping away 
from the basic concepts of the systems appearing in the history of philosophy whatever pertains 
to their external configuration, to their application to particular concerns, and the like, we are left 
with the different stages of determination of the idea itself in its logical concepts" (LHP I 25-6, 
176). In other words, while Hegel takes the idea to be one by virtue of the systematic relations of 
which it is comprised, he holds that the unity of the idea can nevertheless be observed in history 
through the relationships that obtain among distinct philosophical systems – namely, through the 
fact that each philosophical perspective can be shown to contain the various systems which have 
preceded it in time. The diversity of philosophies throughout history, then, is no argument 




"one idea is in the whole and in all its parts, just as in a living individual one life or one pulse 
courses through all the members" (LHP I 25-6, 175).  
 To be clear, Hegel's claim is not that each philosophical system in the past was 
consciously aware of its involvement in this unitary, dialectical development, just as historical 
actors are not aware of their role in the gradual unfolding of significant historical events. Rather, 
this development can only be discerned from the philosophical standpoint of the contemporary 
age. It is only at this point – the point at which reason arrives at an adequate conception of itself 
– that past philosophical systems can be comprehended as particular stages in the self-
determination of the whole. For the historian of philosophy in the present age, past philosophical 
systems are not therefore mere relics, artifacts of a distant and remote reality. As stages in the 
development of our own thinking, that is, the one thinking that pervades the entirety of human 
history and links together each successive age, they are of more than mere historical 
significance.128  
 This is why Hegel thinks that it is not problematic, but indeed, necessary, that the history 
of philosophy is oriented by a particular conception of its object – because it is only by virtue of 
this conception that it becomes possible "to understand [verstehen] the works of the philosophers 
who have labored within its framework" (LHP I 25-6, 206). Even though this conception comes 
onto the scene in one particular stage in the development of human history, this does not mean 
that it is merely a reflection of its time, for Hegel insists that the universal can only express itself 
in the particular – that the universal, absolute reality, is nothing other than its own 
particularization. As Hegel explains in the Science of Logic, "Since it [the absolute idea] contains 
                                                          
128 As de Laurentiis puts it: "One epoch's spirit is made up of that of all previous epochs and transforms the latter by 
assimilation into something new, namely itself. This is why to read history is for us not to read a story of extraneous 
events but our own story." Allegra de Laurentiis, "Metaphysical Foundations of the History of Philosophy: Hegel's 




all determinateness within it, and its essence consists in returning through its self-determination 
and particularization back to itself, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to 
recognize it in these" (SL, 735). By the same token, it is the business of the philosophical history 
of philosophy to recognize the absolute idea as it emerges in each particular epoch within this 
tradition.129   
At this point, one may still demur and claim that the history of philosophy must forgo any 
preconception of its object if it is to offer anything like an impartial representation of the past. 
There are two problems, however, with this objection. First, as we have already seen, such an 
objection would have to engage the philosophical demonstration that Hegel offers in support of 
this conception of philosophy. For this, Hegel refers us to the Logic.130 Secondly, this objection 
comes with its own presupposition about the aim of the history of philosophy – namely, that it 
must necessarily involve an unmediated grasp of past thinking. The objection, therefore, cannot 
stand without providing justification for why we ought to conceive of the history of philosophy 
this way – that is, along the lines of what Hegel calls reflective history. 
                                                          
129 Hegel first developed this understanding of the history of philosophy as the history of reason’s own self-
differentiation in his 1801 essay on The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy: 
“Speculation is the activity of the one universal Reason directed upon itself. Reason, therefore, does not view the 
philosophical systems of different epochs and different heads merely as different modes [of doing philosophy] and 
purely idiosyncratic views. Once it has liberated its own view from contingencies and limitations, Reason 
necessarily finds itself throughout all the particular forms – or else a mere manifold of the concepts and opinions of 
the intellect; and such a manifold is no philosophy. The true peculiarity of a philosophy lies in the interesting 
individuality which is the organic shape that Reason has built for itself out of the material of a particular age.” 
G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, ed. H.S. Harris and Walter 
Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 88. While it remains unclear how Hegel thinks that the 
liberation of reason’s “own view from contingencies and limitations” must proceed, it is evident that he regards it as 
the task of the history of philosophy to trace the self-comprehension of reason as it emerges in every epoch.          
 
130 "The task and business of philosophy itself," Hegel writes, "is to present the one mode of this emergence, the 
derivation of the configurations, the necessity of the determinations as it is thought and known. Because doing so 
involves the pure idea and not yet its further particular configuration as nature and spirit, this presentation is pre-




 The fact that Hegel insists that the history of philosophy must presuppose the concept of 
philosophy and that he thinks that any attempt to avoid this presupposition ensures the 
irrelevance, if not incoherence, of one's account, makes it clear that he thinks that the history of 
philosophy can only be successful as a philosophical history of philosophy. This is indeed the 
strategy that Hegel takes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. He does not attempt to 
abstract away from his own historical circumstances so as to attain an unmediated grasp of the 
thought of an earlier epoch, for he is not concerned with what is particular to that age except 
inasmuch as it represents a particularization of the universal, a determinate stage in the historical 
development of the idea.131 
 Understanding Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy as a philosophical history 
of philosophy allows us to see why his interpretation of the Parmenides may not be open to the 
same sort of objections we considered above in connection with reflective history. If it is true 
that Hegel's interpretation proceeds from an adequate conception of philosophy – a conception 
that comes to light only in Hegel's own time, then it is only natural that he should see in the 
Parmenides an anticipation of his own speculative metaphysics, for his account entails that these 
are but two stages in the development of one and the same thinking. This would be problematic 
if Hegel's conception of philosophy were merely a reflection of his own particular historical 
circumstances, but his claim, as we have seen, is that it is also universal – that it is this 
conception which ultimately determines the shape which thought takes in each and every epoch.  
                                                          
131 Hegel offers a strikingly similar description of the relationship of the historian of philosophy to the thought of 
previous epochs in The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. In this early essay, 
however, Hegel describes the philosophical comprehension of the past in terms of intuition: “The particular 
speculative Reason [of a later time] finds in it spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh, it intuits itself in it as one and the 
same and yet as another living being.” G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of 




 Even so, it may be argued, Hegel gives us no reason to believe that his interpretation of 
the Parmenides accords with Plato's actual intentions; even if Hegel has uncovered the true 
concept of philosophy, it is by no means clear that Plato had this concept in mind when he 
originally conceived his dialogue. This, however, is precisely Hegel's point. His concern is not 
with how Plato understood his own philosophical project – indeed, he himself admits that "in the 
most important matters we cannot sympathize with the Greeks [or share] their feelings" (LPWH, 
73). It makes no difference then whether Plato understood himself to be a skeptic. Hegel's sole 
interest in Plato is with how his philosophy marks an important stage in the historical 
development of the idea. By understanding Hegel's interpretation of the Parmenides in the 
context of a philosophical history of philosophy, we can see why it is no objection to point out 
the vast historical gulf that separates Hegel from Plato or to insist upon the close affinity between 
Hegel's interpretation of this dialogue and his own philosophical project. Such objections are 
only valid when brought against a work of history that attempts to transpose its reader to an 
earlier epoch and secure an unmediated relationship to the past. As we have seen, however, this 
is not the mode of historiography at work in Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy.  
 In this chapter, I have tried to show that Hegel's interpretation of the Parmenides must be 
read in light of his discussion of philosophical historiography, and that concerns surrounding the 
historical status of this interpretation reflect a limited understanding of the role of history in 
Hegel's philosophical project. I would now like to argue, by way of conclusion, that Hegel's 
approach to the historicist concerns raised above in connection with reflective history can be 
seen as an extension of his enduring engagement with skepticism. 
 To demand impartiality from a work of history is to require that the historian transcend 




object. But this, as we have seen in previous chapters, is the same demand that the skeptic 
imposes on knowledge in general. This is what is articulated, for example, in the Third Mode of 
Agrippa, when Sextus writes that: "the existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the 
subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we [skeptics] suspend judgment 
on what it is like in its nature" (OS, 41). The skeptic sees quite clearly that knowledge is always 
mediated, that objects only ever appear to us under particular conditions. Indeed, the Ten Modes 
of Aenesidemus are exclusively devoted to demonstrating this point in various ways. However, 
what the skeptic does not recognize in all of this is a fundamental assumption about knowledge 
operating implicitly in her own account. What the skeptic assumes is that to know an object is to 
know it independently of the conditions under which it appears to us, to know it without 
preconception or presupposition – that is, to know it immediately. In other words, what the 
skeptic assumes is that all mediated, particular knowledge must be considered unreliable. But, as 
we saw in the last chapter, in exposing the opposition between immediacy and mediation as a 
presupposition of the understanding and demonstrating there to be nothing truly immediate but 
the self-mediating totality of the absolute idea, Hegel effectively undermines the very basis for 
skeptical reasoning.  
 As I hope this chapter has made clear, the historian's concern about the mediating effect 
of their historical situation is similarly short-sighted, for it only arises when the historian strives 
for an unmediated grasp of past events. As Hegel shows, however, this reflects a one-sided 
conception of history, one that confines the historian to the particularity of their age and 
precludes a rational comprehension of the past. This is not the case, however, for the concept of 
history that forms the basis for philosophical history. Although the philosophical historian's 




their account dogmatic – an unjustified assertion of a particular historical vantage point. As we 
have seen, it is only because the philosophical historian belongs to the age in which reason has 
arrived at an adequate self-conception that they are able to see every age, including their own, as 
a moment in this development. Their particular historical situation is therefore no obstacle to 
their analysis but rather what supports its claim to universality. Here again, Hegel's strategy is 
not to deny the existence of such mediation or particularity, but to show that mediation and 
immediacy are but two sides of one and the same rational process. To insist upon the mutual 
exclusivity of immediacy and mediation is to insist upon an abstract conception of universality – 
a conception according to which the universal stands apart from its particular instantiations. It is 
this conception of universality that is ultimately at work when we suppose that the historian is 
separated from the past by an unbridgeable gulf, or when the skeptic denies the unity of concept 
and object. This is the fundamental insight that informs Hegel's approach to skepticism: thought, 
as truly universal, is nothing other than its own particularization. Both the skeptic and the 
historicist fail to appreciate this crucial point, however, in employing a finite mode of thinking 
which leads them to focus narrowly on the opposition of the universal and the particular and, 
consequently, to treat with suspicion all particular, mediated claims to knowledge. As Hegel 
explains in the Encyclopaedia Logic, such a procedure is hardly different than asking for fruit 
and rejecting “cherries, pears, and grapes simply because they are cherries, pears, and grapes, but 
not fruit” (ENC, §13R).   
As I have tried to show, this same idea informs Hegel’s own ventures into the history of 
philosophy. It is with this in mind, after all, that he locates the speculative dimension of Plato’s 
Parmenides. On Hegel’s interpretation, Parmenides rejects the young Socrates’ proposal and 




from the particular objects in which they are instantiated, Socrates fails to recognize the sense of 
the universal that is not opposed to but is found within its own particularization. It is for this 
reason that the set of contradictions presented at the conclusion of Plato’s Parmenides does not 
leave us merely in suspense of judgment, as the Pyrrhonist would prefer, but offers, on Hegel’s 
terms, a “self-sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism” (RSP, 323) and an 
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